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ABSTRACT
LEADERSHIP: THE MISSING VARIABLE IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Osei K. Bonsu
Old Dominion University, 2002
Director: Dr. Francis Adams

Contemporary economic theories, modernization and dependency, have
overlooked the fact that the development process depends on the interaction of social
factors. Specifically, the theories have ignored the role of leadership in analyzing
economic development. This dissertation seeks to incorporate the importance of
leadership into the analysis of development. It argues that sub-Saharan African countries
have not developed economically because leaders in the region have been less than
successful in establishing a culture conducive to industrialization. African leaders have
failed to establish the high moral and scientific cultures necessary to promote economic
progress. In place of those cultural attributes, the leaders have fostered corrupt and
authoritarian political cultures that undermine the general economic development of their
societies.
This dissertation offers a detailed paired comparison of the colonial and
postcoionial experience of Ghana and Botswana. The two countries constitute an
effective comparison because they were once colonies of Great Britain and have similar
resource endowments. Since independence, Botswana has achieved greater social and
economic progress because its leaders have established a high moral culture. Ghana, on
the other hand, has experienced stagnation, and in some respects actual decline, in its
standards of living due to its leaders’ inability to establish a high moral culture. Despite
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differences in standards of living, neither country has achieved diversified
industrialization due to a lack of a scientific culture.
The inability to establish high moral and scientific cultures is partially due to the
colonial experience and the political philosophy of Senghorianism. Direct colonial rule in
Ghana replaced the traditional leadership of the country that had shown a greater political
commitment to the general public. In contrast, the colonial protectorate in Botswana
recognized traditional leaders as autonomous authorities without undermining their
legitimacy. Botswana’s leadership continuity preserved the government’s moral
obligation to the general public.
The lack of socio-scientific culture in both countries is due, to a considerable
extent, to the influence of Senghorian philosophy on post-colonial leaders. Senghorianism
argues that analytical scientific thinking reflects the dichotomous European culture and
contrasts with the holistic African intuitive mode of knowing. The adherence to this
philosophy by sub-Saharan African leaders has inhibited the emergence of a scientific
culture that would promote industrialization and economic development.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

This dissertation is dedicated to the global
poor whose desire for material development
has been set back by their own leaders.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In 1992, Julius Ihonvbere, a Nigerian political econom ist, presented a grim picture
of Africa. In his words, “hunger, malnutrition, poverty, uncertainty, disillusionment,
ethnic, regional and religious conflicts, coups and counter-coups, the suffocation of civil
society and gross human rights abuses, massive rural migration, crime, prostitution and
violence, agricultural stagnation and urban decay, de-industrialization and delegitimation
of the state have become common features.” 1 Ihonvbere’s brief summary of the continent
is unfortunately true. In recent years, people in the region are being displaced by wars,
ethnic conflicts, and the greed of their leaders. Today, the so-called African leadership
has become the enemy within, repressing their people and plundering their continent.
Before independence African scholars had a different image of the continent.
They believed that the enemy was the colonizer from afar. W alter Rodney’s study of how
European imperialism underdeveloped Africa possibly best represents this perspective.2
Admittedly, Professor Rodney’s assessment had some m erit, and his contentions drew
upon considerable empirical evidence. The gap between the rich North and the poor

This dissertation is written along the stylistic requirements o f The Chicago
Manual o f Style, 14th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

1 Julius Ihonvbere, "The Third World, Africa and the New W orld O rder," Unpublished Paper
presented at the African and African-American Lecture Series. C entral Connecticut State University, New
Britain, CT. May 1992.
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South serves as a testament to this basic reality. Even today, half a century after
independence, major colonial debris profoundly limits Africa’s economic and political
development. It would, however, be an oversimplification to conclude that the colonial
legacy is the only obstacle to economic and political advance in the region.
The problem o f economic underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is more
complex than the contemporary development literature admits. The problem is not mainly
due to exogenous factors such as colonialism or the exclusion of the region from the
global financial system. Even though these factors play some role, the economic
improvement of Botswana and Mauritius in sub-Saharan Africa seriously undermines the
case o f African marginalization as its proponents claim.3 Part of sub-Saharan Africa’s
economic stagnation and retrogression has to do with the failure of leaders in the region
to establish a socio-scientific culture that promotes technological innovation and
stimulates economic development.
The importance of leadership and culture to the development process has been
well noted in social science studies. Lublin Doe, for instance, argues that the economic
development of a nation is a complex phenomenon, where success or failure depends on
the political will and determination o f its leadership.4 Similarly, in a pioneering work,
Mark Casson demonstrates the importance of leadership in building a national culture that

2 W alter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, DC: Howard University
Press, 1982).
3 Manfred Bienefeld, ‘T h e New W orld Order: Echoes o f a New Imperialism," The World
Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1994): 31-48.
* Lublin Doe, “Economic Development o f Francophone Africa: A Comparison with Republic of
Korea,” International Social Science Journal, Vol. 49, No. 1 (March 1997): 105-21.
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reduces transaction costs and enhances national economic performance.5 Other scholars
argue that the poor economic record o f a nation may be attributed to leadership
problems.6 This seems to be the case in sub-Saharan Africa’s economic development,
because o f failed leadership in the region.
In general, a review of the literature suggests that effective leadership is one of the
most critical prerequisites for national economic development. As such, D. R. Ilgen, D.
A. Major, J. R. Hollenbeck, and D. J. Sego stress that “we cannot overlook the role of
leaders and leadership” in economic development.7 Similarly, the importance of culture
has been well established and noted by various scholars as part of the foundation for
human activities. Institutional economists and other social science researchers have
emphasized the relevance of culture in economic development.8 Casson, for example,
argued that societies that are able to foster high morals and scientific beliefs have
enhanced economic performance, while societies without these cultural attributes lack the
prerequisites for economic development.9 It is the inability of postcolonial SSA leaders to
foster and legitimize high moral and scientific culture that has resulted in the region’s
economic stagnation.

5 Mark Casson, “Cultural Determinants o f Economic Performance," Journal o f Comparative
Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2 (June 1993): 418-42.
6 J. S. Oakland, Total Quality Management (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1989).
7 D. R. Ilgen, D. A. M ajor, J. R Hollenbeck, and D. J. Sego, ‘Team Research in the 1990s,” in M.
M. Chemers and R. Ayman, eds.. Leadership Theory and Research: Perspectives and Directions (San
Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1993), 248.
8 Ann Jennings and William Waller, “ Evolutionary Economics and Cultural Hermeneutics:
Veblen, Cultural Relativism, and Blind Drift," Journal o f Economics Issues, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December
1994): 997-1030.
9 Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”
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In sub-Saharan Africa, the leadership has failed to initiate a cultural change to
transform the region’s traditional production function into a dynamic technological
production function. In industrial scientific terms, all the countries in the region depend
on outside scientific cultures to meet their industrial goods needs. On the global scale,
SSA has 20,000 research scientists and engineers. This means that the region has a
meager 0.36% of the world’s research scientists and engineers, and produces only 0.3%
of the world’s total industrial output. The whole region spends approximately 0.4% of the
world’s total expenditure in research and development towards industrial scientific
culture.10 This reflects the paucity of funds that leaders and their governments allocate to
the scientific culture of creation in the region. This lack o f leadership initiative and
insight leaves SSA’s industrial scientific culture with negligible outcomes as far as
industrialization is concerned. For example, in Ghana, according to the latest indicators
available, low-end industrial production constitutes 5.9% o f total economic output.
Likewise in Botswana, the total economy depends on raw material production mostly in
diamond mining and cattle raising, with only 4.7% of the total output in low-end
industrial production.11
Instead of building a socio-scientific culture, the SSA leadership is marked by
high levels of corruption.12 Political elites embezzle from the national treasury for
personal use, thereby undermining the accumulation of financial capital resources

10 Aqueil Ahmad, “Science and Technology Policy for Economic Development in Africa," Journal
o f Asian and African Studies, Vol. 27, Nos. 1-2 (January-April 1992): 5-10.
11 World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998).
12 David Gould, Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third World: The Case o f
Zaire (New York: Pregamon. 1980).
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essential for economic development. The personal accumulation of public wealth and
funds by leaders cuts across the region. The late President Mobutu Sese Seko of the
Democratic Republic of Congo had, according to one estimate, well over $5 billion in a
foreign account, an amount about the size of Congo’s foreign debt at the time.13 The
records o f extravagance of King Bokassa of the Central African Republic, President Idi
Amin of Uganda, and President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria are all fresh in the
memories of their compatriots.14
Politically, the SSA leadership has always built organizations where networks of
trust are confined to families and cronies, and those of mistrust and suspicion are
relegated to outside groups. They have intensified the divide-and-rule concept, left over
from the colonial period, to serve their political interests. The horrible images of human
rights abuses emanating from the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and economic
impoverishment in the region, are partially attributed to the leadership’s inability to
establish a cultural mindset capable of economic and political progress.15 SSA has not
always been this way. In the late 1950s and 1960s, many countries in the region achieved
economic growth rates ranging between 5 and 7 percent.16 Lately, however, the region’s
economic and political deterioration are due to leadership ineptness.17 Prior to

13 The Economist, Vol. 327, No. 7807 (April 17, 1993): 82.
14 Tunde Adeleke, “Africa and Pan-Africanism: Betrayal o f a Historical Cause,” The Western
Journal o f Black Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Summer 1997): 106-16.
15 Lance Morrow, “Africa: The Scramble for Existence.” Time Magazine (September 7, 1992): 4244.
16 Angus M addison, Monitoring the W orld Economy, (Paris: OECD, 1995).
17 Samuel M. M uriithi, African Crisis, Is There Hope? (NY: University Press o f America, 1996).
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colonialism and its subsequent postcolonial eras, there existed precolonial Botswana and
Ghana in sub-Saharan Africa, headed by traditional leaders who organized and managed
their societies with less economic and human suffering.
Precolonial Botswana was composed of a variety of autonomous nations ruled by
traditional leaders. Politically, the nations were organized hierarchically with succession
based on inheritance under participatory democracy and on the kgotla (ward) systems.18
Economically, the leaders allocated lands and loaned cattle through the mafisa system
that allowed citizens to undertake economic activities. Through that patronage system,
both political and economic systems of the societies were stabilized, and the Tswana
community as a whole progressed with fewer socio-economic problems. In times of
security needs, leaders like Khama the Great rallied other traditional leaders and their
followers to form alliances to repel attackers.19 In 1885 the territories became a
protectorate under the British government, serving as a shield against the South African
Boer invasion. The colonial protectorate system allowed the Tswana leaders to organize
their societies without foreign interference in their domestic affairs. Throughout the
colonial protectorate era, traditional leaders remained effective in maintaining social
order, with their traditional laws guarded by socio-moral obligations between the ruled
and the rulers.20
For almost a century, the protectorate system allowed leaders like Tshekedi
Khama to preserve their national sovereignty and political institutions through a

18 Anthony Sillery, Botswana: A Short Political History (NY: Bames and Noble, 1974).
19 Thomas Tlou, ‘T h e Nature o f Batswana States: Towards a Theory o f Botswana Traditional
Government: The Batswana C ase” Botswana Notes and Records, Vol. 6 (1974): 57-75.
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traditional leadership legitimacy framework. Both leaders and their followers recognized
their fiduciary relationship with each other and refrained from any immoral behavior that
could have had negative consequences on societal welfare. In essence, high moral ethical
standards were maintained in the community to protect gradual social progression. In
1966, the colonial system came to an end and Botswana gained its independence. The
country changed its political system from a hierarchical inheritance system to a
representative political system without changing its leadership class.21 This elite
continuity during the transition from colonial to postcolonial preserved the leadership’s
moral obligation in achieving society’s welfare. The first postcolonial leadership, under
Seretse Khama, emphasized high moral cultural standards and created institutions based
on democratic principles to serve the collective interests of Botswana. Khama’s
successors have adhered to a high moral leadership culture that minimizes corruption,
thereby enabling them to use national financial resources to improve the living conditions
of their people. Despite these efforts, however, Botswana remains industrially
underdeveloped due to the lack of a scientific culture.22
The ability of Botswana’s postcolonial leaders to foster and maintain a high moral
leadership culture that reduces corruption is unique among SSA leaders. In contrast to
Botswana, the leaders of Ghana, which was also a British colony, have led their country
into economic impoverishment since its independence in 1957. Precolonial Ghana was

20 Sillery, Botswana: A Short Political History.
21 Jack Parson, ed.. Succession to High Office in Botswana (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press,
1990).
22 Marilyn Carr, “Intermediate Technology in Botswana: A Review o f Botswana Technology."
Occassional Paper, No. 10 (London: Intermediate Technology Development Group, 1984).
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similarly composed of different nations headed by traditional leaders and based on a
hierarchical system of inheritance. The leaders controlled the economic system through
allocation of land, and ensured that everyone had access to land to pursue their economic
activities. Traditionally, there were fiduciary and moral obligations between rulers and the
ruled, with traditional institutional arrangements preventing leaders from engaging in
corrupt activities and abusing their power.23
Precoloniai Ghanaian nations waged wars among themselves and, as a result,
were unable to amalgamate their societies into one homogenous grand society. Between
1850 and 1902 the British colonized the nations and divided the region into three
sections, instituting direct rule in all the areas.24 During the direct rule period, many of the
traditional leaders and their institutions fell under the subjugation o f British rule, while
other leaders were sent into exile. This process severely strained the moral obligations
established between leaders and followers, and resulted ultimately in a moral decline and
lawlessness in the Ghanaian society.25
After the period of traditional leadership demoralization and subjugation, a new
class of local leadership, made of people with western education, emerged. The new
leadership group gained its legitimacy from the British colonizers who had utilized the
group to gain its political and economic interests. At the end of colonial rule a century
later, a political system adopted from the British helped transfer the national political

23 George B. N. Ayittey, Africa in Chaos (NY: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1999).
24 F. M. Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence 1919-1957 (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1960).
25 Roger Gocking, “British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold C oast Colony,” The
Journal o f African History, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 1993): 93-113.
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power to the new educated leadership group. Lacking local legitimacy, the new group of
postcolonial leaders recognized their authority and power to rule as emanating from
Britain.26 As a result, they failed to see themselves as morally obligated to the welfare of
the local population. Based on that mindset, they have continuously engaged in low-moral
behaviors that serve their personal interests instead o f high-moral behaviors that advocate
collective social interests. Lacking a well-intentional leadership group, Ghana found itself
unable to promote socio-economic development. In other words, when Ghana gained
independence, the traditional leadership group, which held a moral obligation and
fiduciary relationship with the local people, was sidelined. Thus, unlike in Botswana, the
change to self-determination meant that the postcolonial era in Ghana began with
leadership discontinuity and a new political machinery.
The first postcolonial leadership under Kwame Nkrumah, instead of initiating
political socialization to include all the citizens in the political process, disenfranchised
traditional leaders from national governance. Despite his popularity as the best leader that
Ghana has ever had, Nkrumah did not institute high moral ethical standards among his
political officials and inadvertently allowed them to engage in corruption.27 The Ghanaian
situation, where low moral leadership culture facilitated corruption and institutional
decay, is symptomatic of many sub-Saharan African nations. In addition to a culture of
corruption, the regional leaders have been unable to establish a scientific culture.28 In

26 Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer. Ghana: End o f an Illusion (NY: Monthly Review Press,
1968).
27 David Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World (NY: St. M artin’s
Press, 1989).
28 Ahmad, “Science and Technology.”
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essence, the lack of both high moral and scientific cultures undermines the economic
development in sub-Saharan Africa. Even though countries in the region have repeatedly
expressed their interest in economic development, a social phenomenon that received
worldwide attention when the newly independent nations emerged after World W ar H,
they remain largely underdeveloped.
Immediately following their independence, which coincided with the beginning of
the cold war, both Botswana and Ghana embarked on a path of market-led economic
development. However, due to lack of a development paradigm in the world at that time
and to cold war politics, the countries became victims of the economic growth doctrine.29
Both countries, along with many others in Africa, adopted an economic approach
encapsulated in modernization theory and used it as a vehicle for achieving economic
development. Based on the theoretical underpinning of modernization, that more capital
investment leads to growth, the nations were encouraged to mobilize sufficient
investment to accelerate growth without concern for establishing the appropriate cultures
for development.30
A comparison between these two countries is instructive. Botswana has been able
to minimize corruption with high moral leadership culture, while Ghana is marked by
pervasive corruption because of the leadership’s low moral culture. These different
cultural paths have one common denominator, the lack of a scientific culture. The
postcolonial leadership of Seretse Khama in Botswana and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana
failed to establish a scientific culture that could induce industrialization in their respective

29 Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World (NY: Longman, 1985).
30 Peter W. Preston, Development Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell. 1997).
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countries. Their failure to foster and legitimize scientific culture is shrouded in both
leaders’ adherence to Senghorianism. This philosophy, which was advanced in defense of
Africans’ cultural denigration, postulates that the African mode of knowing is an intuitive
form of rationality and is therefore different from western analytic scientific thinking,
which Senghorian philosophy deemed un-African.31 The belief in this philosophy allows
African leaders to move their culture away from criticism. In essence, it acts as a cultural
inhibitor in leadership thinking and thus prevents them from accepting other human
cultural traits that could aid in their nation’s economic development and growth.32
Given the lack of scientific culture that prevents both countries from being
industrially developed, Botswana’s economy has improved, while G hana’s economy has
stagnated. The Leadership, Culture, and Development (LCD) model discussed in Chapter
3 explains the reasons for the improvement in Botswana’s economy. The model, drawing
on the theory o f association and the work o f Mark Casson, stipulates that the two
prerequisite cultural elements for economic development are high moral and scientific
cultures. Leaders who are able to foster, legitimize, and establish these cultures are more
likely to further economic development and prosperity than are those who are unable to
do so. This logic explains Botswana’s better economic status compared to that of Ghana,
with the former’s leadership success owing in part to its ability in establishing a
comparatively higher moral culture.

31 Leopold Sedar Senghor, Prose and Poetry (London: Heinemann. 1976).
33 Olusegun Oladipo, “Reason, Identity, and the African Quest: The Problem o f Self-Definition
and African Philosophy,” Africa Today, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1995): 26-38.
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The high moral culture has enabled Botswana’s leaders to curtail corruption,
while the postcolonial Ghanaian leaders have not been able to do likewise. The difference
in moral culture in the two countries is attributed to differences in the ways both countries
were managed during the colonial era. A protectorate colonial system existed in
Botswana and allowed the traditional leaders to maintain their political institutions with
their high moral values. In Ghana however, direct colonial rule eliminated traditional
leaders along with their political institutions, and undermined traditional moral values. In
view of these social metamorphoses post-independence Botswana has had leadership
continuity with high moral culture, while Ghana’s new leadership group has been unable
to establish high moral culture conducive to development. Implicitly therefore, Ghana’s
economic woes emanate partially from its postcolonial leaderships’ inability to establish
either of the prerequisite cultural elements essential for economic development.
After Nkrumah’s democratically elected government was ousted from office in
1966, the interlude leaderships that ruled Ghana until 1981 abandoned all
industrialization projects that Nkrumah had started. However, they did not abandon the
autocratic and corrupt cultures that had been initiated.33 Jerry Rawlings’ leadership,
which lasted for 20 years and ended in January 2001, intensified those cultures. Rawlings
further exacerbated those negative development cultures by committing severe human
rights abuses. His leadership further undermined G hana’s development through his
Economic Recovery Programs (ERP). Under Rawlings’ ERP, the country accumulated

33 Youry Petchenkine. Ghana: In Search o f Stability 1957-1992 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993).
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approximately $6 billion in debt under the auspices of structural adjustment programs
(SAP).34
In contrast to what happened in Ghana after Nkrumah, the leaderships in
Botswana have ruled differently. After the death of Khama in Botswana, his successors,
including the current president, Festus Mogae, have all followed a high moral leadership
culture of intolerance for corruption. They further increased institutional efficiency in
managing Botswana’s financial resources to enhance the country’s economy. Despite
Botswana’s economic improvement, however, both countries have lacked leaderships that
would have rallied their people to establish both high moral and scientific cultures. Only
the simultaneous creation of these two cultures can lead to the sustainable economic
development o f their countries. Without the leadership to foster and legitimize both
cultures synchronously, sustainable development has stalled and will continue to do so in
both countries, just as it will in the whole SSA region.

THE PURPOSE
The purpose of this dissertation is twofold. First, it brings into focus an
introspective analysis as to why development has stalled in most parts of sub-Saharan
Africa by investigating the relationship between leadership, culture, and economic
development in the region. In so doing, it extends the search for a strategic approach
towards economic development in general for developing countries, most specifically for
those in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, it analytically investigates and explains why
immoral cultural behavior by leaders has impeded economic development in Africa. It

34 World Bank. World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: W orld Bank. 1997).
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does that by using the colonial rule differential factor to elucidate how some traditional
African leaders with moral concern for society were replaced by those with less moral
obligation.

ASSUMPTIONS, HYPOTHESIS, AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
There are two central assumptions in this research. The first assumption is that a
low moral leadership culture impedes economic development in SSA. This assumption is
predicated on the fact that when SSA leaders and their officials engage in immoral acts of
corruption, they siphon national financial resources away from public accounts and into
their private foreign accounts. This behavior diverts resources that could otherwise have
been used for development. In the institutional organizational structure, low moral
leadership creates economic moral decay that translates into production inefficiencies and
increased transaction costs that undermine and slow development.
The second assumption is that SSA leaders’ inability to rally their citizens to
establish appropriate socio-scientific cultures has caused the region to remain industrially
underdeveloped and poor. This assumption is underpinned by the fact that development is
a transformational process requiring the accomplishment of certain social human
activities. In SSA, leaders have failed to foster and legitimize human behavioral activities
that involve rigorous analytical thinking that builds scientific culture. The lack o f that
culture has inhibited the people in the region from indulging in scientific creativity and
innovation. That, in tum, has prevented industrialization from occurring in SSA.
Consequently, the region’s economic production depends on raw materials with little or
no manufacturing. The inability to manufacture what they need to improve their lives
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makes the people materialistically poor and dependent on the outside world, which has its
own scientific cultures that do provide that world with the industrial goods it needs.
Based on these two assumptions and the identified research gap in the scholarly
literature on development, especially neglecting the importance of leadership and culture
in economic development, this study posits the consideration of one hypothesis and three
questions for empirical research. The main hypothesis asserts that African leaders have
failed to establish a socio-scientific culture that promotes technological innovations and
high moral culture capable of fostering sustainable economic development. To investigate
this, the study considers three questions. First, in what ways has the leadership of SSA
failed to establish the basic socio-scientific culture needed for economic development?
Second, granted that there is failure, what culture has the leadership created in place o f
socio-scientific culture to impede economic development? Finally, it asks what colonial
experience might have contributed to the ineffective leadership that undermines subSahara Africa’s development. The main causal relationship for these questions and their
answers will be tested through case studies in chapters four and five.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE W ORK
The neglect of leadership’s responsibility in creating culture conducive to
development in SSA makes this work important.35 The failure to fully incorporate culture
into past studies was probably due to the difficulty o f untangling the convoluted elements
of culture. In this project, the elements of culture are separated in order understand their
impact on economic development. Also, due to the difficulty in operationalizing culture,

35 Jennings and W aller, “Evolutionary Economics."
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traditional economic theorists focus their attention on rational analytic functions that
exclude human issues. Hence, economic development theory has dealt with leadership
issues and its functions, including that of cultural formation, from a distance.36 The result
of this state of affairs has been the exclusion of the role of leadership in economic
development in sub-Saharan Africa. This work will show that economic behavior and
culture are complementary, as far as development outcomes are concerned.
This work collectively synchronizes those important variables in investigating the
lack of development in Africa. The inclusion of leaders’ responsibility in the search to
achieve economic development in underdeveloped areas makes this study significant. The
importance of cultural inclusion in development is well articulated by several authors,
including Samuel Huntington, who acknowledge the need for systematic and empirical
study of the impact of culture on development.37 This research attempts to advance this
agenda. The inclusion of leadership’s responsibility in development strategies extends the
search for strategic approaches towards economic development in SSA. Last, by using the
colonial factor as an explanatory tool, this work assists us in understanding why many
contemporary African leaders indulge in immoral behavior that undermines the region’s
economic prosperity.

36 M ark Casson, The Economics o f Business Culture (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1991).
37 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Goals o f Development,” in Myron W einer and Samuel Huntington,
eds.. Understanding Political Development, 3-32 (Prospects Heights. 1L: Wave Press, 1994).
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METHODOLOGY
In order to test the hypothesis and make a contribution to the literature, this
research investigation uses a deductive case study approach. This methodology is chosen
for two reasons. First, it is a method that permits a systematic examination of theoretical
propositions and thereby assists in confirming or denying a theoretical claim.38 Second,
case studies allow for an in-depth empirical analysis, thereby enhancing the ability to
make accurate inferences about the variables being studied. In this study, these variables
include leadership, culture, and economic development. Most importantly, case studies
are valuable for their methodological advantage in minimizing difficulties that are often
hard to eliminate in cross-cultural studies.39 It further assists in discussing issues in
details, clarifying the relationship of the theoretical components to the hypothesis being
tested, and also demonstrating the real world applicability of this methodological
approach. Finally, for this particular study, the operational difficulty in analyzing both
leadership and culture makes the case study useful because it challenges the research gap
by examining those variables academic development scholars avoid altogether or give
only a cursory glance.
The two countries selected for analysis are Ghana and Botswana, both of which
are located in the sub-Sahara region. Many factors make these countries unique and
justify their choice for research. Both were once colonies of the United Kingdom during

38 Theodre Lowi, “American Business, Public Policy, and Political Theory." World Politics. Vol.
16, No. 4 (1964): 677-715.
3,Harry Eckstein. “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby,
eds.. Strategies o f Inquiry, Handbook o f Political Science, Vol. 7 (Reading. MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975):
79-138.
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the colonial period. Since the two countries achieved their independence, Botswana has
had a stable political system with virtually no political turmoil. Ghana, on the other hand,
has been politically unstable and experienced several military coups. Beginning at
independence, Botswana was comparatively poor vis-a-vis Ghana. It had a per capita
income of about $50, with little or no economic infrastructure. In fact, the British
government built the country’s capital o f Gaborone only in 1960 at the dawn of the
country’s independence. Prior to that, the country was administered from Mefiking, a city
located in South Africa.40 By contrast, Ghana had a per capita income of about $242 and
moderate infrastructure at the time of independence. Its state government had already
been established at Accra, the current capital city. Both countries, however, are equally
endowed with precious minerals (gold and diamonds) and their economies depend on the
production of raw materials.
Since gaining independence, the economic performance of these countries has
diverged considerably. In a dramatic turn of events, Botswana’s economic improvement
has surpassed that of Ghana. Its current per capita income hovers above $3000, and the
nation experienced a 7.7% annual growth rate between 1965 and 1997. By comparison,
Ghana’s per capita income is around $400 and it experienced an anemic 0.9% annual rate
of growth between 1965 and 1997.41 Given that they were both colonies of the same
country, and possess roughly similar mineral resources, the current gap in economic

40 Willie Henderson, “Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation,” African Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 354
(January 1990): 27-56.
41 P. Collier and J. W Gunning., “Why Has Africa G row n Slowly,” Journal o f Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Summer 1999): 3-22. The economic data are quoted from African
Development Bank, Basic Indicators on African Countries (Abidjan, Ivory Coast: African Development
Bank, 1999) and World Development Indicators (1999)
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prosperity in favor of Botswana makes their comparison an important area of research.
The information gathered from the case studies will be used for comparative analysis in
investigating how leadership has impacted the economic status of these two countries.
The information gained from the research will shed light as to whether the leadership role
has an impact on development.
In order to investigate the relationship between leadership, culture, and economic
development in relation to the research hypothesis and questions, the relationship
between leadership and culture is first be established. Thereafter, the relationship between
culture and economic development is also established. Then, utilizing the theory of
association,42 this study explains the relationships between the three key variables. In an
appropriate operating format towards answering the research questions, leadership is
employed as the independent variable. As a transitional mode, culture is employed as the
intervening variable, while economic development becomes the dependent variable.
Culture is divided into reserve and universal zones.43 The distinction allows the
identification o f the cultural elements that are essential and ought to be established in
order to spur development. This separation will be equally important to establish the
reason why a developmental culture has not been established in Africa. The
categorization will also assist in determining the strengths and the weaknesses o f the
cultural problems, and the kind of transformation that the nations of Africa need to
undergo to enable them to cope with development challenges.

42 Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”
43 Kwasi W iredu, Philosophy and An African Culture (London: Cambridge University Press,
1980); Oladipo, “Reason, Identity and the African Quest.”
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CHAPTER SUMMARIES
Following this introductory chapter, chapter 2 provides a literature review on
leadership, culture, and the two main theoretical schools of economic development—
modernization and dependency. The chapter summarizes the major economic
development debates from these two perspectives. Attention is also paid to governance.
To avoid any confusion, the chapter makes a distinction between governance and
leadership. It also makes a distinction between economic growth and economic
development. Based on the detailed literature review, I argue that the two major
development camps have neglected to consider the importance of leadership and culture
in their economic developmental analyses in general, and with respect to sub-Saharan
Africa in particular. The failure to include a domestic institutional analysis provides a
theoretical foundation from which I develop assumptions, hypothesis, and research
questions for empirical investigation.
Chapter 3 uses the theory o f association to build a theoretical framework that
links the variables of leadership, culture, and economic development. It uses the
leadership-culture-development (LCD) model to illustrate how the cultures that leaders
legitimize impact the outcome of national economies. The LCD emphasizes culture, and
explains how it can be divided into two broad aspects o f the reserve zone and the
universal zone. It further examines and isolates scientific and high moral cultures as
essential cultural elements for economic development. In addition, the chapter analyzes
the historical antecedents that led to the Senghorian philosophy that restrained
modernization by suppressing the actions of SSA leaders in establishing scientific culture.
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Chapter 4 offers a case study of Botswana. The chapter examines Botswana’s
leadership from the precolonial era through the colonial protectorate era, including its
contemporary leadership. This section also analyzes how the various leaders organized
their societies towards economic and political progression throughout these times. It
offers explanations as to how the colonial protectorate system was different from that of
direct colonial rule in other parts of Africa. In addition, the chapter explains how
leadership continuity was made possible during the protectorate era. The chapter gives an
account of how Seretse Khama instilled high moral culture into his political officials, to
minimize corruption once independence was achieved. This analysis demonstrates how
Seretse strategically built efficient democratic capitalist economic institutions such as the
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP), and the Botswana Meat
Commission (BMC) to advance his country’s economic progress. Finally, it touches on
how Khama’s belief in the Senghorian philosophy intervened to discourage him from
embarking on a path that would establish scientific culture.
Chapter 5 turns to the Ghanaian case. The chapter similarly examines leadership
and economic development from the precolonial era through the colonial era, including
that nation’s contemporary leadership. Emphasis is placed on demonstrating how the
direct colonial rule in Ghana disrupted the moral obligatory relationship between
traditional leaders and their followers. Of critical importance is the vacillation of colonial
policies and practices, and how two groups of leaderships were created in Ghana,
resulting in the ultimate moral decay of its institutions. The moral decline in the
contemporary leadership ranks has legitimized and spurred corruption and human rights
abuses in the country. The chapter further examines Ghana’s experience with military
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leaders and coup d ’etats beginning with Kwame Nkrumah’s ouster from power up
through the Rawlings’ coup, which put him in power for twenty years. In addition, it
examines how the interlude leaders helped legitimize a corrupt culture that has
undermined the Ghanaian economy. Finally, I look at Rawlings' economic policies under
the structural adjustment program (SAP) which exacerbated the nation’s economic
problems.
The comparative analysis of the two case studies is the focus of chapter 6. Here, I
examine how the colonial differences affected the leaderships o f Botswana and Ghana.
The section compares the economic cultures that leaders in both countries established, as
well as the impact of those cultures on the economic development outcomes of these
countries. It compares and analyzes the economic status of Botswana and Ghana by using
the LCD model to offer a theoretical explanation for the economic position of each
country. The chapter reviews the economic cultures that exist in both countries and
analyzes what brought about those conditions. Towards the end, the chapter uses the
Senghorian dimension to explain why both countries lack scientific cultures.
Chapter 7 concludes the research with a summary of the empirical investigation. It
calls attention to the inability of sub-Saharan African leaders to establish the essential
cultures needed for economic development. The chapter discusses implications that this
research on leaders in the region might have, and suggests what could be done to
minimize the underdevelopment in the region. Finally, the chapter suggests that future
studies on economic development strategies need to include analysis of leadership and
culture.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Since decolonization, the study of sub-Saharan Africa’s economic and political
development has been dominated by liberal views that envision the development of
market system democracies similar to those found in the Western countries.1 This
approach is encapsulated in the modernization paradigm.2 Modernization theory uses
modem economic theory and statistical analysis to portray the internal process of changes
that developing countries ought to go through if they are to become successful in attaining
sustainable economic growth.
However, the modernization euphoria was challenged from 1960 to the mid-1980s
by dependency theorists who demonstrated that political and economic developments can
proceed in many paths. Dependency views underdevelopment in Third World countries in
terms of international and domestic power politics, institutional and structural economic
rigidities, and the proliferation of dual economies and dual societies both within and
among the nations.3 Dependency theory, therefore, emphasizes that external and internal
institutional and political structures constrain economic development in poor countries,
including those in sub-Saharan Africa. In order to resolve the underdevelopment

1Peter J. Schraeder. African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation (NY: St. M artin’s,
2000); Richard Higgot, Political Development Theory: The Contemporary Debate (London: Croom Helm,
1983).
2 Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World ; Preston. Development Theory.
3 Raul Prebisch. The Economic Development o f Latin America and its Principal Problems (N Y :
United Nations, 1950).
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problems, dependency theory advocates the restructuring of the global system and fails to
mention the need for cultural re-orientation of underdeveloping nations by their leaders.4
The overall structure of the arguments in the literature can be viewed as a series of
related claims about the nature of social theorizing and the business o f theorizing
development. However, any specific theorizing with respect to the dynamics of complex
changes towards development in the Third World, according to Peter Preston, must be
understood as a discrete exercise in order to make sense out of the arguments.5 In other
words, the business of analyzing social developments, whether politics or economics, is a
complex descriptive task that requires one to disentangle crucial axes of development
events. The central purpose of this chapter is to review some of the cumulative
information regarding theories of leadership and development.
In order to assist in deciphering the social complexities related to the hypothetical
question posed in chapter one, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first reviews
the theories of modernization and dependency. In the second part, attention shifts to
reviewing the literature on leadership and cultural theories, including the role of
leadership in development. In part three, I analyze the historical antecedents of SSA
leadership as a prelude to my empirical research.

4 Paul Streeten. The Frontiers o f D evelopment Studies (London: Macmillan, 1972).
5 Preston, Development Theory.
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MODERNIZATION THEORY
Earlier twentieth-century economists believed in an economic orthodoxy that was
based on an equilibrium concept.6 Among those theorists were W. S. Jervons, Alfred
Marshall, Leon Walras, and Vilfredo Preto. They argued that if the market were left
alone, it would function to maximize the well-being of society at large.7 Unfortunately,
the human misery of the great depression in the 1930s called into question the
equilibrium thesis and gave prominence to a state intervention scheme constructed by
John Maynard Keynes.
Keynes demonstrated that economies could go into depression equilibrium where
various factors of production are left idle. This fact, Keynes argued, results in
unemployment, misuse of resources, and a possible domination of the economy by
monopoly firms. To rectify this problem, Keynes proposed an alternative view involving
deficit spending to stimulate economic growth.8 In this way, Keynes introduced the
intervention growth theory into development economics. As an approach within
development studies in the Third World, the growth theory was elaborated upon between
the 1940s and 1950s and was absorbed into modernization theory. It became the first
legitimate intervention development approach until the arrival of neoliberal development
policies such as structural adjustment program and governance in the 1980s.9

6 Ibid.
7 C. Napoleon, Economic Thought o f the Twentieth Century• (London: Martin Robertson, 1972).
8 K. Kurihana, ‘T h e Dynamic Impact o f History of Keynesian Theory,” in R. V. Eagly, ed..
Events: Ideology and Economic Theory, 178-199 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1968).
9 Julio Faundez , G ood Governance an d Law: Legal Reforms in Developing Countries (N Y : St.
Martin’s, 1997).
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The theoretical underpinning for modernization theory is that more investments
lead to more growth, which ultimately results in development.10 In this context, the
process of development is seen as a series of gradual and successive stages.11 In order for
poor countries to go through the process, they are told to mobilize sufficient investments
from both domestic and foreign sources to accelerate economic growth.12 In another form,
the modernization growth theory indicates that for an economy to develop, capital, in the
form of new investment, is necessary.13
The outspoken advocate for the doctrine of economic growth under the banner of
modernization was the economic historian W. W. Rostow. According to Rostow, all
countries go through “stages of growth” as leaders seek to transform their traditional
agriculture-based economies into industrial economies. The stages of growth doctrine
argue that industrialized nations have gone through the first three stages and passed to the
stage of “self-sustaining growth.” Thus Rostow believed that undeveloped countries
could do the same in propelling themselves into sustainable growth.14
In addressing development problems of African countries, modernization theory
emphasizes structural changes in production. This approach involves mechanisms by
which countries can transform their economic production from a traditional to a modem

10 E. Hosbaum, Ages o f Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991 (London: Michael
Joseph, 1994).
11 Paul Baran and E. Hobsbaum, ‘T h e Stages of Economic Growth,” Kyklos, Vol. 14 (1961): 23442.
12 W. W. Rostow, The Stages o f Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1960).
13 Preston, Development Theory.
14 Rostow, The Stages o f Economic Growth.
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system, one composed of industrialized, diverse manufacturing products and services. A
well-known structural change approach is based on a model of development formulated
by Nobel Laureate W. Arthur Lewis in the mid-1950s, known as the “two sector surplus
model (TSM ).” 13 The model was later modified and extended by John Fei and Gustav
Ranis and became accepted as the theory of development process in labor surplus in
Third World countries.16
TSM focuses on both the process of labor transfer and the growth o f output and
employment in the industrialized modem sector. According to Lewis and his colleagues,
the underdeveloped economies consist of two sectors. One of the sectors is the
overpopulated rural traditional agriculture sector characterized by zero marginal labor
productivity and thus classified as having surplus labor. The other sector is the modem
industrial sector with high productivity but without sufficient labor. The model
recommended that the excess labor in traditional agriculture should be transferred to the
urban modem industrial sector to increase output to stimulate growth and economic
expansion.17 Economic expansion, according to this theory, is determined by the rate of
industrial investment and the capital accumulation in the modem sector.18

15 Arthur W. Lewis, The Economic Growth (Homewood. IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1955).
16 John C. Fei and Gustav Ranis, Development o f the Labor Surplus Economy: Theory and Policy
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).
17 Schraeder, African Politics a nd Society: A Mosaic in Transformation; Todaro, Economic
Development; Lewis, The Economic Growth.
18 Preston, Development Theory; Todaro, Economic Development.
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The transfer of labor from the rural sector is made possible by high productivity in
the modem industrialized sector, which means high wages in that sector. The economic
rationalization of higher wages in modem industry is based on the usual assertion that
wages are determined by the marginal product of labor (MPL) which is equal to the wage
of production (WP). The Lewis model assumed wage rates in the urban industrial sector
would have to be at least 30% higher than the average rural income to induce workers to
migrate from their homes.19
To ensure an appropriate environment for growth, modernization theory offers a
proposal for political stability in the developing world. In the political domain,
modernization theorists place emphasis on classic theories of democratic pluralism.20
They believe that the key to political development is a rapid growing electorate both
willing and able to participate in domestic politics. According to the theory, political
participation plays a crucial role in economic development.21 The political approach that
became popular with modernization was structural functionalism. Structural
functionalism assumes that all political systems perform similar “functions” despite
structural differences. It is, therefore, assumed that a senator in the United States
Congress and a chief in Nigeria perform the same political function within their
respective political systems.22

19 Todaro. Economic Development, 68.
20 A. F. K. Organski, The Stages o f Political Development (NY: Knopf. 1965).
21 Schraeder. African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation..
22 Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, Politics in Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, I960).
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According to Peter Schraeder, structural functionalism represents modernization
advocates’ desire to promote a “value neutral [bias-free] scientific framework for
comparing any political system, regardless o f its culture or history.”23 By this assumption,
modernization theorists believe structural functionalism can enable ethnic divisions in
Africa to cease. In essence, this logic represents wishful thinking on the part of architects
of the structural-functionalist approach. Their framework suggests that all African
political systems will ultimately evolve into stable multiparty democracies similar to that
of the United States and other Western countries. In spite of its good intentions,
modernization theory overlooks the importance of local leadership in the creation of the
democratic culture.

Criticism of Modernization Theory: A Cultural Perspective
There are many shortfalls o f the Keynesian-based modernization theories.
However, we look at the deficiencies that are relevant to development in sub-Saharan
Africa. First, the theory is derived from advanced economies based on implicit
assumptions of efficient and adequate institutional structures that are characteristics of
industrialized countries. Cultural attributes which are absent in most developing
countries, particularly those in SSA. This underscores incompatibility of modernization
theory in the region, especially when there is leadership absence to establish the culture
that is conducive to the applicability of the theory.

23 Schraeder. African Politics and Society: A M osaic in Transformation, 25.
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Second, the TSM assumes that surplus labor exists in the rural agriculture sector,
while there is full employment in the urban industrialized sector. Most contemporary
research seems to indicate that the reverse is true in developing countries. That is. in
general there is substantial unemployment in urban areas as opposed to surplus labor in
the rural areas. This condition seems to be substantiated by the fact that “development
economists today seem to agree that the assumption o f urban surplus labor is empirically
more valid than the opposite Lewis assumption of a general rural surplus labor.”24
Lewis’ assumption of the automatic transfer o f readily available trained skilled
labor is also troubling because it indicates that the rural areas in the developing nations
have trained labor. Contrary to this assumption, it is the lack of a diversified
industrialized culture of skilled labor in those areas that constitutes problems for
development in SSA. As agrarian economies, labor in the region is not alternatively
trained and therefore lacks any industrialized culture that makes it readily available to be
utilized in the modem sector. Following this line of reasoning, unless the TSM is
associated with some sort of skill training—which is usually lacking in developing
countries—Lewis’ theory of labor transfer could be considered less relevant with respect
to economic development. Quite to the contrary, it can be argued that without the proper
leadership to establish the appropriate culture, the TSM model under the modernization
paradigm undermines growth. This conclusion is based on the fact that many rural
migrants, before their migration to the urban areas in search of jobs, were productive,
regardless of how meager the actual scale of production.

24 Todaro, Economic Development.
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Characterization by the TSM model that the MPL of labor in the rural sector is
equal to zero could be argued to be invalid because labor in the rural sector is not applied
to the production of one product, nor is all labor applied to one unit o f land. People in the
agricultural industry, just like other industries, have equally important though different
functions that make the division of labor also applicable to rural labor. Contrary to this
reality, the model attempts to group all labor under one task, allowing the theory to
validate its assertion of zero marginal productivity of labor.
Modernization assumes that the faster the rates of capital accumulation, the higher
the growth rate of the modem sector and faster the rate of new job creation in that sector.
Two flaws arise from these assumptions. First, there is no guarantee that profits will be
reinvested in those countries since the capital for the modem industrial sectors are often
mobilized from offshore.25 It has been argued by dependency theorists that foreign
investors in those sectors repatriate their profits to their home countries.26 Even when
capitalists decide to re-invest, as Todaro has argued, they may do so by investing in
sophisticated labor-saving equipment, rather than by hiring more labor as the Lewis TSM
model assumes.27
In the political arena, several trends call into question optimism about
modernization’s structural functionalism in developing countries in Africa. At the time
the strategy was intensively advocated, the political culture for such a system was (and
still is) non-existent in those areas. One example among the trends in the region at the

25 Ibid.
26 C. Furtado, Accumulation and Development (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1976).
27 Todaro. Economic Development.
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time, and even today, is political violence. There was a spread of guerrilla insurgencies
and civil wars along the terrain, notably in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan.
In fact, the trend later caused a shift in modernization literature from optimism in political
and economic developments in SSA, to a pessimistic expectation, which was
characterized by Huntington as political decay.28 In a later work, Huntington argued that
rather than contributing to democracy and stability in Africa, modernization’s political
recommendations rendered the developing countries in the region politically unstable.29
Drawing on Huntington’s analysis, it is fair to argue that modernization’s political
structural functionalism was incompatible with the political cultures that existed in some
developing nations and could have contributed to instability in some areas o f the region.30
One shortcoming of modernization theory in SSA has to do with investments. The
theory’s ambiguity on investments for development has made economic planners from
developing nations view pecuniary investment as a panacea for their development
problems. Because of this, they neglect other vital variables, such as leadership and
scientific cultures, which are essential for development. On the other hand, if the
proponents of the theory should argue that by investment, they mean all possible factors
that make development possible, then modernization theory has definitional problem for

28 Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Order in Changing Societies and Political Decay,” World
Politics. Vol. 17, No. 3 (1965): 386-430.
29 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968).
,0 Leonard Binder, Crises a n d Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1971).
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investment.’1This definitional vagueness makes the theory fall short o f its prescriptions
for development since investments in any of the above-mentioned areas (scientific
culture, leadership, etc.) contribute towards economic development in the less developed
countries. This ambiguity creates obstacles and puts constraints on the potential
effectiveness of modernization’s growth model.
If one takes into account the labor saving bias, reinvestment alternative, the
possibility of capital flight in the form of profit repatriation, the nonexistence of rural
surplus labor, the growing urban labor surplus, and the unavailable skilled labor to be
transferred to the modem sector, then modernization in the form of a TSM of
development needs modification to make it suitable for development in SSA. Ironically,
as a state intervention approach, modernization fails to mention the role of state
leadership in its economic development. Coupled with that, it fails to address the cultural
environments in which its recommended policies should be implemented. In short, the
theory is silent on cultural compatibility in which state economic policy would be applied.
Despite its many flaws, it is modernization’s state approach to development that has come
under attack from the neoliberal advocates in its own camp. They profess that the failure
of development in Africa and elsewhere is due to state intervention. In the subsequent
paragraphs, I consider the neoliberal concept of modernization.

'' Maurice Scott Frietzgerald argues that investment be sought in other things besides innovative
technological changes. W hile this assertion may be technically correct, it fails to direct developmental
planners which directions to take in their pursuit o f national development. Please see: Maurice Scott
Frietzgerald . A New View o f Economic Growth (NY: Oxford University Press. 1989).
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Neoliberalism and the New Development Paradigms
In the past, underdevelopment was largely seen as a consequence of a series o f
structural constraints, which called for a massive increase in domestic investments relying
mostly on the state. Under the new approaches by neoliberal economists, the diagnosis
and prescription have both changed. Structural constraints have come to be regarded as
distorted consequences of misguided state intervention that could only be overcome by
greater reliance on free markets.32 The free market paradigms have therefore become
dominant in developmental strategies in SSA and all other developing countries.33 The
crux of these new neoliberal developmental strategies is that if the developing countries
want to develop, then they should open their economies to the outside world. The
paradigm under the auspices of globalization espouses that the opening up of markets by
underdeveloped nations will bring them investments, technology, management skills, and
other resources necessary for their economies to grow and ultimately develop.j4
To benefit from this “open border” development mechanism, the sub-Saharan
African countries are told to embark on export promotion to sell their products, which
consist mainly of raw materials.35 In conjunction with export promotion, the countries
are advised to privatize their national companies and cut social services to their citizens

Montek S. Ahluwalia. “Structural Adjustment and Reform in Developing Countries," in United
Nations. International Monetary and Financial Issues fo r 1990s, Vol. 4, 129-141 (NY: United Nations,
1994).
'' Faundez, Good Governance and Law.
>4 Ahluwalia, “Structural Adjustment and Reform."
“ John Sender, “Africa’s Economic Performance: Limitations o f the Current Consensus,” Journal
o f Economic Perspectives, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer 1999): 89-114.
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to reduce government expenditures.36 These neoliberal approaches in sub-Saharan Africa
are being pushed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, under
their Structural Adjustment Program and “good governance” policies.37 Consolidation of
the strategies has been accelerated by the decline of communism in Eastern Europe and
the removal of socialist ideology. These events have helped to alter the socioeconomic
development of the underdeveloped nations around the world, including those in the SSA
region, in favor of the liberal tradition and at the expense of revolutionary nationalists in
Africa.38
The irony of the neoliberal free market approach in the form of structural
adjustment programs, however, lies in its historical antecedents. As previously stated, the
economic orthodoxy of the industrialized world was once based on the free market
equilibrium concept, a condition which was identical to what neoliberalism advocates
today for the developing countries and one which ultimately led to the great depression in
the 1930s. The question that arises to undermine the validity of the SAPs then becomes:
What makes the neoliberals believe that these similar conditions will result in
development in sub-Saharan Africa when the region does not have the productive culture
that the industrialized world had when it experienced its depression under similar
conditions? In other words, the neoliberal development policies that advocate a hands-off

36 World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda fo r Action,
(Washington. DC: W orld Bank, 1981).
37 Fantu Cheru. The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development and Democracy (London:
Zed. 1989).
38 Timothy Shaw, “Reformism. Revisionism, and Radicalism in African Political Economy During
1990s," The Journal o f Modern African Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (1991): 191-212.
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state approach without examining other human social factors, such as leadership and
culture, stands to contribute little in terms of development for African nations.
As the Ghanaian experience shows, the new neoliberal development paradigm,
with its disregard for leadership to establish the appropriate culture for sustainable
development, has many flaws. In Ghana, the adoption of SAP policies in 1983 resulted in
the dismissal o f 20,000 workers from the National Cocoa Board, thereby exacerbating the
living conditions of many G hanaians/9 Advocates o f the program pointed to Ghana’s
growth rate of 5% for three consecutive years and hailed Ghana as a development miracle
without mentioning the fact that the average citizen has been made worse off now than
prior to the introduction of SAPs.40 According to reports on Ghana, adjustment programs
have not improved, but rather have worsened the poor’s basic needs measured in terms of
income, consumption, and access to social services. The devaluation of the Ghanaian
currency associated with the program also has brought massive increases in living costs to
all residents in the country.41
One major dilemma for neoliberalism is that in terms of development, SAPs
can hardly be characterized as a developmental tool if development includes social justice
and democracy.42 The dilemma stems from the incompatibility o f SAPs and social

39 Ibid.
40 Africa Research Bulletin. No. 11347 (July 16- August 15, 1993).
41 Hutchful Eboe, “Smoke and Mirrors: The World B ank's Social Dimensions o f Adjustment
Program," Review o f African Political Economy. Vol. 62 (1994): 569-84.
42 Claude Ake, ‘T h e New World Order: A View from Africa,” in Hans-Henrik Holm and George
Sorensen, eds.. Whose World Order: Uneven Globalization a n d the End o f the Cold War, 19-42 (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1995); For social aspect for development, please see Gunnar M ydral, “What is
Development?” Journal o f Economic Issues. Vol. 8 (1974): 729-36.
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democracy. The program can only be successful in non-democratic environments where
social resentment to the program is repressed by dictatorial rules.4j Due to the nondemocratic nature of the program, its implementation undermines the democratic political
side of the development equation. For example, the Ghanaian growth rate cited by the
IMF as a success story can be attributed to the dictatorial rule of the Rawlings regime in
the country for the last twenty years.44
The idea that SAP is an economic growth tool makes it less of a development tool
because the two concepts (growth and development) are not the same, and as it will be
shown in chapter three, growth does not necessarily lead to developm ent45 For that
reason, the SAP cannot be labeled as a developmental tool for developing countries,
including those in SSA. As this study will also show, neither will governance culminate
in development. Governance relates to the administration of a status quo and is therefore
only a managerial tool with little or nothing to do with development, which is a
transformation process.46
Despite the flaws of modernization theory and its free market approaches,
classical modernization theorists and their neoliberal cohorts are optimistic that the
correct mixture of economic policies by developing nations will generate economic
development. However, the dependency school, by contrast, is much less optimistic with

43 Jeong Ho-Won, “Ghana: Lurching Towards Economic Rationality,” World Affairs, Vol. 159.
No. 2 (Fall 1996): 64-71.
44 Ibid.
45 The distinction between growth and development is revisited in chapter three o f this dissertation.
46 Christopher Hood, “A Public Management For All Seasons.” Public Administration, Vol. 69
(1991): 3-19.
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the structural change development approach. Not only do they disagree with the
structuralists, but also the dependency school argues that structuralists divert attention
from the real issues in the global economy that prevent the Third World countries from
developing.47

DEPENDENCY THEORY AND ITS REVOLUTION
Dependency theory emerged as a major alternative to liberal theories of
development in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Dependency specialists criticize both
liberal and critical theorists alike for being too “Westemcentric” in their analyses 48
Dependency wages most of its wars against capitalism just as Marxism does 49 Ironically,
it criticizes Marx as a European who was primarily concerned with the fate of Europeans,
but not Asians or Africans.30 Dependency theorists are more concerned with
understanding why the regions of the southern hemisphere are suffering from economic
stagnation, dictatorial leaders, unrest, and political instabilities despite the optimistic
projections of modernization theory.

47 Preston, Development Theory.
48 Andre G. Frank. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies o f
Chile and Brazil (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1967).
49 Avineri Shlomo, Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization: H is Dispatches and other
Writings on China, India, Mexico, Middle East, and North Africa (NY: Doubleday, 1968).
50 Stephen Katz, ‘T h e Problem o f Europecentrism and Evolutionism in M arx's Writings on
Colonialism,” Political Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4 (1990): 672-86.
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The core argument of dependency is that “international relations between
capitalist countries and the developing areas are inherently exploitative, and that the
international capitalist system is the primary source of this exploitation.”51 It is this
relationship that has impeded development in Africa, Latin America, and large parts of
Asia. In How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Walter Rodney argued that prior to the
spread of international capitalism in the sixteenth century, Africa was developing
politically and economically, in much the same way as other regions of the non-European
world.52 According to Rodney, the European invasion of Africa culminated in a form of
direct colonial rule, and led to the total incorporation of Africa into the global capital
system. This had profoundly negative consequences for the continent’s development. As
a result, he concludes that European domination led to the underdevelopment in Africa.
According to Rodney, African development was “blunted, halted, and turned back.”53 In
order to resolve the underdevelopment problem in developing countries, dependency
theorists advocated restructuring the global financial and production system.54 One strand
of dependency that places emphasis on global production and trading discrepancies
between the developed North and underdeveloped South is the circulationist view.
Drawing on the works of Arghiri Emmanuel, a group of scholars emerged in the
1970s under the banner of dependency. They became known as the circulationists. This
group offered more sophisticated analyses of the development and underdevelopment

51 Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation.
52 Rodney, H ow Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
53 Ibid., 224.
,4 Prebisch, The Economic Development o f Latin America.
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thesis by focusing on the international trade relationship that benefits industrialized
nations at the expense of developing nations.53 In a massive three-volume work,
Immanuel Wallerstein detailed the historical analysis of what he refers to as “the
capitalist world economy,” a worldwide capitalist system controlled by exploitative
industrial powers. The author believes this system is intentionally manipulated to improve
the economies of the metropolis while the economies of the satellites grow more
impoverished.56
By using a concept based on the indirect rule model, Wallerstein explains that
capitalism has orchestrated a pyramid scheme making it more difficult to accumulate
capital for the development of economies of poor countries. Drawing from the
metropolis-satellite model originally proposed by Andre Gunder Frank, Wallerstein
pointed to and added a third tier of nations, which he called the semi-periphery. These are
the nations he considers as neither very powerful nor very impoverished but as rising
regional economic and politically powerful nations with aspirations that someday they
will join the metropoles in controlling the global capitalist system.37
The theoretical argument of the circulationist is that the semi-periphery nations
have become buffer zones. They are being exploited by the metropoles, while the semi

55 Emmauel Arghiri, Unequal Exchange: A Study o f Imperialism o f Trade (London: New Left,
1976).; Higgot, Political Development Theory.
56 The titles of W allerstein’s three volumes are as follows according to the volume numbers.
Volume One: Capitalist Agriculture and the O rigins o f European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century
1979; Volume Two: Mercantilism and the Consolidation o f the European World-Economy 1600-1750.
1980; Volume Three: The Second Era o f Great Expansion o f the Capitalist World-Economy 1730-1840s.
1989. Academic Press in New York published all volumes.
57 Immanuel Wallerstein. “Dependence in an Interdependence World: The Limited Possibilities of
Transformation within the Capitalist World Econom y,” African Studies Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1974): 2430.
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periphery nations turn around and exploit the periphery countries in their regions.58 The
intermediate role played by the semi-periphery nations prolongs the polarization needed
to keep the capitalist regime in place by undermining the creation of a unified front
against the metropoles. This structure maintains the capitalist reign, keeping the
underdeveloped nations impoverished and undermining their political and economic
development. While circulationists concentrate on a comprehensive analysis for all the
regions in the South, the neo-Marxist strand of dependency emphasizes the development
of African workers vis-a-vis their relationship with the capitalist North.

Neo-Marxism
While the classic dependency and circulationist theorists focus on the exploitation
of the developing nations by the metropoles, the neo-Marxists, also under the umbrella of
dependency, emphasize the importance of African workers who are kept in the
underdeveloped status quo. The neo-Marxists dominated the critical traditions of African
politics in the late 1970s and 1980s. For them, what is important to socialist African
leaders are labor laws and working conditions for workers in their countries.59 Samir
Amin serves as the intellectual bridge between neo-Marxists, dependency theorists, and
circulationists. Using West Africa as an example, Amin argues that the unequalization of
the regions is made possible because the economies in the regions are structured around
production that serves the interest of the metropoles but not that of the developing

58 Karen Mingsi. "The Ivory Coast at the Semi-Periphery o f W orld Economy," International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32 (1988): 259-74.
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countries. This state of affairs, he further argues, has been made possible because leaders
in West Africa have reinforced this structural reality.60
Amin uses the economy o f Senegal as an example and points to the fact that the
country’s economy has been planned around the production of only groundnuts.
According to Amin, this agricultural specialization provides France with inexpensive oil,
which is a derivative of groundnuts grown by Senegalese, and hampers the economic
development of Senegalese workers by paying them little or nothing for their labor. While
dependency theory does well at describing the structural relationship between the North
and South, it does not offer concrete solutions to the underdevelopment of the South.
The only proposal put forward is for the South to divorce itself from the international
economic structure, a strategy that does not seem to be especially feasible.

Criticism of Dependency Theory
Dependency theory is effective in describing the global capitalist system. It claims
that the industrialized capitalist nations have undermined social and economic progress in
less developed countries. However, this theory, fails to offer a strategic approach for
development in the periphery countries, though there is some validity in the assertion that,
via trade, some surplus might have been extracted from the satellite areas. It is equally
valid to argue that the development of the metropoles was not contingent upon the surplus

59 For the overview o f the neo-Marxists’ literature and the critique o f both classical Marxism and
Dependency, see Marenin Otwin. "Resolving Epistemological Contradictions in Marxist," The Journal o f
M odem African Studies. Vol. 27. No. 4 (1989): 641-70.
60 Samir Amin. Neo-colonialism in West Africa (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1973).
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from the South.61 In that sense, dependency may be inaccurate in attributing all
responsibility for the lack of development in the underdeveloped countries to the
metropoles.
One of the core arguments o f dependency is that the lack of development in the
underdeveloped world stems from its association with the industrialized world.
Realistically, no matter how convincing this argument may sound, it remains invalid
because development is a process o f endogenous transformation. Therefore, the
peripheral countries could have pursued a self-reliant development path as the core
European countries did in sixteenth century. In fact, in arguing against this core-periphery
argument, Amin in, ‘Delinking Towards a Polycentric World’, suggest that the periphery
can pursue autocentric development by gradual withdrawal in various degrees from the
capitalist world economy.62 Amin further rejects the circulationists’ thesis by arguing
that the capitalist world economy is not the only mode of production within the
international system.63
In addition to Amin, Claude Ake also rejects the development of
underdevelopment thesis of dependency. Even though Ake agrees that capitalism is
exploitative, he disagrees with dependency theory’s contention that the expansion of
capitalism has permanent regressive effects on Africa. Instead, Ake views the spread of
capitalism to Africa as one “developmental” stage in the overall movement towards

61 Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
62 Samir Amin, Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World (London: Zed, 1990).
63 Samir Amin, “Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formation o f Peripheral
Capitalism,” New York M onthly Review (N ovem ber 1976): 293-386.
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socialism.64 Even within the dependency camp itself, there is no unanimity about the
negative impact of capitalism on the development of the peripheral areas. As the literature
indicates, there are dependency scholars who believe that the periphery can achieve
development within the capitalist world system.03
If Henrique F. Cardoso’s assessment that development for the south is possible
within the prevailing global structure is correct, then the lack of development in those
areas can be attributed to some of their endogenous factors. In this respect, an internal
analysis of domestic culture and leadership’s role is warranted. Yet, dependency fails to
examine either. Even though the theory describes the structural collaboration between
local and external leadership in exploiting local workers, it fails to explain that
collaboration. It fails to say anything about the culture that the “compradors” have
legitimized to undermine potential development in poor countries.66 In short, while both
dependency and modernization are state-oriented theories, they fail to incorporate in their
development analyses an explication of the leadership that controls the state apparatus.
On a more crucial note, the two theories are silent on culture, the socially accepted
systems of practices and behavior upon which economic operations rely.

64 Claude Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
1996).
65 Henrique F. Cardoso, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University o f
California Press, 1979).
66 Compradors are local elites in less developed countries who collaborate with the core countries
to undermine economic development at home through exploitation for their personal gain as opposed to
national interest.
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CULTURE
Even though the two dominant theories in development-modernization and
dependency—might overlook culture, the importance of culture in development has been
well established and noted as part of human activities by various scholars.67 For the
purpose of this study, culture is defined as an accepted system of social practice o f
behavior and prescriptions.68 This definition means that cultures are meaningful orders of
persons and things. In an economic sense, cultures are compatible with the view that
individuals optimize, and their behaviors sustain an economic equilibrium. This
equilibrium reflects the values and beliefs of the leaders who establish the culture o f the
group. The accepted systems of cultural behavior are an unfolding process. Their
evolution can be viewed as an evolving hermeneutic system. The evolving nature allows
culture to be dynamic. It also means open-endedness rather than closure, allowing
cultural flexibility and the potential for human intent, discretion, and problem solving
with critical reasoning.69 Culture’s dynamic characteristics make it not a rigid “set,” but
an open-ended complex set of rules, an organized and organizational hermeneutic
network in which no trait of rule stands alone or drives any cultural force apart from its
context. In the broad sense, culture is everywhere and it is everything. In its generalistic

67 Amartya Sen, “A Matter o f Choice: Is Culture Merely an Adjunct to Development?” UNESCO
Courier (September 1996): 10-13.
68 Diane Hughes, Edward Seidman, and Nathaniel Williams, “Cultural Phenomena and the
Research Enterprises: Toward a Culturally Anchored Methodology,” American Journal o f Community
Psychology. Vol. 21, No. 6 (December 1993): 687-703.
67 Jennings and Waller, “Evolutionary Economics"; Casson, "Cultural Determinants.”
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term, culture is an interpretive integration of material objects, behaviors, and their
meanings.

70

Anthropologists have made the study o f culture paramount in their field.
Institutional economists and other social science researchers emphasize the importance of
culture in economic development.71 For example, Casson argues that cultural activities
and behaviors have significant impact on economic development. He also notes that
societies with high morals and scientific beliefs as cultural attributes have high economic
performance, while societies with low characteristics of these cultural attributes lack the
prerequisites for economic development.72
Similarly, other scholars have suggested that the difference in economic
development may be attributed to culture. Findings by Adelman and Morris indicate that
religious and linguistic diversity impact economic development.73 In the area of political
development, Haug finds that cultural diversity negatively impacted political stability.74
In a more recent study, Reynolds compares 37 less developing nations and concludes that
the culture of each of those nations affects their economic growth rates.75 In another
comparative study by Mardsen, the author establishes that not only is there a big gap

70 Wiredu, Philosophy and An African Culture; Jennings and Waller, “Evolutionary Economics.”
Casson. "Cultural Determinants.”
71 Jennings and Waller, “Evolutionary Economics.”
■Casson . The Economics o f Business; Casson, “Cultural Determinants."
77 Irma Adelman and Cynthia T aft M om s, Society, Politics, and Economics Development
(Baltimore. MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1967).
4 Marie R. Haug. “Social and Cultural Pluralism as a Concept in Social System Analysis.”
American Journal o f Sociology, Vol. 73 (November 1967): 294-304.
7< Lloyd G. Reynolds, Economic Growth in The Third World 1850-1980 (New Haven: Yale
University Press. 1985).
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between African countries and their counterparts in Asia, but that the difference in
economic development between the two regions is due to their cultural differences.76
From this he concludes that culture is an important factor in development.
There is widespread agreement in the literature that culture is one of the most
important variables in economic development.77 To the extent that Brad Lian and John R.
Oneal emphasize that, “ignoring cultural influences on economic development seems
particularly unwise,” they see the current neglect of the cultural variable in development
analysis as misguided.78 Vernon Ruttan shares this position. He summarizes the situation
in the following way:
Cultural consideration have been cast into the “underworld” of develop
mental thought and practices. It would be hard to find a leading scholar
in the field of developmental economics who would commit herself or
himself in print to the proposition that in terms of explaining different
patterns of political and economic development... a central variable is
culture.79
Though the authors emphasize the importance of culture in economic growth, they fail to
identify which cultural elements are important and essential for economic development.
Neither do they mention leadership’s responsibility for establishing the right culture for
promoting economic development.

76 Keith Mardsen, “Why Asia Boomed and Africa Busted,” Asian Wall Street Journal (June 11,
1985): 8.
77 Mardsen, “Why Asia Boomed” ; Adelman and Morris, Society, Politics, and Economics
Development; Reynolds, Economic Growth in The Third World; Haug , “Social and Cultural Pluralism”;
Casson, "Cultural Determinants.”
78 Brad Lian and John R. Oneal, “Cultural Diversity and Economic Development: A CrossNational Study o f 98 Countries, 1960-1985,” Economic Development a nd Cultural Change. Vol. 46, No.l
(October 1997): 61.
79Vernon W. Ruttan “What Happened to Political Development?,” Economic Development and
Cultural Change, Vol. 39 (January 1991): 275.
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Criticism of Culture
As the literature shows, many scholars have argued that culture is crucial to
development. The problem, however, is that the literature fails to identify and distinguish
which cultural attributes are essential for development. For example, in a cultural study
by Adelman and Morris, the authors use ethnicity and language as variables to determine
economic development.

80

The authors overlook the cultural attributes they employ in

their studies. The ones that they identify have no value bearing on the transformation
process and are, therefore, negligible to development, though they are only strictly
utilized for self-actualization.81
Aside from failing to make the distinction between cultural attributes based on
their usage, the literature on culture fails to make leaders responsible for cultural
engineering. This neglect allows leaders to escape accountability for a dysfunctional
culture as far as economic development is concerned. The one exception in this regard is
Casson, who shows that leadership is responsible for cultural establishment through
o-,

legitimation of behavior. “ Leadership’s responsibility in establishing an appropriate
culture for social progression in politics and economics illustrates the importance of
leadership in development.

80 Adelman and Morris, Society. Politics, and Economics Development.
81 Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective (Bloomington. IN:
Indiana University Press, 1996); Wiredu, Philosophy and An African Culture.
82 Casson, ‘Cultural Determinants."
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THE POSITION OF LEADERSHIP
Although the phenomenon of leadership has been around since antiquity, the
systematic study of leadership did not start until the beginning of the early 1930s.83 Since
then, a considerable amount of work has been done in the fields o f psychology, sociology,
and business, which contribute to the accumulated information in the literature on
leadership. However, the literature is deficient with respect to studies of political
leadership.84 The findings related to team leadership, however, provide information
useful for understanding the importance of political leadership on group performance in
QC

general, including that of economic development.

In this section, I review the literature

on leadership theories and make a distinction between leadership and governance. The
remainder of this section is devoted to the review o f African leadership from a historical
perspective.
Leadership theorists point to a wide range o f definitions on the concept of
leadership with little consensual agreement among them as to which definition is
appropriate.86 Despite the definitional confusion, there is a fair degree of consensus
concerning the nature of leadership in the literature that focuses on the study of
phenomenon. Bums, one of the pioneer scholars o f leadership theory, defines the concept
as “the reciprocal process of mobilizing, by persons with motive and values, various

83 Robert J. House and Ram N. Aditya, T he Social Scientific Study o f Leadership: Quo Vadis? ”
Journal o f Management, Vol. 23, No. 3 (May/June 1997): 409-73.
84 Ibid.
85 M. J. Steven and M. A. Campion. "Staffing Teams: Development and Validation of the
Teamwork-KSA Test,” Unpublished Paper presented at the Ninth Annual Conference o f the Society for
Industrial and Organizational Psychology. Nashville. TN. April 1994.
86 A. I. Bryman, Leadership and Organizations (London: Routledge and Regan Paul, 1986).
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economic, political, and other resources, in a context of competition and conflict, in order
to realize goals independently or mutually held by both leaders and followers.”87
From the same perspective, Bryman suggests “the common elements in these
definitions imply that leadership involves a social influence process in which a person
steers members of a group towards a goal.”88 Therefore, the common consensus among
scholars of leadership issues is to define the concept of leadership as an influencing
process that integrates the purpose of leaders and followers into a symbiotic and mutually
interdependent relationship.

SO

Kenneth Boulding distinguishes this relationship from

threat and exchange and identifies it instead as a source of power.90 Although leaders and
followers are bound together by a common quest. Bums clarifies the definition of
leadership by drawing a distinction between leaders and followers. According to him, a
leader “takes the initiative in making the leader-led connection.”91 A leader becomes the
active focus of the group, and therefore “exercises a determining influence on the
behavior of the group members and on the activities of the group.”92

87 J. M. Bums, Leadership (N Y: Harper and Row, 1978).
88 Bryman, Leadership a n d Organizations.
89 G. Gemmil and J. O akely, “Leadership: An Alienating Social Myth?" Human Relations, Vol. 45
(1992): 113-29; Bums, Leadership.
90 K. E. Boulding, The Im age (Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 1956).
91 Bums, Leadership, 20.
92 B. M. Bass. Handbook o f Leadership (London: Macmillan. 1990), 27.
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Bums draws attention to a differentiation in leaderships by categorizing them into
transactional/supervisory and transformational/strategic leaderships.94*This taxonomy has
taken on considerable importance in the literature on leadership because it assists in
drawing a clear distinction among leaders. Transactional leaders operate within the
framework of the self-interest of the followers, engaging them in a quest with the promise
of a reward. On the other hand, transformational leaders usually look for potential
motives in followers, seeking to satisfy their high needs, and engage them to achieve their
mutual quest. As a result, transforming leadership is based on a relationship o f mutual
stimulation and elevation that make leaders effective moral agents.94
For Bums, leadership is further categorized by making a distinction between
supervisory and strategic leadership. Strategic leadership usually gives purpose, meaning,
and guidance to organizations. This they do by providing a vision with inspirational
appeal to the members of organizational and external constituencies on which they are
dependent. In terms of large organizational groups like a nation, strategic leadership
functions include: making strategic decisions that concern the welfare and security o f the
inhabitants, allocating and distributing resources, providing direction for the nation’s
prosperity, and most importantly, establishing a systematic culture that possesses the
capabilities to improve and maintain the entire group’s interests.95 Supervisory
leadership, on the other hand, is a behavior that provides guidance, support, and
corrective feedback for day-to-day activities of the group members. In other words,

'*' Joe L. W allis, “Integrating the Ideas of Dissenting Economist into Theory o f Transformational
Leadership.” Review o f Social Economy, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Spring 1993): 14-39
1,4 Bums, Leadership.
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supervisory leadership is a task involving person-oriented leadership behavior void of
making any significant changes.96 In conjunction with Bums, Bass argues that
transformational leaders have both charismatic and inspirational traits.97
Charismatic leaders are considered to be exceptional individuals who inspire the
creation of organizational cultures that subsequently become tradition.98 Modem studies
of charismatic leadership find that the charismatic phenomenon is widely distributed
throughout every social community.99 All writers on leadership, however, do not share
this view of charismatic leadership.100 Leadership literature focuses on the search for
individual characteristics that differentiate leaders from non-leaders. In doing so, it
identifies several studies in which traits are associated with leaders’ effectiveness.101 In
the coming paragraphs, I review some of those traits and what they reveal about
leadership.

95 House and Aditya, ‘T h e Social Scientific Study of Leadership.”
96 Ibid., House and Aditya provide elements o f strategic leadership for organizations but caution
that those elements can be modified to suit the needs o f individuals.
97 B- M. Bass, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations (N Y : Free Press, 1985).
98 House and Aditya, ‘T h e Social Scientific Study o f Leadership."
991. A. Conger and R. A. Kanungo, ‘Tow ards a Behavioral Theory o f Charismatic Leadership in
Organizational Settings," Academy o f Management Review, Vol. 12 (1987): 637-47.
100 C. Lindholm. Charisma (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. 1990).
101 R. M. Stogdill. ‘‘Personal Factors Associated With Leadership : A Survey o f the Literature,”
Journal o f Psychology, Vol. 25 (1948): 35-71; C. A. Gibb, ‘T h e Principles and Traits o f Leadership, ”
Journal o f Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 42 (1947): 267-84.
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The Leadership Trait Paradigm
There are a number of specific traits that are associated with effective leadership.
Studies that investigate personal characteristics include psychological traits and motives
such as authoritarianism, intelligence, need for power, needs for achievement, and
appearance to measure the effectiveness of leaders.102
In line with trait theory, McClelland’s Achievement Motivation Theory has had a
great deal of relevance to the practice of leadership.103 The core of McClelland’s theory is
that individuals who engage in goal-setting and self-regulating behavior are high
performers who become effective leaders.104 It has been empirically demonstrated that
groups that are managed by such leaders perform better than groups that are managed by
non-achievement motivated leaders.105
Similarly, McClelland’s 1975 work argued that the combination of nonconscious
motives such as high power motivation and high concern for moral exercise of power are
predictive of leaders’ effectiveness. This combination of motives is referred to by
McClelland as the Leader Motive Profile (LMP). Power motivation theoretical logic
centers on the assumption that nonconscious concern for acquiring status and having an
impact on others derives from a desire to have power. Thus, it induces leaders to engage

102 Stogdill, Personal Factors Associated With Leadership.
103 D. C. McClelland. J W. Atkinson, R. A. C lark and E. L. Lowell, The Achievement Motive (
NY: Irvington, 1976).
104 A. Bandura. Social Foundation o f Thought a n d Action: A Social Cognitive Theory
(Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice Hall. 1986).
105 G. H. Litvin, and R. A. Stringer Jr., M otivation a nd Organizational Climate (Boston: Harvard
Business School Press, 1968).
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in social influence, a behavior that is required for effective leadership. The central
argument o f this leadership theory is that highly motivated individuals obtain more
satisfaction from the exercise of influence, and this satisfaction sustains their interest in
the exercise of leadership. Therefore, if enacted in a socially constructive manner, high
power motivation results in effective leadership performance.106 The problem is unless
disciplined to use the power in a constructive manner, power motivated leaders exercise
power in an impetuously aggressive manner for self-aggrandizing purposes that are a
detriment of their communities.107
The theory further hypothesizes that leaders with high concern for the moral
exercise of power act in an altruistic and collective-oriented manner. Such leaders are
ethically concerned about the consequences of their actions on others.108 The point of
LMP theory, therefore, is that the combination of higher power motivation and high
disposition towards the moral exercise of power results in leadership that induces
followers’ trust and respect for the leader, and commitments to the leader’s vision.
Parallel to the power motive within the LMP is affliative motivation. It is a
nonconscious concern for establishing, maintaining, and restoring close personal
relationships with others. Leaders with affiliative motivation are non-assertive and are
reluctant to monitor subordinates even when required to do so. Leaders with this trait
manage on the basis of personal relationships and show favoritism towards some people.

106 D. C. McClelland. Power: The Inner Experience (NY: Irvington, 1975).
107 House and Aditya. "The Social Scientific Study of Leadership.”
108 D. G. Winter and N. B. Barenbaum, “Responsibility and Pow er Motive in W omen and Men." in
A.J. Stewart and M. B. Lykes. eds.. Gender and Personality. 247-267 (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 1985).
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In comparing the two traits, leaders with a need for power do not engage in dysfunctional
behavior that is associated with leaders with affiliative motivation such as favoritism,
submissiveness, and reluctance to monitor and discipline subordinates.109 Contrary to
affliative motivation, when the self-aggrandizing tendency associated with the power
motivated leader is inhibited by a high concern for morally responsible exercise of power,
leaders with the power motive trait engage in an effective exercise o f power.110
The above theoretical analyses indicate that achievement motive is predictive of
leadership’s effectiveness.111 Robert J. House, for example, found in 1991 that motive
components of the LMP predicted U.S. presidential charisma and presidential
performance effectiveness.112 In another study, House also contended that leaders with
high confidence, strong motivation, and strong convictions in moral correctness of their
beliefs are strongly motivated to attain and assert influence in society. This group of
leaders he referred to as charismatic leaders. These are the leaders who advocate change
and are usually determined to accomplish their objectives. Due to their confidence,
convictions, and willingness to transform society to meet their higher needs, they often

109 D. C. McClelland, Human Motivation (Glenview, IL: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1985).
110 These theoretical expectations have been confirmed; see R. J. House, S. Shane, and D. Harold,
“Rumors o f the Death of Dispositional Theory and Research in Organizational Behavior are Greatly
Exaggerated,” Academy o f Management Review, Vol. 21. No. 1 (1996): 203-24.
111 D. C. McClelland and D. H. Burnham. “Power is the G reat Motivator,” Harvard Business
Review, Vol. 73, No. 1 (January-February 1995): 126-39.
112 R. J. House, ‘T h e Distribution and Exercise of Pow er in Complex Organization: A MESOTheory,” Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1991): 323-52.
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challenge the status q u o ."3 They are more persistent in the face of obstacles and
therefore become effective leaders.
The works by Simonton, Spangler, and House have shown that assertiveness and
self-confidence associated with charismatic leaders is usually correlated with their risktaking and pro-social dominance. In different operationalizations of the same data, both
studies found that U.S. presidents’ risk-taking behavior is related to presidential greatness
and effectiveness.114 Charismatic leaders are effective because of their ability to mobilize
people to follow the leader’s vision. Usually, such leaders advocate the vision o f a better
future for the collective social system and, in all cases, avoid self-aggrandizement. From
these accounts in the literature, the success and the effectiveness of leaders are associated
with their sense of social responsibility and collective interests rather than self-interest.115
From the above theoretical discussion, it can be asserted that traits such as
intelligence, morals, motive for power, and affiliation motive help to differentiate leaders.
Also, in the domain of trait theory, pro-social influence motivation and achievement
motivation help to explain how leadership effectiveness is enhanced in certain situations.
For example, achievement motivation illustrates effectiveness and success when tasks are
challenging. Despite its usefulness, questions regarding the accuracy of predictions of

113 R. J. House, “A Theory o f Charismatic Leadership." in J. G. Hunt and L. Larson, eds..
Leadership: The Cutting Edge. 189-207 (Carbondale, IL: South Illinois University Press, 1977).
114 D. K. Simonton, Greatness: Who makes History and Why (N Y : Guilford, 1994); W . D.
Spangler and R. J. House, “Presidential Effectiveness and the Leadership Motive Profile,” Administrative
Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3 (September 1991): 364-96.
115 House and Aditya, ‘T h e Social Scientific Study of Leadership.”
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trait theory on the effectiveness of leadership sparked the formulation of other theories,
such as Leadership Member Exchange theory.116

Leadership Member Exchange Theory
As opposed to traits or behavior of either the leader or the follower, leadership
member exchange (LMX) examines relationships. It explains that a high degree of mutual
influence and obligation between leaders and followers will result in several important
positive outcomes such as high performance in a group, citizenship behavior, satisfaction,
and commitment of the group. The core of the theory is that effective leadership consists,
in part, of the good relationship between leaders and followers.117 A good relationship in
this sense is characterized by trust, respect, and mutual obligation. These traits, in tum ,
generate mutual loyalty and influence between superiors and subordinates, and result in
high performance of the group. In a recent study, Deluga finds evidence of an association
between the quality of LMX and self-reported citizenship behaviors. These include
desirable courtesy, conscientiousness, altruism, and sportsmanship—elements that are
t i o

necessary for economic and other social developments.

Despite the usefulness o f the

above theories, the leadership studies have a number o f weaknesses.

116 These theoretical expectations have been confirmed., see R. J. House, S. Sahne and D. Harold,
“Rumors of the Death o f Dispositional Theory.”
117 G. B. Grean and M. Uhl-Bien, “Relationship-Based Approach to Leadership: Development o f
Leadership Exchange (LMX) Theory o f Leadership over 25 Years: Applying a Multi-Level Multi-Domain
Perspective," Leadership Quarterly. Vol. 6, No. 2 (1995): 219-47.
118 R. J. Deluga. “Supervisor Trust Building, Leaders-Member Exchange and Organizational
Citizenship Behavior," Journal o f Occupational and Organizational Psychology, Vol. 67 (1994): 315-26.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r re p r o d u c tio n proh ibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

58

Criticism of Leadership Theory
One salient problem within the leadership studies is that leadership research has
been studying management and supervision and not leadership as it claims to do. This has
been done because it has always been easier to study supervisors and managers than
higher level executives, and also because relatively large sam ples of lower-level
managers are more accessible to investigators. The problem, however, is that leadership
studied at those levels is almost exclusively supervisory as opposed to strategic. For
classifying managers as leaders, the leadership studies have mainly focused on business
environments and have completely overlooked the importance o f strategic
transformational leadership in national development.119
With respect to national development, leadership studies are deficient on the
question of political leadership.120 The exceptions to the political leadership flaw are the
two separate works done by Simonton and House on the effectiveness of U.S
presidents.121 These works, however, only address local leadership—in this case the
United States—and cannot be universally applied due to reserve zone cultural
differences.1-2 Leadership is an integrative process in all societies that influences other
social functions such as economics in different societies, including those in Asia, Latin
America, and Africa, which should not be overlooked. Neither should leadership, as a

119 Abraham Zaleznik, ‘T h e Difference Between Leadership and M anagement." H an ard Business
Review (May/June 1977): 67-78.
120 House and Aditya. ‘T h e Social Scientific Study o f Leadership.”
121 Simonton. Greatness: Who makes History; Spangler and H ouse, ‘‘Presidential Effectiveness.”
122 “Reserve zone” in this case means cultural attributes that deal with self-actualization. This
concept is clarified in chapter three, where culture as a comprehensive co n cept has been categorized into
two broad aspects.
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behavioral concept, be left to the studies of only a few disciplines such as psychology and
business, as seems to be the norm. Rather leadership studies should incorporate other
areas, such as development, because such efforts will strengthen the utilization and the
application of the knowledge resource provided by the leadership discipline. For example,
a clear distinction between leadership and governance within the field of leadership itself,
as provided next, clarifies the roles of people in those positions.

The Difference Between Leadership and Governance
As earlier alluded to, the distinction between leadership and governance, as
management has come to be called, is warranted in the literature for the clarification and
assignment of responsibilities in social affairs.123 Even though a distinction exists and
has been clearly articulated by Zalezink, the literature obfuscates the distinction and uses
governance and leadership synonymously.124
Leadership, as defined earlier, is a transformational process that involves
articulating organizational vision, introducing of major changes, providing inspiration,
and dealing with troublesome aspects of both internal and external environments of an
organization. On the other hand, governance or management is viewed as the
implementation of leaders’ vision and changes introduced by leaders as well as the
maintenance and administration of organizational infrastructures. Subsequently, after
Zaleznik’s categorization, a similar distinction between managers and leaders by Bennis

123 Faundez. Good Governance and Law.
124 Zaleznik. ‘T h e Difference Between Leadership and Management.”
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and Nanus was made. They state that “managers do things right and leaders do the right
things.” 125 Some scholars of leadership contend that these distinctive findings are
qualitative suggestions and therefore need empirical demonstrations through rigorous
methodologies.126
For the development scenario, a contemporary demonstrative empirical evidence
for this distinction is the vision of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
that economic development in the developing countries can be accomplished through
structural adjustment programs with emphasis on good governance. This view led both
institutions to instruct the leaders in those countries to implement structural adjustment
programs. The articulation of that vision, and its introduction by IMF and the World Bank
in conjunction with instructions to the developing countries to adopt, implement,
maintain, and administer those institutional infrastructures serves as empirical evidence
of a distinction between leadership and governance. In this example, both the IMF and the
World Bank played the strategic leadership role and the so-called leaders of the
developing countries became managers or governors or, at best, supervisory leaders in
implementing the SAP vision formulated by both institutions for development purposes
in sub-Saharan Africa.
As the above example illustrates, leadership and governance involve separate
processes. Leadership is a social process that needs to be undertaken by people, and even
though the leaders need not be present at all times, if the process is being done then

125 W. Bennis and B. Nanus, Leaders: The Strategies fo r taking Charge (NY: Harper and Row,
1985).
125 House and Aditya, ‘T h e Social Scientific Study o f Leadership.”
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leadership is being exercised. The essence of the argument between the two concepts is
that managers or governors are oriented towards stability and leaders are oriented towards
innovation.127
Based on the contrast between leadership and governance, it can be asserted that
governance is a behavior of one in a position of formal authority to maintain compliance
of the group members with their normal role requirements. Its other functions include:
coordinating and staffing the components for the group activities, administering the
infrastructure of the organizations, and handling the day-to-day problems that emerge in
the process of strategy and policy implementation and ongoing organizational functions.
In short, there a is difference between leadership and governance: the former provides
vision, direction, strategy, and inspiration to group units and behaves in a manner that
reinforces the vision and its inherent values, while the latter manages, implements, and
administers the vision of the leader.
Given the clarification between leadership and governance plus the relevancy of
leadership as some of the theories illustrate, the essential question for our purpose is:
What is the importance of leadership to development? As noted earlier, there is a
deficiency in the leadership literature regarding political leadership. However, the
findings relating to team leadership provide information useful for understanding the
importance of leadership in development.128

127 G. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations. 3rd. ed. (Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994).
128 Steven and Campion, “Staffing Teams."
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IMPORTANCE OF LEADERSHIP IN DEVELOPMENT
The importance o f leadership in development has been noted in the social science
studies. For example, in comparing the economic development of Francophone Africa
and Republic of Korea, Lublin Doe shows that economic development of a nation is a
complex phenomenon, where success or failure depends on the political will and
determination of its leadership.129 Also, in a pioneer work, Casson demonstrates the
importance of leadership in building a national culture, which reduces transaction costs
and ultimately enhances the economic performance of the nation as a group.130 In other
works, scholars have argued that most failures in teamwork can be attributed to
leadership problems and not to individual team members.131
According to Larson and Lafasto, leadership does more than ju st influence team
effort. Effective leadership fundamentally changes what a team effort is all about.132
Burgess, Riddle, Hall, and Salas further explain the relationship between leadership and
group effectiveness, stating that “effective team leader behavior will lead to effective
team performance, and ineffective team leader behavior will lead to ineffective team
performance.” lj3 Likewise, Pratt and Jiambalvo suggest that team effectiveness cannot be
maximized without addressing issues of leadership behavior.134

129 Doe, “Economic Development of Francophone Africa.”
130 Casson, The Economics o f Business; Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”
131 Oakland, Total Q uality Management.
1 C. E. Larson and F. M. J. Lafasto, Teamwork: What M ust Go Right / What can Go Wrong
(Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989).
133 K. A. Burgess, D. L. Riddle, J. K. Hall, and E. Salas, “Principle o f Team Leadership Under
Stress," Paper Presented at the 38th Annual M eeting o f the Southeastern Psychological Association,
Knoxville. TN ., March 1992.
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In general, a review of the leadership literature suggests that leadership is one of
the most critical ingredients in effective team performance, such as the economic
development of a nation, impacting all team processes, both directly and indirectly.135 As
such. Ilgen. Major, Hollenbeck, and Sego stress that as we look at teamwork, of which
economic development of a nation is part of, “we cannot overlook the role of leaders and
leadership.”lj6 Given all the economic performance failures in developing countries,
especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, several important questions arise: Why have
development theories not evaluated the region’s leadership experience? Where does the
African leadership fit in this framework of global economic development? Do the
region’s leaders play a legitimate role in the region’s economic development?
All the above questions are pertinent, yet the development literature continues to
ignore the role of leadership in the region’s development. One exception is the recent
work by Marina Ottoway, who looked at new African leaders and their neoliberal
economic policies designed towards economic growth.137 Ottaway’s work utilizes a
neoliberal perspective to evaluate some African leaders who are adopting market
liberalization and democratization policies for growth. By contrast, this research
investigation focuses on leadership’s role in establishing cultural conditions that make

IM J. Pratt and J. Jiambalvo, “Relationship between Leader Behaviors and Audit Team
Performance," Accounting Organizations and Society, Vol. 6 (1981): 133-42.
1” Casson. “Cultural Determinants," ; Bums, Leadership-, House and Aditya, 'T h e Social
Scientific Study of Leadership,” ; Pratt and Jiambalvo, “Relationship between Leader Behaviors,” ; Larson
and Lafasto. Teamwork; Doe “Economic Development of Francophone Africa."
' ,h Ilgen. M ajor, Hollenbeck, and Sego, ‘Team Research in the 1990s."
1 Marina Ottaway, “Africa’s New Leaders: African Solution or African Problem?” Current
H iston. Vol. 97, No. 619 (May 1998): 209-13.
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development possible. However, before the leadership role is addressed, a review of subSaharan African leaderships and their relation to the developmental joumey of the
African people needs to be undertaken.

African Leadership in Historical Context
Leadership in sub-Saharan Africa can be divided into three historical periods:
precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial. Here, the first two leadership groups are briefly
discussed. Precolonial leaderships in SSA were made of two main types of indigenous
political institutions with a further differentiation within each. The first type is based on
tribal grouping. Tribes existed as separate political entities and governed themselves
independently. They were headed by chiefs chosen by the people, and their attendant
administrative and judicial institutions were referred to as chiefdoms. The second type
was the imperial rule. This was when some conquered tribes came under the hegemon of
others, as in kingdoms and empires.138 In matters of serious consequences concerning the
entire population, including new laws and declaration of war, the chief summoned all
members of council elders in addition to his advisors. At such meetings, the chief
presided over the council and sought its opinion. Such practices were common
throughout most parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Tribes that practiced this leadership model
included the Yoruba of Nigeria and the Swazi and Zulu of South Africa.139

118 Ayittey, Africa in Chaos.
IW D. Boama-Wiafe, Africa: The Land, People and Cultural Institutions (Omaha. NB: Wisdom
Publication. 1993).
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The African village meeting under the tree and the European parliament were just
different locational, structural, and administrative forms of the same institution of
democracy. The only salient difference was that the indigenous African system was based
on direct participatory democracy, while its European counterpart was, and still is, a
representative democracy. The unique characteristic of the precolonial African
democratic system of government was that it was open and inclusive. One did not have to
belong to a political party or a family to participate in the process. At village meetings,
the people expressed their views freely, and no one was punished for disagreeing with the
chief.140

Leadership Role in Precolonial Economy
Precolonial leaderships established the cultural conditions for their citizens to
conduct economic activities. In agriculture, the role of the chief and the king was to
ensure that access to land was available to everyone who wanted to farm. The supervision
of access to land did not inhibit the freedom of choice because the leadership did not
interfere or dictate what crops the peasants should raise.141 The cultural sentiment was
that a restriction placed on an individual’s economic activity translated into a burden on
the economic welfare of the entire society.”142 The notion was that as individuals
prospered so did their families and the societies at large, and unless an individual act of

140 J. K. Fynn, Ashanti and Its Neighbours 1700-1807 (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1971).
141 P. Wickins, An Economic History o f Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
142 Ayittey, Africa in Chaos. 109.
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economic activity conflicted with society’s well-being, the leaders had no authority to
interfere.
Outsiders, mostly Europeans and Arabs, who first came upon precolonial
Africans’ ways of living, denigrated the culture as a primitive communism.143 Ironically,
postcolonial nationalist leaders joined the denigration chorus and described the
indigenous culture as socialism. Both assertions are incorrect. African communities did
not run communal enterprises or have widespread state-ownership of the means of
production.144 The means of production in precolonial Africa were privately owned and
the profit motive was present in all market transactions. People did not seek permission
from their chiefs before conducting economic activities. They engaged in economic
activities based on their own initiatives and free will.145 Economic activities, however,
were made possible due to civic cultural conditions of honesty, trustworthiness, and
security that existed at the time, conditions that were made possible by leadership
guidance through legitimization and interpretations of moral and ethical norms.
Unfortunately, the power of the precolonial leadership was disputed and
challenged by the intruding colonial power. In most instances, the colonial powers used
force to take power from indigenous leaders.146 By those actions, it is correct to state that
the colonial powers staged coup d'etats against democratic governments. Such actions

143 C. L. R. James, Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution (London: Allison and Bushy, 1977).
144 Ayittey, Africa in Chaos.
145 Ibid.
146 Adam Hochschild provides convincing evidence as to how Europeans terrorized African leaders
to im pose colonization. See Adam Hochschild. King Leopold's Ghost (N Y : Houghton Mifflin. 1998).

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e cop y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r re p ro d u c tio n p rohib ited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

67

ultimately disrupted the prevailing political and economic systems in precolonial
Africa.147 The question then becomes, what kind o f leadership did the colonial power
offer to sub-Saharan Africa?

Colonial Leadership
African colonization by Europeans received its official seal of approval at a
conference in Berlin between 1884 and 1885. At the conference, the African continent
was formally partitioned among the then seven European powers: Belgium, Britain,
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.148 The colonial leadership adopted different
but similar administrative apparatus to rule their colonies. British colonialism took on
two specific forms. In territories with white settlers, the British envisioned granting some
form of independent status within the British Commonwealth following the models of
Australia and New Zealand. In the remainder of the colonies in Africa, with few
exceptions, British colonization was based on institutional direct rule.149 French
colonialism, by contrast, was based on a centralized form of direct rule based on
assimilation.150

147 The intrusion o f colonial powers in Africa is a vital concept because it sets up the foundation
for the illegitimacy, in most African minds, o f the contemporary governments in Africa. For a b rief
description o f the conflicts between the Asante Empire and the British colonial intrusion, and how the
British forcefully deposed an Asante King, see "Asante And Ghana: A Close-Knit Glove” Africa News
Service (August 5, 1999).
148 Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A M osaic in Transformation.
149 C. Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1994).
150 Jean Suret-Canale, French Colonialism in Tropical Africa 1900-1945 (NY: Pica Press, 1971).
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In the aftermath of the imposition of colonial rule, colonial leaders forcefully re
arranged trading routes to ensure that all economic interactions within a given empire
took place exclusively between European colonial powers and their individual colonies.
For example, in the colony of Togoland, the German colonial leadership eliminated crossborder trade with the British colony of Gold Coast and the neighboring French colonies of
Dahomey and Upper Volta and, instead, restricted Togoland’s trading economic ties
exclusively to Germany.151
The forced colonization of Africa came with the imposition of five destructive
conditions that crippled the region’s developmental potential. These conditions included
the imposition of the European nation system, incorporation of several African nations
into one state, destruction of indigenous checks and balances, introduction of
authoritarian political regimes, and the creation of export-oriented mono-crop economic
industry.152 All the above conditions are important to our hypothesis in chapter one, and I
examine the three that are crucial to the development of the region.
The first of the three destructive conditions to the region’s development was the
erection of authoritarian state rule in Africa. As mentioned above, in the precolonial days,
African politics reflected democratic principles, in which the relationship between the
leadership and the masses was based on legitimacy, freedom, and free dialogue.153 On the
contrary, the colonial leaderships lacked the legitimacy but intended to rule, and thus
created authoritarian states. The authoritarian model of state-society relations became

151 W oodruff D. Smith, The Germany Colonial Empire (Chapel Hill, NC: University o f North
Carolina Press, 1979).
132 Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A M osaic in Transformation.
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commonplace in colonial Africa and was usually referred to as “Bula Matari,” which in
the context of state-society relations embodies the vision of a state that crushes all
resistance.154 Parts of its apparatus were coercive police-military forces that maintained
the enforcement of local compliance with colonial rules and regulations. Unfortunately,
this authoritarian state model remains in place in contemporary Africa as a carryover from
the colonial era inhibiting all forms of democratic developments in the region.
A second far-reaching colonial leadership impact in the region was the imposition
of the European nation state system on the rich and varied African political system that
existed in precolonial days.155 The grafting of the European nation-state system created a
series of artificial states that did not evolve gradually according to the wishes of the
indigenous African people. Today, that colonial legacy, as usually witnessed on
television, has contributed to the ethnic violence across sub-Saharan Africa, impeding any
political cooperation that could make development possible.
The third colonial economic legacy was the turning of the states into mono-crop
economies designed to serve as convenient and cheap sources of raw materials for
European industry. One most cited example of this model is the relationship between
France and Senegal, where France artfully manipulated the Senegal to cultivate peanuts to
feed the France’s industries and made Senegal’s economy dependent on only peanuts.156

153 Ayittey, Africa in Chaos.
154 Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. 1.
155 Ayittey, Africa in Chaos; Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
156 Sheldon Gellar, Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West (Boulder: W estview,
1995).
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The above vestiges of colonial leadership in sub-Saharan Africa embodied in
authoritarianism, a closed economy, and the dependency on raw materials, have become
impediments to the region’s development. Unfortunately, postcolonial leaders have not
been able to eradicate colonial social cultures and, in their places, erect cultures of
democracy, private ownership, regional trade, honesty, and scientific culture. In
proverbial terms, the colonial leadership acted as a double-edged sword: one side halted
African’s precolonial social democratic system, while the other side simultaneously
undermined regional economic integration and progression.

POSTCOLONIAL SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN LEADERSHIP
The roots of the collective African contemporary leadership can be traced to the
formation of the Pan-African Congress movement of the twentieth century, which shaped
the struggle for Africa’s independence. The initial objective of Pan-Africanists such as
Edward Blyden and, George Padmore was the salvation of blacks in the new world.157 In
1927, during the fourth Pan-African congress meeting in New York, Africans from the
Gold Coast (modem Ghana), Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Nigeria added their voices to the
demand for greater autonomy, liberty, freedom, and self-development.158
The organization changed its objective and strategy in 1945 and directed its
attention to Africans who acknowledged their capacity to overthrow colonialism. From
then on, the activities of the Pan-African congress became instrumental in the attainment

157 Adeleke, “Africa and Pan-Africanism.”
158 J. Langely Ayodele, Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa 1900-1945 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1973)
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of independence by African nations. Its first success came in 1957, when it assisted the
black African nation of Ghana to gain its independence.159
With the attainment of independence, most African leaders, notably Kwame
Nkrumah of Ghana, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Sekou Toure of Guinea, and Julius
Nyerere of Tanazania tried to keep the Pan-African spirit alive. Since the organization
facilitated the independence of most African nations, Nkrumah advocated its
immortalization into a continental union o f Africa.160 But, against Nkrumah’s advocacy
of a continental African Unity, Nigeria’s first Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa raised a
staunch opposition by asserting that a United States of Africa was prem ature.161
Even though many African leaders, then, including Kenneth Kaunda, Sekou
Toure, and Julius Nyerere, spoke in favor of continental African unity, the new
independent nations remained divided as the colonial power had left them. Each state
proceeded to develop and nurture micro-nationalist consciousness that eventually
multiplied to threaten the corporate existence of the states. The lack o f consensus on the
part of leadership to bridge the states together, as the United States had done 150 years
earlier, can be construed as a partial explanation for the continent’s woes today. For,
continental unity could have brought the African people peaceful coexistence if not quick
material development, given that the freedom of movement could have preemptively
resolved some of the ethnic conflicts that engulf most of the states.

159 Adeleke, “Africa and Pan-Africanism.”
160 Some Essential Features o f Nkrumaism (London: Spark and Panaf Books, 1975).
161 Gideon C. M. Mutiso and S. W. Rohio, eds.. Readings in African Political Thought (London:
Heinemann, 1975).
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Nkrumah made several attempts to address the complex task o f nation building
beyond achieving national sovereignty. As reflected in his writings and speeches.
Nkrumah called upon African leaders to initiate policies that catered to the well-being and
welfare of their societies, with the intention of reconciling the disparate ethnic groups and
wielding them into a nation.162 In essence, Nkrumah sought to resolve the structural
contradictions inherited from colonial leaders and to pave the way for advancing human
welfare.163 His idea of African prosperity was shared by many African leaders including
Nigeria’s first president, Nnamdi Azikiwe, who added in his own words that “the African
leviathan -- whatever form it takes —(shall) enhance the standard of living of Africans,
safeguard their existence, guarantee freedom under the law, with fundamental human
rights.” 164
The above observations reflect the dedication of some earlier postcolonial leaders
and their intentions to move their communities towards social and economic
development. However, the call upon their fellow leaders to assume responsibility for the
welfare and prosperity of the African people proved to be problematic because some of
the leaders turned out to be immoral minorities whose interests were more personal than
the collective interest o f their societies. That group includes leaders like Mobutu Seseku
of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Idi Amin of Uganda, and Leopold Senghor of

162 Kwame Nkrumah, Neocolonialism: The Stage o f Imperialism (NY: International Publishers
Company, 1966).
163 Adeleke, “Africa and Pan-Africanism.”
164 Nnamdi Azikiwe, “My Plan for A frica.” in Rupert Emerson and Martin Kitson, eds.. The
Political Awakening o f Africa, 157-175 (Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965).
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Senegal of the earlier days, and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Charles Taylor of Liberia, and
General Abacha of Nigeria these days.

Contemporary Leadership and Development
Politically and economically, African leaders have adopted different development
strategies. Economically, at the time of independence, some leaders inherited or adopted
economic systems based on the capitalist model of development. Others decided to
approach their inherited economic strategies differently.165 Cote d ’Ivoire, under the
leadership of Felix Houphouet-Boigny, adopted a brand of capitalism that relied on a
close link to France. President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya adopted capitalist values which
Daniel Arap Moi, his successor, has maintained.160 Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal
maintained close economic ties with the West and promoted a national development that
drew on capitalist principles.167 Under these models, the countries have virtually
depended on the free market system for development and have produced only raw
materials for international trade.
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, on the other hand, launched a socialist development
experiment in Tanzania under a traditional name of Ujamaa (brotherhood). However,
twenty years after its inauguration, the program brought no development and has

165 John Sender and Sheila Smith, The Development o f Capitalism in Africa (London: Methuen,
1986); Paul Kennedy, African Capitalism: The Struggle fo r Ascendancy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988).
166 David Throup and Charles Hornsby, Multi-Party Politics in Kenya (Athens, OH: Ohio
University Press, 1998).
167 Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation.
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therefore been gradually dismantled by Nyerere’s successors.168 In most cases, the leaders
continue the mono-crop production policies that were instituted by the colonial leaders.
Similarly, their trading partners continue to be their former colonial masters. Moreover,
the postcolonial leaders have failed to diversify production in their countries and continue
to export raw materials, while importing domestic consumer goods from the
industrialized w orld.169 Regional trade, such as the trans-Sahara trade that had
invigorated the West African economy during the precolonial days, but which was halted
by the colonial leadership, has not been resuscitated to spark regional development in
trade. In short, all the five destructive vestiges of colonialism previously mentioned are
left untransformed by the postcolonial leaders. Consequently, none of the economic
development approaches adopted by the leaders has been fruitful in their respective
countries.
Politically, whether a civilian or military government, most African leaders have
maintained the authoritarian state they inherited from their colonial predecessors, thus
making the development of political democracy impossible in most parts of the region.
In the early 1960s, the lack of economic development coupled, with political repression
by the leaders, brought resentment and dissatisfaction in many African countries that
ultimately led to military coups in the region. By 1998, there had been as many as 83
successful military coups in Africa, with the majority of them occurring in SSA. The

168 Rodger Yeager, Tanzania: An African Experiment (Boulder: W estview, 1991).
169 Wosene Yefru, ‘T h e African Challenge to Philosophical Paradigm: The Need for a Paradigm
Shift in Social. Economic and Political Development o f Africa.” Journal o f Black Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3
(January 2000): 351-82.
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phenomenon brought in a new form of leadership, made of military officers.170 Today, out
of the 45 countries in the region, only five (Eritrea, Namibia, South Africa, Botswana,
and Djibouti) have not experienced a coup d'etat and thus may have been spared from a
military dictatorship.171
M ilitary leaderships, like their previous civilian counterparts, have been less
effective in transforming economic and political institutions that could bring about
development in SSA. Political developments in the region show that the military leaders
learned some useful lessons from their predecessors, lessons that have become crucial to
their own political survival. They retained the divide-and-rule policies from colonialism
and have been accentuating the problems of multi-ethnic differences and tensions instead
of resolving them. Though the leaders often profess to address “national interests,” their
development policies and programs focus on narrow sectional and ethnic biases. To
maintain their political power and security, they often appealed to and coopted their
respective ethnic and regional constituencies and, in the process, turned people against
each other.172
Social harmony has been lacking in many African communities because
postcolonial African leaders, with the exception o f a few like presidents Khama o f
Botswana, Nyerere of Tanzania, and Mandela of South Africa have failed to harmonize
their discordant ethnocentric and cultural groups. The increase in ethnocentric
provincialism and economic deprivation are evident in sub-Saharan Africa. Though in

170 Pierre Englebert, “Precolonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic Development in
Tropical Africa." Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. I (March 2000): 7-36.
171 Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation.
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varying degrees, the embers of ethnocentrism, fueled by leaders’ egocentric attitudes,
splinter the countries. Nigeria is a prominent example of this phenomenon. As a result of
demands by particular ethnic groups for their own separate political framework, Nigeria
is tom between conflicting demands for secession and independence by aggrieved and
alienated minority groups.173
The situation in Nigeria is a microcosm of socio-political development in subSaharan African countries. This situation results from leadership neglecting to defend and
sustain the interest and aspiration of the African people. As leaders reneged on their
responsibilities, the citizens began to search for a sense of meaning and identity within
their separate and respective ethnic enclaves, making it possible for the cancer of
ethnocentrism to further fragment Africans, turning many into second-class citizens in
their own countries, and under their own governments. One outstanding exception to the
contemporary African leaders’ behavior is that of former president Nelson Mandela of
South Africa, who was able to bring freedom to his people through his own personal
sacrifice.174
Another example from Nigeria illustrates how the leaders have publicly
denounced their responsibilities to the African people. About a decade ago, when Nigeria
faced hunger and starvation, the domestic attention zeroed in on the visible and
unjustifiable affluence of members in the ruling class. The then information minister,

|7' Englebert. “Precolonial Institutions.”
173 Adeleke. “Africa and Pan-Africanism.”
174 Kent R. Rasmusseen, M odem African Political Leaders (NY: Facts on File. 1998).
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Tony Momoh, told the citizens of his country that the government did not owe any of
them a living.175
In addition to separating their citizens into ethnic enclaves to advance their own
political interest, another leadership behavior that has done extensive damage to the
region’s development is corruption. For our purpose, corruption will be defined as the
abuse of public office for private gain. The term will be limited to those actions by
government officials that are illegal, such as when public officials use authority to
advance personal interests rather than encompassing those interests that government was
designed to serve. In this sense, corruption includes both pecuniary and non-pecuniary
benefits. Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon;176 however, the type of corruption
endemic in African leadership has been especially detrimental to the region’s economic
growth and development.177
Notorious among African leadership corruption is the late President M obutu of
Congo. Mobutu and his associates plundered more than $8 billion from their country’s
coffers, of which Mobutu siphoned about $5 billion into his personal accounts around the
world.

jig

Unfortunately, the Mobutu regime and its officials were not the only predators

in SSA. A long list of corrupt leaders and officials exists, such as Midibo Biko, one-time
Oil Minister of Nigeria, who took $3 billion and fled to Great Britain. Moussa Traore,

175 Blaine Haren, “Foreigner’s Impression.” African Concord (January 27, 1996): 46-48.
176 A. J. Heidenheimer, Political Corruption Reading in Comparative Analysis (NY: Holt Rinehart
and Wiston, 1970).
177 Gould. Bureaucratic Corruption.
178 Ibid.
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once president of Mali, also salted away $1 billion.179 In all instances, the leaders left
their countries stranded and in need of foreign financial capital for economic
development. This high-level theft has directly contributed to the lack of economic
development in the region.
Regardless of how African leaders assume power, whether by the military or
civilians, the above-mentioned tactics are employed in weakening societal cohesion. This
is one of the tragic paradoxes of sub-Saharan Africa. While it is no longer threatened
from outside, the national sovereignty, human welfare, and economic development of the
countries in the region have fallen victim to the policies and behaviors of the very leaders
entrusted with their defense. From the previous analysis, it is obvious that in sub-Saharan
Africa, the lack of efficient and adequate institutional structures, characteristic of
developed countries, acts as a constraint on development. Therefore, in order to spark
development that will yield social and material satisfaction for the African people, similar
scientific cultural characteristics must be established to make development possible. It is
the establishment of these cultures that makes leadership utterly important in the
development of the less developed nations. This transformation is essential because, as
Paul Bowels once wrote, “things don’t just happen, it depends on who comes along.” 180
In terms of social development, whether in politics or economics, the ones who come
along to make things happen are transformational leaders.

179 The Economist, Vol. 327, No. 7807 (April 17, 1993), 82.
180 Paul Bowels, “Shattering Sky." New York M onthly Review (D ecem ber 1999): 18-24.
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LEADERSHIP AND CULTURAL ROLES: NEGLECTED GAPS IN DEVELOPMENT
STUDIES
The literature review makes it clear that economic development theorists have
largely overlooked the role of leadership and the importance of culture in economic
development in developing countries, including those in sub-Saharan Africa.181 Even
though both modernization and dependency theories suggest that Third World states have
a promethean capacity for economic and social development through industrial
modernization, both are silent on the question of leadership.182 Furthermore, the theories
also neglect to consider the cultural behaviors that the state and its leadership should
establish and maintain towards achieving developmental goals. Due to this neglect, little
research has been conducted that links the role of leadership to nation building and
development in less developing countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa.
Likewise, the importance of cultural behavior has been neglected in economic
development analyses of developing nations with the simple assumption that economic
rationality is not compatible with cultural subjectivity.18j
This neglect has created a gap in the development literature because development,
as previously defined, is a social transformation process that requires leadership guidance
that has not been discussed in the literature. The exclusion of leadership in the
development analysis renders the theories and their impacts incomplete. In fact, it is not
the lack of leadership alone that is critical to development, but also the cultures that

181 Jennings and Waller, “Evolutionary Economics."; Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”
182 Franck Petiteville, ‘T hree Mythical Representations o f the State in Development Theory,”
International Social Science Journal, Vol. 50. No. 1 (March 1998): 115-24.
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leaderships establish. Even though the literature does not deny the importance of culture
in social development,184 the dominant theories, as alluded to, have downplayed the
significance of culture when analyzing development in the global South. This neglect of
culture, like that of leadership, again leaves a gap in our understanding of why African
countries have experienced developmental stagnation. The concern for this cultural gap
has been raised by many authors, including Samuel Huntington. Huntington argues that
culture and its impact on development require systematic and empirical study.185 This
dissertation addresses that concern. It categorizes cultural elements for easy utilization in
developmental analysis, isolates cultural elements that are necessary for development
purposes, links leadership and culture to development, and uses both concepts to explain
why development has not progressed in sub-Saharan Africa. By doing this, the
dissertation offers an original contribution by filling the leadership and cultural gaps that
currently exist in the development literature.

I8? Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”
184 Sen, “A M atter of Choice."
185 Huntington, ‘T h e Goals o f Development.”
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CHAPTER ID
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As the previous chapter has shown, modernization, dependency, and neo-Marxist
theorists have failed to examine how economic developmental successes are shaped by
the interaction between leadership convictions and cultural attributes at the global,
national, and local levels. Most studies of economic development conducted under these
three dominant doctrines are focused on other variables than leadership and culture.
Implicitly, the three theories have ignored the fact that development processes are
complex and depend on the interaction between social factors.
The exclusion of these social factors, it can be argued, has contributed to the
inability to effectively explain the dismal economic progress in sub-Saharan African
countries. This, in tum, produces dissatisfaction with the above theoretical models
because the attempts to explain the economic dynamic process in sub-Saharan Africa fall
short of reality.1 According to Chazan, Mortimer, Ravenhil and Rothchild, this
shortcoming means “social scientists have had little alternative but to undertake a search
for a new conceptual framework that would afford a fuller insight into the dynamic
processes unfolding on the continent.”2 Many scholars such as Hyden argue that “Africa

1 Samir Amin, “Underdevelopment and Dependency in Black Africa: O rigins and Contemporary
Forms,” Journal o f M odem African Studies, Vol. 10 (1972): 503-24 ; Colins Leys, Underdevelopment in
Kenya: The Political Economy o f Neocolonialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Claude
Ake, “Rethinking African Democracy,” Journal o f Democracy, Vol. 2 (1991): 32-44.
2 Naomi Chazan, R. Mortimer, J. Ravenhil and D. Rotchild, eds.. Politics and Society in
Contemporary A frica (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1983).
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needs a new paradigm, or set of paradigms” to explain the region’s development
processes. 3
Using the ideological message of association,4 this chapter builds a theoretical
framework that links leadership, culture, and economic development. The chapter is
divided into three sections. Part one examines the relations between leadership and
culture. Part two looks at the relations between culture and development. The phenomena
between and within these three elements create a framework from which an answer will
be sought for the question posted in the hypothesis. The second section separates culture
into two broad aspects in an attempt to isolate and identify the cultural elements essential
for economic development. Part three provides the philosophical and historical debate
surrounding Africans’ cultural dilemma that prevents the leadership from establishing the
appropriate culture for development. Before delving into the relationships, section one
begins with the definitions of the basic concepts: culture, economic development, and
leadership.

Definitions of Culture, Economic Development, and Leadership
As stated, culture is defined as accepted systems of social practice of behavior and
prescriptions. This means that culture is a meaningful order of persons and things. In an
economic sense, culture is compatible with the view that individuals optimize, and their

3 Goran Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1983 ), 193.
* Association theory relates cultural values to economic performance, and leadership is part o f the
mechanism that links the two. Unlike sociological theory, association retains the methodological
individualism o f economic analysis. A ssociationists' standpoint is represented by institutional econom ics.
For more on association theory, see R. H. Frank. Choosing the Right Pond (NY: Oxford University Press,
1985); Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”
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behaviors sustain an economic equilibrium. This equilibrium reflects the value and
beliefs of the leaders who establish the culture of a group. This accepted system of
behavior (culture) is an unfolding process. Its evolution can be viewed as an evolving
hermeneutic system. The evolving nature allows culture to be dynamic and prevents it
from becoming static. It also means open-endedness rather than closure, allowing cultural
flexibility and the potential for human intent, discretion, and problem solving with critical
reasoning.5
Culture’s dynamic characteristics make it not a rigid “set” but an open-ended
complex set of rules, an organized and organizational hermeneutic network in which no
“trait” o f “rule” stands alone or drives any cultural force apart from its complex
processual context. In the broad sense, culture is everywhere and it is everything. In its
most general sense, culture is an interpretive integration of material objects, behavior, and
their meanings.6
In this work, economic development is defined at a national level. Development
occurs when a nation, through accumulative causation by virtue of cultural process,
acquires the understanding of natural law of creation and uses it to attain the
technological capacity to enable it to produce diverse products to satisfy its population’s
need. In other words, a society develops economically as its members jointly increase
their capacity for dealing with their environments. This capacity for dealing with the
environment is dependent on the extent to which they understand the laws of nature

5 Jennings and W aller, “Evolutionary Economics” ; Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”
6 Wiredu, Philosophy and An African Culture.
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(science), and to the extent to which they put that understanding of knowledge into
practice by devising tools (technology), and in the manner in which work is organized to
benefit and sustain the entire welfare of the society.7
Economic development thus reflects the utilization of the understanding of natural
law to devise technology so as to enable mankind to harness resources to sustain and
improve their living. On the national level, development is when a group o f human
species confined within a geographical location has been able to understand natural law to
enable them to collectively organize to increase their capacity of production through
technological innovations.8
Leadership is a reciprocal process of mobilizing people by individuals with
motives and values and other resources in order to realize goals that are independently or
mutually held by both the leader and the group members.9 Leadership occurs when an
individual, or a group, with a high moral quality has the capability of inspiring citizens of
a nation and engaging them to achieve a mutual objective. There are transformational and
transactional leaderships. Transformational leadership usually seeks to satisfy the high
needs of their groups and engages the group members in achieving those needs. It is
based on a relationship of mutual stimulation and elevation that converts leaders into high
moral agents.10 Transactional leadership, as opposed to transformational leadership,

7 Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
8 Richard L. Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development: Towards a Conceptual
Clarification," Journal o f Economic Issues, Vol. 29, No. 4 (December 1995): 1171-88; Simon Kuznets,
Economic Growth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); M yrdal, “What is Development?”
9 J. C. Rost, “Leadership Development in the New Millennium,” The Journal o f Leadership
Studies, No. 1 (1993): 99-108.
10 Bums, Leadership.
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operates within the framework of self-interest and promises rewards to followers.11 Both
transformational and transactional leaders can be inspirational and charismatic.12
Writers on leadership point to a wide range of definitions for this phenomenon.
However the common elements in all the definitions imply that leadership involves a
social influence process in which a person or a group of persons steerfs] members of a
group towards a goal.13 Leaders and followers are bound together by a common quest.
However, the leader becomes the focus of the group actively and therefore exercises a
determining influence on the behavior of the group. Through such a role, leadership is
able to legitimate some behaviors while denouncing others, and consequently creating a
culture for the group.14 Leadership, regardless of the type, is a source o f power that
rallies group members to modify cultural behavior.15

LEADERSHIP AND CULTURE: THE LINK
In most groups leadership is responsible for establishing a culture conducive for
welfare and development. The assumption here is that leadership has good morals, the
right ethical beliefs, and is able to rally group members towards a mutual quest to their
benefit. The above assertion is based on the premise that, in every nation, citizens
delegate social regulation to leadership with an implicit assumption that the leadership is

11 Ibid.
12 Bass, Handbook o f Leadership-, Bums, Leadership.
13 Bryman, Leadership and Organizations.
14 Bass, Handbook o f Leadership.
15 Boulding, The linage.
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responsible for engineering the social system. Politically, this is synonymous with a
mandate. The delegation of such a responsibility from the population to the leadership
always comes with authoritative power of some kind allowing the leadership to legitimate
cultural behavior deemed conducive to achieving national welfare. In other words, a
nation entrusts its leadership with the practice o f intellectual division of labor in
processing information to establish an appropriate environment to enable the nation to
maintain and improve its existence. Therefore by the theory o f association, the culture
that leadership ordains through interpretation and legitimation has an impact on a nation's
ability to achieve its economic material need s.16 In this respect, the leaders are
responsible for engineering a culture that effectively coordinates all social intricacies
within a nation to improve and sustain the national economy.
The unspoken contractual relations between the citizens and leadership make the
latter obligated in providing a social aura in the form of a culture conducive for society’s
economic satisfaction. The inherent leadership responsibility is important because, from a
cultural point of view, a nation’s economic operational systems is like that o f a firm. They
both encounter a coordination problem that can lead to high transaction costs. However
this problem can be overcome in a nation by moral manipulation of leaders through
engineering a sense of obligation by articulating legitimate objective. This indeed is the
main role of leaders, by which they create national cultures.17

16 It is important to note that leaders play an instrumental role in association theory. According to a
recent work done by Casson, the author established that association theory relates cultural values to
economic performance and leadership is the link between the two. See Casson, “Cultural Determinants."
17 Casson, The Economics o f Business.
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As an evolving accepted system of social practices and behaviors, cultural
behavior and its formation implies that evolutionary selection is part of, rather than
subsequent to novel cultural variation. The psychological mechanics that cause
individuals to behave the way they do, also known as teleological actions, are rooted in
the complex meaning of the cultural matrix in which the actions occur.

18

The reason is

that the hermeneutic complexity sets limits on the ranges of both the meanings o f various
acts and the actions that individuals are likely to consider as they pursue their objectives.
The important point is that the social logic that acts as the behavioral regulator is
designed by leadership’s legitimation and interpretation as previously mentioned. This
ability gives leaders the power to influence or modify the cultural behavior of citizens.
But why, it may be asked, are group members so easily influenced? Do not their
own life experiences dictate their preference? Theoretically, the answer is that preferences
need to be psychologically legitimized and life experiences need to be interpreted. As
Casson explains, “preference legitimation requires a moral systeml9and interpretation of
life experience requires a scientific theory of some kind.”20 Both services are provided to
members of a group by leadership. By providing both legitimation and interpretation of

18 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory o f the Leisure Class (NY: Mentor, 1953). The idea of teleological
act was originated by Veblen when he offered the description o f complexity in the Theory o f the Leisure
Class in 1899; the concept was again reprinted in 1953 by Mentor Publishers. Recent work by Ann Jennings
explained that the concept equally applies to complex cultural processes. Individual and group cultural
behavior is formed in response to a given stimulus and will necessarily affect the character of the response
to other stimuli. As a result, the modification o f human nature at any point becomes a modification to the
general population as a whole. See Jennings and Waller, "Evolutionary Economics.”
19 There is no definitive way of appraising moralities. Therefore in our case, the implicit ranking of
moral systems is by their instrumental contribution to material economic development.
20 Casson, "Cultural Determinants,” 422.
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the system, the leader legitimizes certain kinds of culture and denounces others.21 This
makes a leader responsible for establishing cultural expectations. Armed with the
overbearing power of influence, it becomes obvious that leadership relativism can reduce
cultural dynamics by requiring adaptations to comport with fewer cause and effect
relationships. The point being made here is that the kind of culture and how a culture of a
society changes to suit a mutual quest depends on a leader’s beliefs.
Cultural formations can amplify problems and dislocations, requiring more
concerted and coordinated efforts than single individuals can provide to induce change
within the system. On such occasions, legislative and judicial actions by governments can
provide solutions. Here too, the importance of leadership in cultural establishment
becomes imperative. A good example of this is what Daniel Rodger described as the “
transformation of social meanings o f the state” in relation to “democracy and the people”
during the Jacksonian era in the United States.22 As earlier alluded to, the mechanics of
social engineering comes by legitimation and interpretation. The interpretation helps to
provide the acquisition methodologies. Acquisition in this context signifies the way and
manner in which the intended cultural evolution is undertaken by the leadership. There
are two options, speciation and adaptation, that are usually available for undertaking such
cultural evolution23.
Cultural adaptation involves reinterpreting hermeneutic linkages to accommodate
the novelties arising from individual, and some times group, teleological behavior. It does

21 Ibid.
22 Daniel T. Rodgers. Contested Truths (NY: Basic Books, 1987).
23 Jennings and W aller, “Evolutionary Economics."
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not refer to changes in singular behaviors or habits, but to the complex patterned habits
and activities that constitute individual lives in a cultural setting.24 It is commonly
applied ex-post to changes that have already appeared, meaning the changes that are made
are “selected” as beneficial adaptations.25 In most cases, conventional notions of
beneficial evolutionary “selection” express both dominant cultural habits of thought and
self-congratulatory cultural impulses. Meaning adaptations are filtered but not
predetermined.26
Speciation, on the other hand, occurs by reintegrating the existing structural
elements of an organism and recreating the organism-environment relationship. It is a
tautological “default category” containing those cases that do not seem to fit adaptation.
Speciation is a discontinuous change, in contrast to the “continuous” change of
adaptation. As a discontinuous cultural change, speciation is important in part because it
offers an explanation for why, in an analytical sense, economic development in some
developing countries has become problematic. It involves more dramatic reintegration of
the cultural hermeneutic than those permitted by ambiguous flexibility. It implies a
cultural leap into interpretations that are highly countered intuitive from the standpoint of
earlier understandings, consequently yielding relativism in human knowledge across
cultural species.27

24 Veblen, The Theory.
25 Jennings and W aller, “Evolutionary Economics."
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
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Macroevolutionary biological theories, used by some anthropologists have
discussed speciation as an event involving regulatory, rather than structural formation.28
However, it is necessary to note that neither relativism in human knowledge nor cultural
discontinuity is absolute because ambiguity in culture accommodates the interpretive
potential needed for cultural evolution. Dialectically, as the above analysis indicates, the
legitimation and interpretation power of leaders makes them the cultural architects of a
group. Thus leaders become responsible for providing the milieu in which the expected
outcome for national welfare will be possible. The role of leadership in providing
appropriate culture is essential because from an economic point of view, nations and the
groups of people within them are no more than a nexus o f contracts. The contracting
parties are individuals each playing some functionally specialized role that requires an
optimistic view of other individuals’ intentions and moral commitments of one’s own to
bring about successful outcomes. Therefore, when leadership fails, through its
legitimation and interpretation, to establish a appropriate cultural milieu, the result is a
negative performance of the nation’s economy.

Some Implications For sub-Sahara Africa
The implication of the above discussion of leadership’s role as a cultural engineer
concerns its link to cultural relativism among leaders and its impact on social progress. In
most parts of sub-Saharan Africa, elitist and leaderships form limits evolutionary
potential by restricting the cultural dynamic and protecting the cultural myths that sustain

28 Paul Diener, “Quantum Adjustment, Macroevolution, and the Social Field: Some Comments o f
Evolution and Culture,” Current Anthropology, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1980): 423-30.
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social hierarchy. Consequently, this undermines the cultivation of rigorous analytical
cause-and-effect scientific culture that possesses the capability to spark material
economic development. In that region of the world, the cultural myth, as identified in
Senghorian philosophy, has created a scenario that avoids inter-and intracultural
communication in the domain of thought, especially in critical scientific thinking. The
belief in mythology has maintained the status quo for the countries in the region to engage
in counter-productive development approaches based on the neoclassical Keynesian
doctrine of growth.

CULTURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE LINK
As the hypothesis infers, a relationship exist between economic development and
culture. However, the question remains as to how economic process is connected to
culture. From a general observation, culture clearly plays a significant role in economic
development in the sense that it influences individuals’ values and serves as a motivating
force for them to achieve what they deem essential.29
The Veblen dichotomy serves as one explanation of the connection between
culture and economic development. The dichotomy can be interpreted as having a
dynamic technology juxtapose to ceremonial nature of social institutions. The inference
here is that technology conceptualized as social capital and permeable to scientific
knowledge serves as a dynamic instrumental function in improving economic living.30 In
the same line of reasoning, Kuznets characterized economic development as an epoch in

29 Sen, “A Matter of Choice.”
30 Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development.”
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which both economic production and social organization became permeable to the
application of science.31 Such a culture-conception of technology, which includes both
social (factory system) and material (steam engine) factors, helps to explain the
connection between technology and culture.
In fact, there is no distinction between technology and culture because they are
opposite sides of the same coin, the coin of useful knowledge. For, knowledge as a
protean concept appears in its application form as technology and in store as culture. Here
culture, as previously defined, is the accepted systems of practices and behavior. Through
this technological association, we see that the relationship between culture and economic
development becomes clearer.32 This establishes the link between the two.
By definition then culture is omnipresent, thus making cultural behavior both
deeply habituated and systematically complex in all social endeavors, including that of
economics. A careful observation reveals that economic interest does not act in isolation
from ones cultural behavior. Indeed, the matrimony between culture and economics is so
complete and everlasting that it enabled Veblen to write “the economic interest does not
act in isolation, for it is but one of the several vaguely isolable interests on which the
complex of teleological activity is carried out by the individual.”33
Veblen’s observation is applicable to market economies of the contemporary
world. For, if we focus on a “subset” of our social process, it is recognized that market
activities are predicated upon an entire complex of individual teleological activity rather

31 Kuznets, Economic Growth.
32 Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development.”
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than vaguely isolated economic interests. A salient indication that economic behavior,
though as uniquely complex and non-compartmentalistic as it may be, is rooted in
cultural continuity, a significant evidences that economic development and cultural
process cannot be partitioned.
Culture, as previously stated, is an accepted system of social practice and behavior
that in economic terms has a collective subjective connotation. Subjectivity has two
meanings in economics. One has to do with the idea that individual preferences are not
directly measurable but are revealed only indirectly through behavior. The other meaning
of subjectivity is within the context o f probability. Unfortunately, probability too cannot
be measured directly. It, however, can be observed that when individuals maximize their
expected utility, changes occur in their behavior. The changes that occur when people
maximize their utility are affiliated with the modification of an individual’s subjective
probability.34 Deductively, what this implies is that behavior or culture is economically
driven via utility maximization.
From the above analysis, it can be concluded that there is a clear link between
culture and economic evolution and its development. One caveat about the two meanings
of subjectivity mentioned above is that individual preferences and beliefs differ.
However, generally speaking, people belonging to the same group do have similar
preferences and beliefs. The explanation for this similarity is that preferences and beliefs
are malleable and that individuals exposed to the same influence tend to conform in these

33 Veblen, The Theory, 77.
34 This conditional probability is well discussed in psychology and is the same concept underlying
Pavlov’s work. For more information see Casson, “Cultural Determinants."
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respect. These influences, in turn, affect individual behavior through its impact on
preferences and beliefs. An attribute that is critical within the realm of economic
development to the extent that Casson wrote, “it affects individual behavior towards each
other. Which in turn can affect both efficiency and equity within the group.”35 These
characteristics are essential in economic development and in all organizing economic
societies.

Figure 3-1.
The Leadership, Culture and Development (LCD) Model for Developing Nations.

Leadership ===
a. legitimation
b. interpretation

■>Culture
a. science
b. moral

=====> Economic Development
a. capability to produce

As the above analysis has qualitatively shown, there is a correlation between
leadership, culture, and economic development. As Figure 3-1 shows, through
legitimation and interpretation of values, leadership establishes an accepted system of
practices and behavior that leads to a culture of a group, in our case, a nation. The Veblen
dichotomy serves as one explanation for the connection between culture and economic
development through technology. Culture as a technology is linked to economic
development as a social capital. It is also clear that from an economic perspective, culture
is compatible with an individual’s utility optimization. Deductively therefore, culture
becomes economic driven and becomes linked to economic development. The
phenomena between and within these three elements demonstrate the relationship

35 Casson, “Cultural Determinants,” 420.
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between leadership and economic development, practically, in all human social groups.
There is one problem, however regarding how development and growth are treated in the
contemporary development literature that needs some clarification.
As one may recall from chapter two, different scholars have identified several
cultural elements and their contribution to economic growth, when they are in fact
addressing development problems. This situation means that growth is equal to
development or will ultimately lead to development. This view allows writers to use the
two terms synonymously.36 This however is a serious misconception that has been taken
for granted in the discussions of developmental approaches, one that often leads to illdefined developmental policies in less developing nations including those in SSA. In
what follows, a distinction is made between those two terms, growth and development, in
order to clarify the prevailing misconception.

The Difference Between Economic Growth And Development
Contemporary economics based on neoclassical synthesis has always treated
economic development and economic growth as virtually synonymous.37 The difference
between the two is discussed here to assist in alleviating the confusion that exists within
the contemporary development theories for using the two terms synonymously. The lack

36 Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development."
37 H. W. Ardnt, Economic Development: The History o f an Idea (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1987); Robert Dorfman, “Review Article: Economic Development from the Beginning to Rostow,”
Journal o f Economic Literature, Vol. 29 (June 1991): 573-91.
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of clarification may have contributed to irresponsible policy formulation that has
undermined prospects for economic development.38
Economic development is a dynamic transformation, which takes place between
equilibrium positions such as from tradition to modernity. In a simple context, it is a
transformation that deals with sequential pattern o f structural changes; a process whereby
one structure gives rise to a new structure with the acquisition o f knowledge.39 It is
associated with non-traditional economic variables such as transformation o f values and
the impact of technology.40 Development serves as an independent variable upon which
growth is dependent. In other words, it is development that leads to growth, not viceversa, as the conventional development theories, (modernization, dependency, and the
neoliberal globalization) suggest.41 It is a change that has a continuous direction and
which culminates in a phase that is qualitatively new from the previous phase.
A country’s economic development reflects a long-term rise in capacity to
produce diverse economic goods for its population. This growing capacity is based on
technology, as well as social and ideological cultural institutions that are essential for its
support. One institutional economist who emphasized the social nature of the
developmental process is Gunnar Myrdal, who defined development as “the movement
upward of the entire social system.”42 The entire social system, depicted by Myrdal, is

38 Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development.”
39 Ibid.
40 Myrdal, “What is Development?”
41 Simon Kuznets, “Modem Economic Growth: Findings and R eflections,” American Economic
Review, Vol. 63 (June 1973): 247-58; Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development.”
42 Myrdal, “What is Development?” 729.
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what one British anthropologist referred to as “that complex whole,” known as culture.43
Culture constitutes the substantive nature of that which experiences accumulation and
metamorphosis in the dynamics of economic evolution.44
Economic growth, on the other hand, is a quantitative static analysis, or at best,
one o f comparative static. It deals with changes within a structure without relating to the
transformation of the structure. Growth by itself is seen as a replication of a given
structure that does not lead to development. It is a measure of development, but by itself
is not development, and it is measured by a quantitative concept of GNP/capita.45 The
discussion of prerequisite technology and social transformation lay outside the Keynesian
matrix upon which a growth model rests. Hence, an economic growth model, as a
derivative of the Keynesian matrix is inadequate to explain the social and cultural
transformation structures that are required in a theory of the dynamics of economic
development.46 This deficiency is not unknown within the economic profession. Indeed,
some economists have sought to overcome the comparative static inherent in the growth
model.47

43 R. L. Brinkman, "Growth Vrs. Development,” in F. N. Magil, ed.. Survey o f Social Science:
Economics Series, Vol. 2,948-955 (Pasadena, CA: Salem Press, 1991); R. L. Brinkman. "Culture Evolution
and the Process o f Economic Evolution,” International Journal o f Social Economics, Vol. 19 (1992): 24867.
44 Brinkman. “Culture Evolution.”
45 Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development” ; Myrdal, “What is
Development?”
46 Brinkman, “Growth Vrs. Development”; Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa-, M yrdal,
“What is Development?”
47 R. F. Solow, Growth Theory: An Explanation (NY: Oxford University Press, 1970).
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In drawing a line between growth and development, it can be concluded that
growth is a measure of development. It relates to the replication o f the same structure.
The process of economic development, however, is different. It is a dynamic
transformation whereby one structure gives rise to a new structure. The transformative
capacity is based on the acquisition of technology. The levels o f GNP/capita characteristic
of economic growth are achieved not by growth process but are due to the results from
developmental process of cultural and social transformations.
As discussed in chapter two, there is a general consensus in the literature that
culture has an impact on economic performance. Even though this assertion is valid, there
has been no identification as to what cultural characteristics have a direct correlation with
development. In what follows, cultural elements essential to economic development are
identified. Before that is done, however, culture as a whole is categorized into two broad
aspects to help avoid the generalization that is often associated with cultural analysis. The
categorization will assist in identifying the cultural characteristics that are essential to
spurring development in developing countries.

THE TWO BROAD ASPECTS OF CULTURE
The fact that culture is not well understood is often interpreted as an inherent
limitation of the subject, either because it is difficult to quantify or because it is
everywhere. In order to overcome this impending stumbling block so as to enable us to
utilize culture in an acceptable manner in this analysis, this section categorizes culture
into two broad aspects. This distinction is important, at least for our purpose, because in
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Africa cultural sensitivity is so high that some clarification is warranted to avoid the
misrepresentation that is often associated with cultural analysis.
In sub-Saharan Africa, the sensitivity to invoking culture in economic
development debates has a subjective legitimacy as opposed to an objective one. This is
mainly due to the complex nature of culture as a sociological attribute for selfidentification and the difficulty associated with deciphering the network of culture as a
whole. Therefore, the distinction will help create a rational understanding for shedding
some of the cultural emotional sensitivity. Lastly, the distinction helps to alleviate the
confusion that hangs over culture by allowing us to separate the needed prerequisite
cultural elements essential to development from the convoluted cultural elements. In
doing so, it assists in our efforts to resolve the African developmental dilemma by
highlighting the coexistence between culture and economic development. In the African
context, the distinction is not only critical but it is also very important, for the failure to
categorize cultural elements and understanding their implications is one o f the major
weakness of cultural traditionalism that implicitly undermines African development.48

The Distinction
Culture is a complex human phenomenon or attribute. It is seen in people’s work
and recreation, in their worship and courtship, in their way of investigating nature, and in
utilizing the possibilities of nature. Culture is also seen in the manner in which people
house and clothe themselves, their method of conducting war and peace, their system of
statecraft, education, of rewards and punishment; the way they regulate personal relations;

48 Oladipo, "Reason, Identity, and the African Quest.”
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and the ideas underlying these institutions and practices.49 In this sense, it is easy to
acknowledge that culture is an amorphous complex human phenomenon.
Despite its complexity, culture’s constitutive elements are o f two broad types.
There are those that “have no essential bearing on the question of either human well
being, truth, or falsehood.”50 These aspects of culture include procedures, customs, and
usage such as language, style of apparels, dance, music, recreation, and style o f courtship.
These according to Oiusegun Oladipo constitute the reserve zones, in which each nation
is able to develop its own identity. Within the reserve zone, all nations can cultivate their
identities without compromising the idea of unity and equality of the human species.51
Kwasi Wiredu strengthens the reserve zone by adding to it that, “all of this and more are
contingent,” in the sense that adopting one rather than the other “often makes no objective
difference to human well-being or to one’s belief about the world.” 52 Due to this reason,
“there cannot be any compelling reason to change such elements of culture in favor of
foreign ones.”53 To do the contrary, however, is to engender a loss o f identity.
As opposed to the reserve zones, the other aspect deals with the elements of
culture that are anchored in truth-value or have some essential bearing to the quality of
human life. These include philosophy, science, and religion. In these areas the story is

49 Wiredu, Philosophy and An African Culture.
50 Kwasi W iredu, “Problems in A frica’s Self-Definition in the Contemporary W orld," in Kwasi
Wiredu and K. Gyekye, eds.. Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, NO. I (Washington,
DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. 1992), 65.
51 Oladipo, “Reason, Identity, and the African Quest." 30.
52 Wiredu, “Problem s in Africa’s Self-Definition,’’ 66.
53 Ibid., 65.
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different. Here, it is unwise to ignore development in other cultures because they are areas
that are not crucial to self-definition.54 Wiredu’s assessment suggests that these “are
areas of human experience in which the effects of cultural differences could conceivably
be eliminated through peaceful give-and-take dialogue among cultures.”55 The key point
is that, since this sector of culture is primarily concerned with the domain of thought
where truth is sought, it would be foolish for any culture to ignore whatever development
has taken place in other societies by invoking the protection of self-definition or
actualization.56
The above analysis helps to categorize culture into two sectors as Figure 3- 2
illustrates. One of the sectors, the reserve zone, is unique to certain groups of people who
are sometimes confined within a geographical area. So this term is utilized for self
definition. The universal zone, by comparison relates to the domain of thought. It
comprises philosophy, science, and religion, and suggests that an overlap exists among
human beings regardless of geographical location.57 The universal zone is the one that
contains the culture of ingenuity. It is within the universal domain that one finds the
science of creation that offers informative ways of understanding natural law to enable
human beings to improve their living. It is equally within this universal domain that
religion is anchored. Religion offers the moral guidelines upon which society as a whole
is organized towards improving human lives. In organizing human economic affairs,

54 Oladipo, “Reason, Identity and the African Quest” ; W iredu, "Problems in Africa’s SelfDefinition."
55 Wiredu, “Problems in Africa’s Self-Definition.” 6556 Oladipo, “Reason, Identity and the African Quest.”
57 Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars.
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morality, a derivative of religion, regulates a culture of trust, which is essential for the
synchronization of economic activities.

Figure 3-2
Two Broad Aspects of Culture

Culture
Universal Zone:Domain of Thought

Reserve Zone:Self Identification
Language
Asante &
English

Food
Steak &
Fufuo

Clothes

Socialization

Religion

Kente&
Jeans

Courtship &
Baseball

Morals &
Trust

Science of
creation

Philosophy

Technology

Reasoning

This diagram draws upon “Two Aspects o f Culture" intellectual constructs separately
presented by Professor Kwasi Wiredu and Professor Olusegun Oladipo in their
respective works “Cultural Universals a nd Particulars: An African Perspectives " and
“The African Quest: The Problem o f Self-Definition and African Philosophy”.58

What this indicates is that it is within the universal domain of thought, rather than
the reserve zone that is often associated with high subjectivity, that nations should seek to
improve their scientific and moral cultural elements to enable them to acquire knowledge
that will assist them in producing their material needs. The above distinction between the
two broad aspects of culture illustrate that the reserve zone points to self-definition while
the universal zone is associated with values of absolute truth that contribute to quality of

58 Professor Wiredu believes there are universal cultural attributes that are shared by all human
beings, and it is based on these attributes that universal human communication becomes possible regardless
o f race or geographic location. Those interested may see Kwasi W iredu Cultural Universals and
Particulars. Professor Oladipo’s work compliments W iredu’s work by further drawing the distinction
between the Reserve Zone and the Universal Zone, and the utilization o f the former for identification. See
Olusegun Oladipo, “Reason, Identity, and the African Quest.”
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human life. The underlying implication here is that “a culture can shed off many o f its
traits and gather foreign accretions without losing its identity.”59
This being the case, nations need not demonstrate their uniqueness, especially
within the domain of cultural thought by clinging to all elements of their traditional
culture to maintain their cultural identity. In fact, by using Wiredu’s distinctive rational
analysis, what they need to do to ensure their self-identity is to safeguard those contingent
aspects of their culture. This action will reduce cultural confusion and allow them to avail
themselves to the opportunities offered by advances made by others in those areas of
culture relating to the domain of thought (e.g. in science, which has a positive impact on
human well-being). This route is the only logical one that developing nations, particularly
those in Africa, can use to guarantee that their intellectual future will not be “exclusively
decided by the fact of the economic and technological superiority o f the already
hegemonic cultures of the metropolitan world.”60 This method of safeguarding their way
of life is the most likely way they can effectively participate in the quest for development
which is “a continuing world-historical process in which all peoples, Western and nonWestem alike, are engaged.”61 Now that it is clearly established that a nation can pursue
its self-actualization without hampering its economic development, the question o f what
cultural elements need to be established in order to spur economic development takes
precedence.

59 Wiredu, “Problems in Africa’s Self-Definition.” 65.
60 Anthony Kwame Appiah, “African-American Philosophy," The Philosophical Forum: A
Quarterly, Vol. 24, Nos. 1-3 (Fall/Spring 1992-93): 23.
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PREREQUISITE CULTURAL ELEMENTS FOR SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
In an attempt to answer the question posted with our hypothesis in the first
chapter, one objective of this investigation is to show that the African leadership has
failed to establish the essential cultural characteristics appropriate for economic
development. The logical question therefore becomes what are those cultural
characteristics? As one institutional economist has identified “it is surprising as well as
disappointing that no such model has been advocated.”62 Though economic theory of
culture does not yet exist, contemporary market analysis makes it possible to identify
some key cultural characteristics that condition the economic development performance
of a nation.
The following section identifies two basic cultural prerequisites that are essential
to economic development. This is done with the affirmation that economic performance
of societies are inversely related to these cultural characteristics and without them it will
be difficult, if not impossible, for an economy to develop.63 In what follows, I identify the
culture of scientific differentiation and trust as the two basic cultural prerequisites
essential for economic progress in all developing nations.

61 Wiredu, Philosophy and An African Culture, 43.
62 Casson, “Cultural Determinants,” 431.
63 Casson, The Economic o f Business.
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Scientific Culture
A vital prerequisite culture for material economic development is scientific
culture with moral differentiation that enables the utility of science for material
improvement.64 Morality in this sense is identified with legitimation of ends, in other
words, what society accepts as socially right or wrong, while scientific knowledge is an
informed and appropriate means of doing things—creating technology.65 It is acquired
through a linear methodological investigation and the understanding of natural law of
creation.66 Scientific culture is characterized with the application of science to processes
of material production. In other words, accepted systems of practice and behavior allow
both material production and social organization to become permeable to scientific
knowledge acquired through the investigation of natural law and creation.67
The origin of scientific culture is attributed to discoveries of scientists and
philosophers like Copernicus, Newton, and Bacon, whose works were eagerly studied by
enthusiastic middle class Europeans who were eager to apply new ideas to industry and
commerce.

68

Scientific culture propagates a cultural paradigm with a mindset that is

helpful in understanding the process o f innovation and invention. It is a culture that

64 Kuznets, Economic Growth; Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development";
Casson, “Cultural Determinants”; Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. All these authors have
illustrated the importance o f science in economic development. Walter Rodney specifically illustrates how
Europe’s economic development was accelerated by scientific technology.
65 Adeleke, “Africa and Pan-Africanism”; Casson “Cultural Determinants.”
66 John F. Wilson, "Scientific Culture and the Making of Industrial West," Business History, Vol.
40, No. 2 (April 1998): 152-53.
67 Kuznets, M odem Economic Growth.
68 Wilson, “Scientific Culture."
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influenced the European Industrial Revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
by improving their understanding of nature.69
Scientific culture is a convoluted behavior mixed of material technology and
social technology that provides the power of science and reveals an orderly
understandable universe, thereby laying an enduring base for free rational discourse
towards innovation and inventions. Wrapped in a passion to know, scientific culture
nurtures collective knowledge to investigate natural law and contributes to indefinite
human progress. On the other hand, this approach avoids metaphysics and despises
revelations and dogma. It is a culture that provides a practice of intensive creative
thinking through education, honesty, and void of corruption in human behavior. This
culture sees our universe as one in which humanity, through continued inquiry,
perpetuates development.70 In its real sense, scientific culture offers a society the ability
to manipulate the environment for the purpose of enhancing the process of living.

SCIENTIFIC CULTURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The literature shows that the importance of scientific culture in economic
development goes far back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries during the industrial
revolution in Great Britain.71 Similarly, the American Progressive Era (1896-1916) was
fueled by the quantum leap in American scientific culture at which time technical

69 Ibid.
70 Edward O. Wilson, “Back to the Enlightenment: We must know. W e will know," Free Inquiry,
Vol. 18, No. 4 (Fall 1988): 21-22.
71 Ian Inkster, Scientific Culture and Urbanization in Industrial Britain (Ashgate, VT: Aldershot
and Brookfield, 1998).
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rationality was laid.72 It was a scientific cultural revolution that precipitated science-and
technology-driven socioeconomic development in Europe and led to the formation of
scientific societies that were later emulated around the industrialized world. For example.
Academic des Sciences in Paris in 1666, the Akademie der Wissenschften in Berlin in
1700, and the New York Academy o f Sciences in 1817 are some of the first scientific
societies to emerge in the industrialized world.73
All those scientific societies and their national leaderships recognized the
importance of scientific culture for development in the West. In England, the Royal
Society is credited for pioneering the movement in 1660.74 The point here is that societies
that are able to establish a culture of understanding the natural law of creation enhances
their technology and increases their ability to improve living by manipulating natural
laws. In comparison, societies that lack the scientific culture of understanding natural
laws are less likely to possess the ability to manipulate natural law to their benefit.
In developed countries, there are scientific cultures that seek to understand the
appropriate way of doing things through the understanding of natural law of creation.
Those countries have further distinguished between science and morality. This does not
suggest that industrialized countries are secular. In fact, developed nations are not secular,
but what they have done is differentiate science from morals. This distinction enables
them to devote science in discovering natural laws, while regulating their societies with

72 Guy B. Adams and Virginia H. Ingersoli, “Culture, Technical Rationality, and Organizational
Culture,” American Review o f Public Administration, Vol. 20. No. 4 (December 1990): 285-302.
73 Leo T. W. Hin and R. Subramaniam, “Chemical Societies Boost Development.” Chemistry and
Industry (February 7, 2000): 90-91.
74 Ibid.
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moral laws. This cultural ability to differentiate science from morals is the key to material
development. Differentiation opens up the route to economic development through
technological advancement, thus making it possible to raise material consumption above
subsistence levels. This process becomes possible because natural restrictions are
surpassed by progressive missions that harness resources to higher levels, whiles morality
is used to establish norms of both equity and efficiency for society.75

Efficiency
In all human endeavors as with all aspects of life, efficiency is not only critical but
also paramount for human progress. This is especially true with respect to economic
development where “culture that encourages a realistic and sophisticated view o f the
environment is likely to support better informed and more successful decision.”76 Within
this line of reasoning it becomes apparent that a culture that encourages good behavior
such as trust and integrity is likely to improve the coordination of different individuals’
decision, reduce transaction costs, and enhance efficiency to economic development.

Culture of Trust
Trust is an optimistic view o f parties’ intentions and moral commitments o f one’s
own. If parties have trust then each will validate the others beliefs and a successful

75 G unnar Mydral explains how society as a whole has to be elevated to high level within the
framework of development. It can be argued that his intentions were affiliated with moral aspect o f
development with works in convolution with scientific aspect o f culture. Societies that are able to dissect
and at the same connect the two stand the chance o f becoming sophisticated from an economic point o f
view.
76 Mydral. “What is Development?” 733.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

109

equilibrium outcome in the market will be achieved.77 Between the two cultural
prerequisites identified here as essential for economic development, trust is the most vital
one in all social organization.

7R

Indeed, if the culture o f scientific knowledge is

considered as the engine behind economic development, it is unequivocally right to
isolate trust as the lubricant that keeps the developmental engine running most smoothly.
For without trust, both the moral and the scientific cultures will break down, the trio
works simultaneously together. A market economy depends on the culture of trust. When
trust is high, buyers and sellers function with more confidence and less pessimism.
Different stages of the national economy can be safely delegated to different firms, since
the risk of contractual default between them is low. In every economy, developed or
underdeveloped, synchronization of valid and accurate information is essential to keep
the day-to-day mechanics of the economy operable in such a manner that reduces
transaction costs. When low transaction costs are associated with a high trust culture,
economic outcomes are realistically more egalitarian.79
In societies where a pessimistic view of human nature is prevalent, it is more
difficult to foster economic development because transaction costs are high and the
problems are well known.80 In other words, a person’s beliefs about human nature affect

77 A. Parfit, “Prudence, Morality, and Prisoner's Dilemma," in J. Elster, ed.. Rational Choice, 3459 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Amartya Sen, Ethics and Economics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
78 N. H. Leff, Trust. Envy, and the Political Economy o f Industrial Development: Economic
Groups in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).
79 J. Coleman, The Foundations o f Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1991); J. W idner and R. Putnam, Associational Life, Government Effectiveness and Economic Development
in Africa (Washington DC: World Bank, 1993); A. Mundt and J. W idner, “Researching Social Capital,”
Africa, Vol. 6, N o.l (Winter 1998): 1-24.
80 P. Milmgrom and J. Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management (Englewood Cliff:
Prentice Hall, 1992).
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both his own behavior and his expectation of other people’s behavior. Therefore,
pessimism of human nature in the absence of trust can precipitate self-validating distrust,
which will simultaneously ruin any potential for building a sustainable economic
development. Hence, a culture of trust is imperative in providing an optimistic view of
human nature to make economic development possible in a market economy.

High Trust Generates Labor Specialization
In a national economy the internal synergistic operation runs well to inhibit
economic bottlenecks when trust is high. Trust culture encourages specialization because
everyone surrounded by a cultural aura of trust becomes confident that the specialists
upon whom their needs rely on will not let them down. This sense of feeling does not
only apply to production, but rather permeates all other spheres of economic functions
including that of decision-making.
In the realm of economic development, trust is particularly important for all kinds
of investments, in the sense that human resource investors are assured that their
specialties will be demanded. Financial investors, likewise, have the trust that their
pecuniary investments will not only come back, but they do come back with profits. Due
to this unspoken assurance emanating from trust, people in high trust societies will be less
reluctant to release the resources they own to other people, or to delegate the decision
about the use of their resources to other decision-m akers.81 In both cases, the resource-

81 In field research conducted by Mundt and Widner in Botswana and Tanzania, it was found that
in regions o f those two African countries where there was trust among the members there was a high local
investment. For more analysis on that research, see Mundt and W idner, “Researching Social Capital.”
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owner and the decision-maker who make decisions on their behalf act judiciously but
with less hesitation when there is an atmosphere of trust. For example, the fact that forty
percent of Africa’s wealth is held in overseas investments, indicates that African
resource-owners have a greater sense of security investing overseas.82
The point is that civic cultures, particularly those that deal with efficiency,
honesty, and trust, constitute a social capital that shapes economic productivity. Even
though they are by no means the only factors involved in economic development, their
contributions are substantial. For example, it is the trust culture that allows economic
sectors like engineering departments in high institutions of learning to work jointly with
businesses on product development to create society’s material wants.83 In regard to the
decision-making, an obvious question that comes to mind is, how does the decision
maker arrive at a decision? This question represents critical function that is required of
leaders. This brings us to the relativism on leadership’s ability in establishing an
appropriate environment for economic development, which is judgment.

Judgment: The Deciding Factor
The question as to how leaders make strategic decisions to benefit their nations is
important because of the success and the consequences of that decision. Here too, culture
is important. In decision-making, some societies emphasize a theoretical approach and
others emphasize a pragmatic approach. People who choose a theoretical culture in

82 J. E. Stigliz and L. Squire, “International Development: Is it Possible?” Foreign Policy (Spring
1998): 138-51.
83 M ark Dogson, “Learning. Trust, and Technological Collaboration,” Human Relations, Vol. 46,
No. 1 (January 1993): 77-95.
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decision-making are usually more interested in understanding the situation before acting.
On the other hand, those who emphasize pragmatism believe that it is sufficient to know
that a certain action produces good results in certain circumstances without knowing
exactly why this is the case.84 The consequential differences between theoretical and
pragmatic decisions are reflected in social organizations and have an impact on economic
development. Therefore a leader’s orientation in any of the two has an impact on his or
her nation’s economic performance. However, the question as to which one of the two is
appropriate for development is difficult to discern.
In reality, neither of the cultural approaches has an absolute comparative
advantage over the other. Because, even though, the theoretical culture is useful for
interpretation of evidence, no single theory is ever entirely adequate. On a similar note,
pragmatism by itself is not always sufficient in interpreting evidence without theory. In
this respect, a successful combination of theory and pragmatism is the hallmark of a
successful decision-maker, a quality that is needed for the smooth functioning of all
economic systems.85
The foregone analysis has identified two key cultural characteristics, a scientific
culture with moral differentiation and a trust culture as prerequisite factors that are crucial
for sustainable economic development. The lack of these basic prerequisite cultural
elements will have a negative impact on any process of economic development. Societies
that have established these behavioral characteristics, and have improved their scientific

84 Casson, The Economics o f Business.
85 Mark C. Casson, The Entrepreneur: An Economic Theory (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982).
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culture, have been characterized as developed economic countries. Those that have not
established the prerequisite scientific cultures are still producing their material needs
within the constraints o f nature without the ability to manipulate natural laws to reduce
their transaction costs. This deficiency restricts those societies from harnessing natural
resources to meet their needs. For that reason, they are considered less developed
countries and associated with material poverty.
The last scenario is the predicament in which sub-Saharan African countries find
themselves. Leaders in that region of the world have not established the prerequisite
culture o f scientific know-how to understand the law o f nature so as to enable those
countries to manipulate nature to their advantage. Part of the leaders’ inability to establish
the appropriate culture stems from their deficiency in interpreting how the world around
them is constructed. This has become a hindrance to their ability to legitimate the culture
needed to make scientific knowledge possible.86
As the theoretical section of this chapter demonstrates, there is a relationship
between leadership beliefs and cultural environment within groups, such as a nation.
Hence the presence or the lack of a specific cultural environment can be attributed to
leaderships’ orientation and beliefs. Through this associational concept, the economic
situation in a country can be linked to the leadership’s ability to create the needed culture
for p ro sp e ro u s development. In this respect, it is important for leaders to be evaluated
based on the cultures they have legitimized and what becomes of the culture as far as
economic development is concerned.

86 Casson, “Cultural Determinants"; Adeleke, “Africa and Pan-Africanism.”
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As discussed in chapter one, both current political and economic pictures of
Africa demonstrate that developmental conditions of the African people look
disappointing; from hunger in Somalia and Ethiopia, to political violence in Sierra Leone,
Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The perturbing question is why Africa
finds itself in such a debilitating situation and why is it that the leaders are unable to
minimize the misery of the African people. In other words, why are the African leaders
unable to establish scientific cultures that could have made sustainable economic
development possible? There are multiple reasons for the current impoverished economic
conditions in the region. Many scholars have pointed to colonialism and postcolonial
encroachment in the global financial system.87 Returning to the colonial debate alone
will only propagate the same paralysis of analysis that African scholars have been
engaged in for the past half-century88.
However, in order to understand the African developmental predicament, it is
important to understand some of the images that were established during the colonial era
as explanatory tool for a point of departure. Out of those images is the difference between
colonial protectorate and direct rules that helps explain why there is high moral leadership
consciousness in Botswana as compared to Ghana. The theoretical logic of the difference
emanates from the fact that the protectorate system allowed traditional leaders to maintain
their institutional legitimacy, and in doing so preserved the moral contractual relationship
between leaders and followers in Botswana. On the contrary, under the direct rule that
existed in Ghana, the high moral cultural relationship that existed between leaders and

87 Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
88 Yefru, ‘T h e African Challenge."
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their followers was replaced by a low moral relationship between postcolonial leaders and
their citizens. Those images form part o f the background knowledge with which the
African leadership has failed to establish cultures conducive to economic development.
In other words, the images of colonized Africa that were established during the colonial
days have continued to influence the way most postcolonial African leaders think. For
that reason, I offer a brief summation of the origin of contemporary African cultural
dilemma that is inhibiting development in sub-Saharan African.

THE ORIGIN OF THE CULTURAL DILEMMA IN AFRICA
The lack of an appropriate economic culture in Africa is linked to how Africans,
mainly the postcolonial leadership, take culture in its totality as only a tool of selfidentification. In doing so, they apply both broad aspects o f culture in all areas without
the appropriate distinction. This problem originated from the colonial and post-colonial
attempts by African nationalist leaders to defend African culture against its denigration by
European scholars. It is one o f the issues, according to Masolo, which defines “the
struggle for identity in Africa by means o f definition of reason, its nature, and its
functions.”89 The attack of the African culture by Europeans and its defense by Africans
poses two problems. The first pertains to the question of how best to respond to the
European denigration of African cultures and traditions. The second problem relevant to

89 D. A. Masolo, African Philosophy in Search o f Identity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1994).
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African development is how can Africans achieve the prerequisites for economic progress
without compromising their identity.90

The Debate
There has long been a European discourse on Africa that underestimated,
denigrated, and disparaged African culture and identity. Specifically, the discourse
“denied that reason played a significant role in the development of society and culture in
Africa as it did in Europe.”91 To the Africans, this assertion was part o f an ideological
myth that was designed to legitimate the European colonial enterprise. C. L. R. James, an
authority on African politics, eloquently summarizes that myth in its elemental terms as
follows:
Africans are, and always have been, a backward and barbarous people who
have never been able to establish any civilized society of their own.... these
barbarous people were brought into contact with civilization by the brutalities
o f the slave trade. However, the unhappy slave trade is happily behind us, and
as a result of their contact with European civilization, primitive Africans be
come a part o f unified world.92
James’ description makes it quiet obvious that, to the colonizers, Africans were an
inferior race of people who lacked intellectual and moral acumen. Hence, it was deemed
the moral mission of the Europeans to “civilize” the Africans.

90 Oladipo, “Reason. Identity, and the African Quest.”
91 Ibid., 26.
92 James, Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution, 29.
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To correct this denigration of their culture by the Europeans, Africans had to
initiate a counter discourse. The purpose of the African discourse, of course, was to
reclaim African humanity. The reclamation was made in the form of demonstrating the
rationality of African beliefs within the framework of people’s world-views and cultural
practices. In epistemological terms, according to Oladipo, “it involved the postulation of a
form of rationality unique to Africans who, in metaphysical terms were said to have
personality different from, but not in anyway inferior to, the European personality.”93

THE SENGHORIAN PHILOSOPHY
One African scholar who exemplifies the above description is Leopold Sedar
Senghor who postulated an “ African mode of knowing.” For Senghor and his
followers,94 the African mode of knowing is a holistic one, in which dualism between
man and nature, subject and object, mind and matter are absent.95 The mode o f knowing
is contrasted with another, which is considered to be characteristically European. This
mode of knowing is analytic and therefore promotes all sorts of dichotomies between man
and nature, subject and object, and body and mind. Senghor gave the proper
characterization of this contrast when he wrote:

93 Oladipo, “Reason, Identity, and the African Quest,” 28.
94 K. C. Anyawu, The African Experience in the American Market Place (NY: Exposition Press,
1993). Anyawu is one o f the important followers o f Senghor’s philosophy.
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The life surge of the African, his self-abandonment to the other, it[is] thus actuated
by reason . But here the reason is not the eye-reason of the European, it is the
reason-by-embrace which shares more the nature of logos than ratio. Ratio is
compass, set-square and sectants, measure and weight, where logos, before its
Aristotelian tempering, before it become diamond, was living speech. Speech,
which is the most typically human expression of neo-sensory impression, does
not cost the object, untouched, into rigid logical categories. African speech, in
raising itself to the word, rubs and polishes things to give them back their original
color, with their transparency penetrating their surreality, or rather their under
lying reality, in its freshness. Classical European reason is analytical and makes
use of the object. African reason is intuitive and participates in the object.96
The above contrast marked the beginning of “the struggle over the control o f identity by
means of the definition of reason, its nature and functions” in the arena of scholarly
discourse in Africa.97 The Senghorian philosophy has become the mythological bedrock
upon which African leaderships unknowingly undermine the development of their people
by neglecting to create scientific cultures.
In Senghor’s response to the European degradation of African culture and
traditions, there is a certain kind o f African cultural traditionalism with certain
characteristics. Among them are affirmation of an African world-view that is guarded by
a distinctive form of rationality; a certain degradation of scientifico-technical rationality;
and an acceptance of intuition as an alternative source of knowledge. A situation
described by Oladipo as “an attempt to move African culture to a site out of criticism by
celebrating locality as the ultimate determinant o f cultural authority, and belief action;
and recommendation of a solution to the crisis of self-definition in Africa which says that

95 Senghor, Prose and Poetry.
96 Ibid., 33-34.
97 Masolo, African Philosophy, 40.
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Africans should discover what they were previously and take steps to be such again.”98
However, taking and accepting the demarcation made by Senghor carries negative
consequences for African development.

Implications of Senghorian Philosophy on Africa’s Development
Before we examine the implications of the above position, it is important to
understand that the Senghorian demarcation was a response to the European degradation
of the African personality. The dehumanization and the social subjugation were regarded
by Africans as not only insults but also as enemies “of their authentic African traditions
and their will to cultural identity.”99 It was, therefore, psychologically necessary that those
traditions and identities be protected by any means necessary. This protection was vital
not only because of the need to undermine the ideological myth of the colonial enterprise,
but also essential because of the need for the Africans to regain “pride in themselves as
worthy human beings inferior to none.” 100
In fact, there is nothing wrong with the affirmation of an African identity in the
face of European ethno-centrism. The problem, however, is that the Senghorian response
considers Africans as different from other human beings. It does that by claiming that
there is a process of human development that is unique to Africans, and concludes that

98 Oladipo, “Reason. Identity, and the African Quest,” 29.
99 W ole Sonyinka, Art, Dialogue, and Outrage: Essays on Literature and Culture (Ibadan,
Nigeria: New Horn Press, 1988), 179.
100 Rahman Anisur, ‘T o w ard s An Alternative Development Paradigm.” International Federation
Development Alternatives, Vol. 81 (April/June 1991), 23.
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the African culture, which is supposed to be a product of process, has already exhausted
its potential human creativity.
There are many flaws with this assertion of Senghor’s argument. First, let us look
at the response to the European degradation of the African culture, which I consider as
essential and necessary. Senghor attempted to argue for the equality of human race and
the need for the mutual recognition and appreciation of African cultures by other human
beings. However, to achieve this purpose, he asserts African difference and particularity.
While above concession may have been acceptable, it undermined African
identity with other human beings, mainly, the universals of culture.101 It would have
further, and ironically, confirmed the belief that Africans were people quite unlike others.
In other words the acceptance of the Senghorian philosophy in totality constitutes
Africans own self-denial of equality with other humans. On a more crucial note, it is
injurious to progress. For in that frame of thinking, a dynamic culture conducive to a
responsive development process degenerates into a liability that must be overcome.
It should, however, be noted that Africans do have certain cultural traditions
which are indigenous, mainly those in the reserve zone. However, they share with others
the cultural attributes in the universal zone. It is due to the possibility of this sharing that
allows them to interact and communicate with other human beings,102 especially at this
time of “globalization of the productive forces and relations, internationalization of

101 Kwasi Wiredu, “Are There Cultural Universals?" The Monist, Vol. 78, No. 1 (January 1995):
52-64.
102 Kwasi Wiredu, “A Philosophical Perspective on the Concept o f Human Communication,”
International Social Science Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1980): 199-206;
“Cannons of Conceptualization”
The Monist, Vol. 76, No. 4 (October 1993): 450-76.
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consumption patterns and markets, and the complexity in the intensification of the
operations of technological communications.”103
The above-discussed Senghorian philosophy o f complacency based on a thinking
embedded in a mythological paradigm inhibits African leaderships from formulating
policies towards scientific culture. A culture that could have allowed Africans to tap into
their domain of thought to understand natural law towards creation, and ultimately enable
them to enhance their productive capability and ameliorate natural transaction costs that
intensify regional poverty. Clearly African leaders have failed to establish scientific
culture to stimulate the region’s economic development. Ironically, the leaders of A frica’s
dominant institutions, e.g. politics and economics still follow the colonial paradigms that
were established before independence.104 In many cases the leaders have accelerated
negative aspects of those paradigms, rather than transforming the culture.
Contemporary leadership activities, especially in pursuit of personal wealth and
power, have been inhibiting the establishment of cultures of science and trust. As is
shown later, the postcolonial leaders actions have hampered economic development in
SSA. Their violent actions have been brutal, creating a culture of distrust. Most thinking
and planning in governments, firms, universities, educational systems, the media,
religious institutions, and other areas, in sub-Saharan Africa, continue to ignore the
culture of scientific analytical thinking. This ‘fatal flaw’ is what has undermined subSaharan Africa’s economic development.

103 N ’Dri Assie-Lumumba and Lumumba-Kasongo, The Silent Crisis in the International Transfer
o f Knowledge in African Societies and Their Education System: A Theoretical Perspective, CODESRIA
Bulletin, No. 4 (1994): 9.
104 Adeleke, “Africa and Pan-Africanism.”

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of th e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

122

SUMMARY
Leadership is obviously important for a nation’s development. In fact, the
literature suggest that a nation’s economic development depends on the ability of
leadership to transform the society and economy105 Along the same line of reasoning in
the literature, Casson also articulates the importance o f leadership in building a national
culture, which reduces transaction costs and ultimately enhances the economic
performance of a nation as a group. The author further notes that societies with high
morals and scientific beliefs as cultural attributes have high economic performance, while
societies with low characteristics of these cultural attributes lack the prerequisites for
economic development.106 However, despite the importance of leadership and culture in
development, little research has been done by modernization and dependency theorists in
linking the role of leadership to development in developing countries. Likewise, the
importance of cultural behavior has been neglected in economic development analysis by
the two major development paradigms with the assumption that economic rationality is
not compatible with cultural subjectivity.107
This chapter has laid out the theoretical framework for linking leadership, culture,
and economic development. The leadership, culture, and development (LCD) model
highlights the link between the three variables. Through interpretation and legitimation of
values, leadership establishes an accepted system of practice and behavior that leads to a
culture of a group. Culture as a technology is linked to economic development as social

105 Doe, "Economic Development o f Francophone Africa.”
106 Casson, The Economics o f Business.
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capital. It is also clear that from economic perspectives that culture is compatible with an
individual’s optimization. Deductively, therefore, it becomes economically driven and
becomes linked to economic development. The interactive phenomena between and
within these three variables demonstrate the relationship between leadership and
development.
Leadership is a process phenomenon where individuals with high moral capability
rally group members to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome for the group. Leaders
accomplish such objectives through interpretation and legitimation of social norms with
the power invested in them by the group members as a whole. Dialectically, the
legitimation and interpretation powers of leaders make them social engineers as well as
cultural architects upon whom citizens rely for society’s development. Cultures are
accepted systems of social practice of behavior and prescriptions, meaning that cultures
are meaningful orders of thoughts and values with maximum utility for human living.
There are two broad aspects of culture, namely, the reserve and the universal
zones. The reserve zone is mainly utilized for personal actualization that has no essential
bearing on the question of human well-being, truth, or falsehood. On the other hand, the
universal zone anchors cultural elements o f religion, the science of creation, and
philosophy, all of which possess human values essential to the quality of human life.
Religion offers moral attributes from which legal trust culture is derived, while scientific
beliefs offer informative ways of understanding technological manipulation and industrial
creation. Together, both elements form the basic fabric upon which social and material

107 Casson, ‘Cultural Determinants."
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development of a nation is erected. Therefore, the ability for leaders to establish these
cultural attributes in their societies may determine how the society as a whole develops.
Countries with leaderships that are able to engineer these scientific and moral
cultural attributes develop a certain level of social and scientific knowledge that, when
applied, become technology, which assists them in improving their living from nature. It
is the acquisition of the capability to improve and sustain living that constitutes
development. Based on this reasoning, the prerequisite for development becomes socioscientific culture. Hence, the lack of it brings about underdevelopment as most countries
in sub-Saharan Africa are experiencing. Development then is when a nation, through
accumulative causation by virtue of cultural process, acquires an understanding of the
natural law of creation and uses it to attain technological capacity enabling it to produce
diverse products and services to meet social needs.
As the analysis of this chapter shows, leadership and culture are therefore
essential to development, especially in regions of the world like sub-Saharan Africa. The
importance of these variables is reflected in the difference o f development in Ghana and
Botswana. In the next two chapters, the case studies of Botswana and Ghana empirically
demonstrate the relationship between leadership, culture, and economic development in
sub-Saharan Africa.
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CHAPTER IV
LEADERSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF BOTSWANA

There is a general consensus about the importance of leadership and culture in
national development. However, other than the work of Casson that focuses on leadership
and culture in industrialized countries and Eastern Europe, none of the development
theories articulate the relationship and the importance between leadership, culture, and
development.1 To strengthen the connection between leadership and development, a
theoretical analysis was devised in chapter three to establish the link between leadership,
culture, and development. The linkage was demonstrated with an LCD model. The
connection, as previously explained, was made possible through leadership’s ability to
legitimize some behaviors while denouncing others. This exercise of power by leaders
produces socially accepted systems of behavior. It was emphasized that societies that are
able to establish both high scientific and high moral cultures become prosperous through
industrialization and moral altruism. In order to draw qualitative conclusions about the
research question posed in chapter one, this chapter and the next consider two case
studies to address this question. I begin by examining the role of leadership in Botswana’s
development.
In 1800, the territory of modern-day Botswana was populated by a variety of
independent autonomous societies: Kwena, Ngwato, Ngwaketse, and Tawana.2 The
communities were affected by the global capitalist economy long before they collectively

1 Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”
2 Louis A. Picard. The Evolution o f M odem Botswana (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press,
1985); Sillery, Botswana: A Short Political History.
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became British protectorates.3 After becoming protectorates in 1885, the traditional
chiefs became colonial chiefs, partially subjected to the authority of European officials in
Mafeking, South Africa. In 1966, following decades of political maneuvering by
traditional leaders such as Tshekedi Khama and their Western educated young heirs, the
territories were amalgamated into the nation o f Botswana to gain its independence from
Great Britain. Recently, Botswana, under the tutelage of its leaders, has been considered a
“miracle” country with phenomenal economic growth and a well-entrenched multi-party
democratic system that surpasses almost all countries in sub-Saharan Africa.4
When Botswana attained its independence on September 30, 1966, few people
were optimistic about the country’s prospects for social and economic progress. Indeed,
there were many African experts who doubted whether Botswana would survive as a
separate nation. At the very least, the consensus was that it would become a “puppet” of
South Africa’s apartheid government or a Bantu state.5 The pessimism arose from the
superficial knowledge of British colonial history and from South Africa’s prior
determination to incorporate Botswana into the Union of South Africa.6 Perhaps, judging
from the overall economic performi-mce o f African countries, those who held a low
expectation of the country’s economic performance at the time may have had good

3 Neil Parsons, “The Economic History o f Kham a’s Country in Botswana 1884-1930,” in Robin
Palmer and Neil Parsons, eds.. The Roots o f Rural Poverty in Central an d Southern Africa, 113-143
(London: Heinemann Press, 1977); Isaac Schapera, Tribal Innovators: Tswana Chiefs and Social Change
1795-1940 (London: Atholne Press, 1970).
4 John D. Holm, “Democratization in Africa, Botswana: An African Success Story,” Current. No.
366 (October 1994): 36-40.
5 Michael Crowder. Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South West Africa,” The Journal o f Modern
African Studies, Vol. 25. No. 1 (1987): 25-42.
6 Picard, The Evolution o f M odem Botswana.
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reason. Land-locked Botswana’s geographic position left it at the economic and political
mercy of South Africa, making the prospects for development grim if not impossible.7
At independence, Botswana inherited an agreement with South Africa, under
which Botswana received a small share of South Africa’s custom revenue. In monetary
affairs, the country had no currency o f its own but used the South Africa’s rand}
Botswana’s only physical contact with free Africa was a ferry across the Zambezi River
through Zambia. The citizens lived off their cattle and what little food they could grow on
the arid land depending on rainfall. The economy was mainly agrarian and the population
had no alternative means of getting cash except to work in mines in apartheid South
Africa. The conditions were exacerbated by a long succession of drought years that
caused the death of hundreds of thousands of cattle and had left about 25 % o f the
population dependent on relief aid for their basic food needs.9 The country’s
transportation and communication depended on dry-weather roads and tracks. Its railway
system was owned, managed, and controlled by Rhodesia Railways.10 In short, when the
Protectorate was lifted and Botswana become sovereign, it was completely impoverished
and one of the poorest nations in the world.11

7 Crowder, ‘Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South West Africa."
8 Derek J. Hudson, T h e Establishment of Botswana’s Central Bank and the Introduction of New
Currency,” Botswana Notes and Records, Vol. 10(1978): 119-35.
9 John Cathie, Food Security and M acroeconomics Stabilization: A Case Study o f Botswana 196585 (Boulder: W estview Press, 1987).
10 Richard Paul Stevens, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland: The Former Higher Commission
Territories (London: Pall Mall Press. 1967).
11 Steven C. Smith, Case Studies in Economic Development
Company, 1997).

(NY: Addison-Wesley Publishing
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Botswana’s economic status today proves that the pessimists overlooked two
crucial factors in their assessments: the Tswana culture of cohesiveness (kagisano) and
the conscientiousness of their colonial and postcolonial leaders like Tshekedi Khama and
Seretse Khama. As a leader of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and president at the
time of independence, Seretse Khama remained undaunted by the above economic facts.
As a committed high moral conscientious leader, he followed the steps of both his
grandfather, Khama the Great, and his uncle, Tshekedi Khama, and devoted his energies
to maximizing his people’s welfare. Seretse did not allow himself to be caught up in the
surface glamour and inevitable privilege as a head of state.12
From the beginning of his leadership, Seretse emphasized and strengthened the
culture of self-reliance and internal moral discipline. He stressed the importance of
democracy and the involvement of the people in decision making through a combination
of traditional and modem institutions. He then designed the actions of his government to
promote such attitudes. Under his leadership, emphasis was given to promoting moral
principles that could prevent corruption so as to create the kind of society that could bring
development and prosperity to the people of Botswana.13 In his search for a path toward
the future, he began modernization by grafting institutions upon the roots of traditional
values and traditional practices under the rubicles of kagisano: unity, harmony, and a
sense of community.14 The achievements of his leadership, and that of his successors, are

12 Gwendolen M. Cater and Philip E. Morgan, eds.. From the Frontline (London: Rex Collings,
1980).
13 Roger Charlton, “Exploring the Byways o f African Political Corruption: Botswana and Deviant
Case Analysis,” Corruption and Reforms, Vol. 5 (1990): 1-27.
14 Pauline E. Peters, Dividing The Commons: Politics, Policy, and Culture in Botswana
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994).
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that no one questions the reality of Botswana’s existence and the economic progress it has
made since independence.
This chapter focuses on the role o f leadership in the development of Botswana.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the precolonial era
of Botswana. It demonstrates how leaders organized their societies towards social
development until the British protectorate was sought to shield the then Bechuanaland
from Afrikaner encroachment during the latter’s migration into Africa’s interior.15 The
second section focuses on the “colonization” era when the British tried to transform the
Protectorate Bechuanaland into a colony. I demonstrate how Britain’s colonization of
Botswana was indeed different from other colonies in Africa. The section also sheds light
on one of the “colonial” traditional leaders, Tshekedi Khama. He prevented both Britain
and South Africa from colonizing and annexing Botswana. This allowed the Protectorate
Bechuanaland to preserve its traditional institutions with leadership legitimacy to provide
political stability for its economic development in later years. Finally, the third section
looks at the postcolonial era of Botswana’s development under the tutelage of its first
President Seretse Khama and his successors.

15 Louis A. Picard, The Politics o f Development in Botswana: -4 M odel o f Success"! (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987).
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PRECOLONIAL BOTSWANA
Modem Botswana occupies a land that had been inhabited for thousands of
years.16 However, little is known about the origins, social, and political organizations of
the early people.17 The origin of the current population dates primarily from the
eighteenth century, when the migration of the Tswana groups moved westward from
South Africa.

Is

Prior to the creation of the protectorate, a series of tribal states occupied

much of the territory. The four main Tswana tribal states were Bangwato, Kwena,
Tawana, and Ngwaketse.19
Politically, the states were hierarchically organized with succession following
inheritance rules. The chief (kgosi) was the embodiment of the community as a whole. He
was the guardian of the people, their livestock, and their land. His powers included the
power to allocate land for grazing, crops, and residence. He was responsible for the
defense o f his people by mobilizing the males into an army when necessary. The chief
exercised his authority through a hierarchy of relatives and officials, including his close
advisors, traditionally known as the kgotla (ward). The kgolta was the administrative and
ideological center of the nation. The chief usually discussed national matters and law
making with his headmen before bringing them up for popular discussions in the public.

16 Jack Parson, Botswana: Liberal Democracy and the Labor Reserve in Southern Africa
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).
17 Ibid.
18 L. Ngcongo, “Origins o f the Tswana,” Pula. Botswana Journal o f African Studies,V ol. 1, No. 2
(1997): 21-46.
19 Ibid.
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20 In most of the states, non-Tswana groups and conquered communities were
subordinates and were retained in a position of servility by the Tswana. The non-Tswana
groups rendered tribute in the form of produce and labor, and, even within the Tswana
communities, there existed ranking of subordination.21
Economic control during this period was rooted in, but not limited to, the
ownership and control o f cattle. The chief (kgosi) owned large herds of cattle.22 The
ruling class allocated land, adjudicated disputes, and made decisions about social service
and collective behavior.23 The chiefs loaned their cattle to those on whom they depended
for political support. This socio-economic system that bonded the chiefs and their people
together was referred to as mafisa,24 The society’s production limits were the limits o f
technology, nature, and social and political relations. The societies were autonomous,
based on pre-capitalist tributary social formation marked by the existence of two major
classes. The peasantry organized communities and the ruling class that monopolized the
function of the given society’s political organization and exacted tributes from rural

20 Peters. Dividing The Commons.
21 Thomas Tlou, “Servility and Political Control: Botlhako Among the Batswana of Northwestern
Botswana ca. 1750-1906, ” in Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff, eds.. Slavery in Africa: Historical and
Anthropological Perspectives, 367-390 (Madison: University of W isconsin Press, 1978).
22 Parsons. 'T h e Economic History of K ham a's Country.”
21 Picard, The Evolution o f M odem Botswana.
24 Ismail Abdi Samatar, An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership and Colonial Legacy in
Botswana Development (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999).
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communities.23 Through this patronage-client system, both economic and political
systems were stabilized.26
To maintain the social structure for continuity, young people were inducted into
the social strata through age regimentation known as mephato that was always presided
over by a kgosi.21 The initiation process instilled a sense of group unity and educated
young people about Tswana tradition with emphasis on dedicating their loyalty to their
nation (morafe) and the ch ief.28 Using this indigenous traditional Tswana custom, the
leadership established a culture of solidarity and unity among young people to erase tribal
differences and to create unanimity among Batswana.

Was Botswana Ever Colonized?
Most writers on Botswana treat the country as a one-time colony of Great
Britain.29 This label is far from accurate because in the true sense of the word, Botswana
was never a colony but rather a protectorate.30 By the same token, others disagree with
this assessment and argue that there is no difference between a colony and a

25 Amin. “Unequal Development."
26 Tlou, ‘T h e Nature o f Batswana States.”
27 Peters. Dividing The Commons.
28 Tlou. ‘T h e Nature o f Batswana States.”
29 Samatar. An African Miracle.
30 Picard. The Evolution o f M odem Botswana,
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protectorate.31 This unresolved situation clouds the true status as to whether Botswana
was colonized or not, and therefore warrants a qualitative definitional clarification.
The difference between the two concepts is that the protectorate was based on a
mutual arrangement between the indigenous leaders who requested it, and the British
government who provided it as a security measure to keep the territories out of reach
from intruders. On the other hand, colonization was a rule that was arbitrarily imposed by
a colonizer.32 In this context, the protectorate could not be characterized as a colony;
rather it could be deemed as an alliance that was based on a mutual agreement between
two parties. With such a distinction, it is fair to assert that technically Botswana was not
colonized.
The cause for the protection and its request by the traditional Tswana leaders was a
protracted phenomenon in the late nineteenth century. However, the final straw that
precipitated it was the forced migration that brought Afrikaners to the interior of Africa.
During the course of their migration, the Afrikaners came in contact and in conflict with
the Tswana people that resulted in hostilities/3 As time went by, there were more and
more invasions of Tswana territories by the Afrikaners that led to the development of
informal protectorate agreement between the British government and Tswana chiefs.34
Subsequent German and Afrikaner hostilities against the territories forced the Tswana

31 William Duggan, ‘T h e Kweneng in the Colonial Era: A Brief Economic History" Botswana
Records Notes and Records, Vol. 9 (1977): 1-20.
32 Picard, The Evolution o f Modern Botswana.
33 Kevin Shillington, The Colonisation o f The Southern Tswana 1870-1900 (Johannesburg, South
Africa: Ravan Press, 1985).
34 Ibid.
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leaders into a formal protectorate alliance with the British, whom the Tsw ana chiefs
believed could help them resist the Afrikaner’s encroachment. Initially, the Protectorate
Alliance was deemed as a beneficial agreement between the two p a rtie s/3 The agreement
secured British influence in the region and access into central Africa. In 1893, during the
rule of Khama HI, the alliance led by the Tswana chiefs assisted the British to win the war
against the Matebeles from Rhodesia. For the Tswanas, the protectorate eased the
pressure of the Afrikaner encroachment from the southeast and the German pressure from
the west.36 Based on the described circumstance that led to the protectorate, it can be
determined that the conventional belief that Botswana was fully colonized by the British
is questionable. Even if that belief is upheld, it can be further argued that the colonization
was different based on traditional institutional and leadership freedom that existed in the
territories at the time.

The Difference in Botswana’s Colonization
The establishment of British protectorate meant Bechuanaland, as Botswana was
formally known, became part of the British Empire. Politically, the em bryonic stage of
the protectorate had both external and internal dimensions. Internally, parallel rule existed
until 1930. Under the mechanics of the parallel rule, each of the Tswana tribal chiefs was
recognized and retained authority under the supervision of a European layer of
administration. The parallel rule concept was based on the idea that the protectorate
administration and the native administration could be simultaneous but mutually

35 Parson, Botswana: Liberal Democracy.
36 Ibid.
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exclusive from each other. The external protectorate idea was also based on the concept
that protection affected only external affairs, including matters dealing with missionaries
and European affairs in the territories. It left the tribal leaders free to handle their internal
social affairs independently and without outside interference.37
Externally, the Protectorate Bechuanaland was viewed as an appendage of South
Africa in Britain. For example, the British representative in South Africa was, until 1963,
the chief administrative officer of the protectorate. He reported to the Dominion, not to
the colonial office in Britain. This management meant that the tribal territories were not
considered as colonies, but as part of the Dominions. Inherently, the association of the
territories with the Dominion implied that the British accepted their presence in
Bechuanaland not as colonizer, but regarded the territories as autonomous areas with their
legitimate traditional political and judiciary institutions. Based on the above analysis and
reasoning, the proclaimed Botswana colonization, if it is accepted as such, has to be
viewed with some reservations because it was different from other colonies that
experienced direct and indirect foreign institutional colonial rule.38 The main difference
was that while the other colonies suffered arbitrary imposition of colonial rule,
Botswana’s protectorate was based on a mutual arrangement. More importantly, the
Tswana leaders were allowed to rule their people without foreign authorities questioning
their domestic legitimacy.

37 Anthony Sillery, Founding a Protectorate: History o f Bechuanaland 1885-1995 (London:
Mouton. 1965).

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e c o p y rig h t o w n e r . F u r th e r re p ro d u c tio n p roh ibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

136

LEADERSHIP ROLE IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DURING COLONIAL ERA
The protectorate administration in the territories was assigned to cater to the
issues between the traditional rulers and the outside world, including missionaries and
European affairs in the territories. In this respect, the protectorate administration was to
act only as a foreign affairs department for the territories. Given this distinctive
assignment, however, the protectorate administration intervened constantly in issues
affecting social, political, and economic life in the territories in an attempt to impose
direct colonization over the territories.39 As if the intrusion into the domestic affairs was
not enough, the protectorate agreement was further thrown into confusion by the Act of
South Africa, which authorized the incorporation of the territories into South Africa.40 By
several accounts, South Africa raised the annexation issues several times only to be
unequivocally opposed, on all occasions, by the traditional leaders. 41
Between 1933 and 1934, under the leadership of Tshekedi Khama,42 the leaders’
stiffened resistance to the annexation paid off when the Statute of Westminister of 1931
and Statute of Union Act of 1934 solidified the sovereignty of the Union of South Africa.

18 Roger Gocking, “Colonial Rule and the Legal Factor in Ghana and Lesotho,” Africa, Vol. 6,
No. 1 (Winter 1997): 61-85.
39 Thomas Tlou, “A Political History of Northwestern Botswana to 1906,” Ph. D. Dissertation,
University o f Wisconsin-Madison, 1972.
40 P. M. Landell-Mills, ‘T h e 1969 South African Custom Union Agreement," The Journal o f
M odem African Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1971): 263-81.
41 Neil Parsons, “Victorian Triumph of An African Chief: Visit o f Bechuanan Chief to England
During 1890s,” History Today, Vol. 48, No. 4 (April 1998): 25-30.
42 Tshekedi Khama became the leader of Bangwato Royal Family after the death o f his brother
Kgosi Sekgoma in 1925. The rightful ruler, Seretse Khama, was only four years old and so by tradition,
Tshekedi become the regent until his nephew would have become o f age to rule. See Neil Parsons, Willie
Henderson, and Thomas Tlou, Seretse Klutma 1921-1980 (Braamfontain. South Africa: Macmillan, 1997).

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e cop y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r re p r o d u c tio n p rohib ited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

137

By construction, the Statute of Westminister of 1931 and the Statute of Union Act of
1934 voided the immediate transfer of the territories to the Union of South Africa.43 The
conjuncture temporarily prevented the annexation of the protectorate of Bechuanaland.
However, it did not deter the British government’s determination to colonize the Tswana
communities. The protectorate administration made changes aimed at placing the
territories under colonial rule. First, the Dominion Offices under which the territories
were protectively administered changed their patterns of recruitment for the protectorate
administrative service, by bringing officers directly from Britain as part of the “Oxbridge”
generation of colonial administrations.44 After those changes were made, the protectorate
administration presented indirect rule reforms to the traditional leaders and proceeded to
legislate the Proclamations o f 1934 and 1938.45
Under the proclamations, the British intended to alter the traditional ruling
institutions and their legitimacy with four major changes. First, the reforms intended to
regulate the traditional judiciary process o f the chiefs and to modify them with a British
system. Second, the proclamations established tribal councils to counsel the chiefs on the
affairs of Tswana communities. Third, they introduced a European bureaucratic
administrative system by which the chiefs would have administered the affairs of the
tribal communities. Fourth, in 1937, the protectorate administration introduced a British
financial system by creating tribal treasuries in each district with its own financial staff to

41 Picard, The Evolution o f Modern Botswana.
44 Louis A. Picard, “Role Changes Among Field Administrative in Botswana: Administrative
Attitudes in Social Change,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 1977.
4’ Picard, The Evolution o f M odem Botswana,
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assist the tribal leaders.46 The traditional leaders did not want any part of the colonization
and, under the leadership of Tshekedi Khama, waged a relentless political campaign to
save their peoples’ freedom and protect their land from going under the colonial yoke.

THE LEADERSHIP OF TSHEKEDI KHAMA: 1925-59
Tshekedi Khama came to the throne of Bangwato Royal House in 1925 as a
Regent when his brother Sekgoma Khama died, and the right heir to the chieftaincy,
Sekgoma’s son Seretse, was only four years old.47 Tshekedi’s rule was met with the
British proclamations of 1934 and 1938 that entailed strategies for direct colonization of
the territories. As leaders, Tshekedi and Chief Bathoen’s collective resistance to the
British proclamations was the second major political undertaking during the protectorate
era.48
The two leaders staged outright opposition to the British proclamations and
reforms. They sued the High Commission’s administration, citing that the imposition of
the proclamation impinged upon the internal sovereignty of the chiefs, which was
reserved under the treaty. The chiefs’ primary concern was that the proclamations “broke
with Tswana tradition and that they were in violation o f the original nineteenth century
Protectorate agreements with the traditional leaderships.”49

46 Ibid.
47 Crowder, ‘T shekedi Khama. Smuts, and South W est Africa.’’
48 The first m ajor leadership action taken during the protectorate was the activities that led to the
creation o f the “Native Advisory Council" which was utilized as a forum to resist the annexation o f the
territories by the Union o f South Africa. Picard, The Evolution o f Modern Botswana.
49 Picard, The Evolution o f M odem Botswana, 13.
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The court ruled in favor of the High Commission’s office by citing that the
protectorate administration had “unfettered and unlimited power to legislate for the
government an administration of justice among the tribes of the Bechuanaland
Protectorate and that this power was not limited by the Treaty or Agreement.”50 Even
though the chiefs lost the legal skirmish, they won a major battle. Due to the court
challenge by the leaders, the protectorate administration was forced to drop the concept of
tribal council—which would have undermined the traditional rule—from the reforms. In
addition, the earlier adopted judiciary reforms in the territories were also dropped, and the
traditional trial by the kgotlci (ward) was reinstated to become the only recognized
judiciary system of the “tribes.”51 In both practical and technical terms, those actions
released the territories from direct colonization and allowed their traditional institutions
to remain in place to evolve at a gradual pace. It also meant that Tshekedi’s conscientious
efforts led to the preservation of the internal institutions with their legitimacy sans
polarization among its social elements. This legacy has played a crucial role in
Botswana’s political stability and has contributed greatly to its economic growth.
The British attempt to colonize Bechuanaland was only one of the m ajor obstacles
that had the potential to undermine the Tswana social development during Tshekedi
leadership. Another indirect obstacle was the annexation of the territories by South
Africa, which was supposed to have been ameliorated by the 1931 and 1934 Acts of
Westminister that granted sovereignty to South Africa.52 How did the problem emerge,

50 Stevens, Lesotho. Botswana and Swaziland, 132.
51 Picard, The Evolution o f Modern Botswana.
52 Crowder, ‘Tshekedi Khama. Smuts, and South W est Africa.”
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and what did Tshekedi do, once again, to deliver these nations from another regional
colonial “yoke,” one that could have been more disastrous than the previous one
attempted by the British government.53 To understand this, I first examine the disguised
form in which the second annexation attempt came, and thereafter look at how Tshekedi
Khama resolved it in order to allow a gradual social development of his country.
As noted previously, during the 1920s and 1930s the Tswana leaders stiffened
their resistance and luckily won a victory against the incorporation of their territories into
the Union of South Africa. The solution was serendipitous rather than deliberate, owing
to South Africa gaining its sovereignty. The annexation problem emerged again after
World W ar II in a different form when Jan Smut asked for the incorporation of South
West Africa into South Africa as a reward for his participation alongside Britain in the
war against Germany.54 He tried to convince the newly created United Nations to
consider terminating the mandate of South West Africa, and to incorporate the territory as
an integral part of the Union on the basis of geographical contiguity, ethnic kinship,
natural economic advantage, and the desire of its people.35 That was how the disguised
annexation of the protectorate Bechuanaland emerged.

53 There was a general knowledge among the leaders in the territories as o f how poorly the South
African government treated its black population. Tshekedi was aware of the injustices that the South West
African people suffered from Germans and South Africa, since there were a large number o f refugees from
the area living in his own nation. See Picard, The Evolution o f Modern Botswana; Crowder, ‘Tshekedi
Khama, Smuts, and South West Africa.”
54 Crowder, ‘Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South W est Africa."
55 John H. Wellington, South West Africa and Its Human Issues (Oxford: Oxford University Press

1967).
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Tshekedi Versus Smut: The Leadership of National Preservation
Tshekedi’s decision to become involved in the South West Africa issue was
important. Almost form the day he became the Regency of the Bangwato, he resisted
British attempts to hand over the Bechuanaland Protectorate to South Africa. In 1946, the
concern was still very much a live issue to Tshekedi when Smut requested the integration
of South W est Africa. Smut had communicated to the House of Representatives in Cape
Town early that year his intention of raising the protectorate issue on his trip to London
because he believed that the territories were part and parcel of the Union.56 For that
reason, Tshekedi was concerned that if South Africa had gotten its way with South West
Africa, the people of Bechuanaland would have suffered a loss of sovereignty. By
subscribing to the domino theory concept, Tshekedi reasoned that once one o f South
Africa’s neighbors had fallen into her clutches, others like Bechuanaland would have
inevitably followed. From this line of reasoning, Tshekedi saw the bureaucratic
annexation o f South West Africa by Smut as his “fight” which deserved his full
leadership attention to wage.57
Tshekedi began his strenuous campaign to prevent Smut from taking over South
West Africa by asking the British High Commissioner in South Africa to forward, on his
behalf, a telegram to the presiding officer at the United Nations dealing with the mandate
of South West Africa. In the telegram, Tshekedi urged the UN to consider using its power
to keep South West Africa as a separate entity from South Africa until its permanent
policy of suppression of black people had ended. By using South African apartheid

56 Tshekedi Khama. The Case fo r Bechuanaland (Mafeking. South Africa: Pretoria Press, 1946).
57 Ibid.
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policy, Tshekedi had invoked a human rights issue, which South Africa, itself, had helped
the United Nations to design. Therefore, the case received the UN’s attention.58
After sending the telegram to the United Nations, Tshekedi mobilized the support
of his fellow chiefs behind his campaign against Smut. All the chiefs signed a
memorandum to the United Nations’ Trusteeship Committee to consider four issues that
were important to them and the people in South West Africa. First, they requested that the
committee disregard the request for incorporating South West Africa into the Union of
South Africa. Second, they urged the committee to consider transferring the mandate of
South West Africa directly to Great Britain. Third, they requested that the Bechuanaland
Protectorate be given a free and direct access to a West Coast port. Fourth, and finally, all
the chiefs requested that a pending case that related to refugees from the South West
Africa, who were in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, by that time, be given
consideration.59 By including the chiefs, Tshekedi skillfully transformed the case from a
personal one to a national one and gave it more weight on the international level.
To intensify his campaign, Tshekedi devised another strategy. He related the case
to a discriminatory measure that had been imposed on Indians in Natal and then sought
help from the Indian delegation at the United Nations to lead the opposition against
Smut’s request.60 Thereafter, Tshekedi gave extensive interviews to newspapers in South
Africa in which he condemned South Africa’s imperialist ambition in the region. He
described the Union as having oppressive imperialist intentions aimed at undermining the

58 Crowder, ‘Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South West Africa."
59 Ibid.
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development of neighboring territories as a way of ensuring cheap labor for its mining
industries.61 Even in Britain where Smut’s support was high, Tshekedi organized his
network of allies to put pressure on the British government to refuse granting Smut his
wish. In the end, due to the long campaign waged by Tshekedi Khama, the United
Nations’ General Assembly rejected the incorporation of South West Africa into the
Union of South Africa.62 In the process, Tshekedi also made the possibility of the
incorporation of his own territories into the Union of South of Africa more remote and
assured them their future independent sovereignty.
The above activities by Tshekedi and his compatriots during the “colonial era”
demonstrate the effects of leadership roles on national political development of modem
day Botswana. From those activities it becomes obvious that each step towards
Botswana’s nationhood was a well thought out strategy orchestrated by both “colonial”
and precolonial leaders. Leaders such as Khama the Great, for example, had established
the culture of national cohesiveness underpinned by Tswana’s philosophy of unity,
harmony, and a sense of community.63 The same culture motivated Tshekedi and his
successors to carry out Botswana’s national development. From the preceding analysis
one sees that Tshekedi and his colleagues strengthened the Tswana-dom by building a
unified political force indivisible by outsiders so as to preserve Botswana’s sovereignty
with its institutional legitimacy.

“ Ib id

61 "Chief Tshekedi Attack Union Policy,” Pretoria News July 21, 1946,
62 Wellington, South West Africa and Its H um an Issues.
63 Cater and Morgan, From the Frontline.
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By all accounts, Tshekedi was a moral conscientious leader who believed in
preserving the freedom of his people and their land.64 He was unique as an African leader
in taking up the cudgel against colonial rulers on behalf of both his own people and
neighbors. Tshekedi stood apart as the first African leader to see the possibilities of using
the newly created United Nations to plead a case o f oppressed people against the
colonizer. The most remarkable aspect of Tshekedi was his high moral commitment to
the cause he championed, freedom for his people. The commitment was shown in his
devotion to the Tribal Council functions that propelled the territories into the nation of
Botswana under his nephew, Seretse, who he had groomed to carry the torch of Tswana
development.63 As a leader, Tshekedi continued his father’s work by preventing the
Tswana nations from falling into colonial hands.

Leadership Role in Economic Development in “Colonial” Bechuanaland
As noted, the colonial economy of Botswana was organized according to patronclient pre-capitalist structures. Subsistence living was based on extensive cattle
production and food crops supplemented by hunting. During the protectorate era, with its
capitalist activities, subsistence farming was not utterly stripped off as a means of
production. Some land was retained and family labor remained intact, as did political
relationships with the headmen and chiefs.66 Those social activities continued to be
underpinned by mafisa practices and relations of subordination. However, the demands of

64 Mary Benson . Tshekedi Khama (London: Oxford University Press, 1960)
65 Neil Parsons. William Henderson, and Thomas Tlou, Seretse Khama 1921-1980.
66 Samatar, An African Miracle.
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additional needs, in the form of money to pay colonial taxes, brought increasing
economic burdens upon families. These financial burdens made the prevailing economic
system inadequate.67
Initially, the capitalist approach did stimulate economic growth in the autonomous
territories. The economy prospered by supplying wagon trains, controlling trade, and
responding to other opportunities. This fact implies that the capitalistic activities, in
themselves, did not undermine the integrity of the Tswana economy and polity. In fact,
the capitalist approach helped the leaders find new avenues for surplus in manufacturing
goods. The leaders considered capitalism a rational response to market opportunities.
However, they failed to see it as an exogenous influence for the reorganization of
production. In other words, to the leaders, there was no need for restructuring the social
relations of production.68 However, coercive capitalism subordinated the territories to
extract agricultural produce and create a labor reserve to serve mining interests in South
Africa.
The mechanism used to create the labor reserve was underpinned by two
strategies. The first one was peasantization, a process whereby a small group o f people
who wanted to make living by agricultural production (through selling part o f their crops
or herds) was created. The second was proletarianzation, where part of the society was
made to become wage earners by selling its labor for low wages to the South Africa

67 David Massey, A Case o f Colonial Collaboration: The Hut Tax and Migrant Labour.
Unpublished Paper, 1978; Quil Hermans, “A Review of Botswana’s Financial History 1900-1973."
Botswana Notes and Records, Vol. 6 (1974): 89-116.
68 Parsons. ‘T h e Economic History o f Khama's Country."
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mines.69 In some areas, the strategy was orchestrated by restricting access to land through
the creation of freehold farms or limiting peoples’ access to land through the
formalization of territorial boundaries.70 In conjunction with the limitation of access to
land, new demands in the form of taxation were also placed on households. The first tax
was in the form of a hut tax in 1899 in the amount of one British pound per year. In 1919,
the hut tax was increased in conjunction with another tax, the native tax, which was
imposed on households.71
The search for money, due to above cited conditions, compelled people to
participate in market economy outside subsistence agriculture.72 Even in the agriculture
sector, bureaucratic restrictions were devised. For example in the cattle market, there was
an imposition of discriminatory regulation in South Africa against Bechuanaland cattle
imported to South Africa. The regulation decreased Batswana’s ability to sell cattle,
which was the main agriculture product from the territories.73 Other forms of economic
activities, such as trade, were restricted to Batswana. The restriction spared no social
class in Bechuanaland and even chiefs were denied licenses to trade.74 These strategies

69 Martin Legassick, “Gold, Agriculture and Secondary Industry in South Africa, 1885-1970: From
Periphery to Sub-Metropole As a Forced Labour System." in Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons, eds.. The
Roots o f Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa. 175-200 (London: Heinemann, 1977).
70 Donald Kowet, Land, Labor, Migration and Politics in South Africa: Botswana. Lesotho, and
Swaziland (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978).
71 Massey, Case o f Colonial Collaboration.
72 Isaac Schapera, Migrant Labour and Tribal Life: A Study o f Conditions in Bechuanaland
Protectorate (London: Oxford University Press, 1947).
73 Hermans, “A Review o f Botswana's Financial History.”
74 Alan Best, “General Trading in Botswana. 1890-1968,” Economic Geography, Vol. 46, No. 4
(October 1970): 598-611.
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were employed to undermine the pre-protectorate economic system in order to allow the
creation of a colonial economy that served capitalist interests.
Against all odds, the chiefs tried to resuscitate the local economy, but to no avail.
For example, Kgosi Isang Pilane of BaKgatla organized a tribal boring scheme to get
water to the cattle grazing lands for his subjects.75 Unfortunately for the leaders, however,
the social and economic facilities of the ruling class were intertwined with the
underdeveloped facilities of the subordinate majority class. In so doing, the capital
formation of the indigenous ruling class upon which the rest of the economic structure
relied was undermined.76 With the chiefs loosing their autonomy and the British taking
away lands, the chiefs were left with less means to improve their economies.77 Even the
land that was available could not produce much food for the population due to lack of
manpower since the male aged 15-44 years were working in South African mines.78 The
poor economic conditions of the territories were further exacerbated by natural conditions
over which leaders had no control. Drought and rinderpest epidemic were two natural
conditions that worsened economic conditions.
In the capitalist labor reserve sector, there were only few jobs created to manage
the administrative system and the economic infrastructure of the labor reserve. The jobs
that were created included clerks, translators, messengers, drivers, and shop assistants.

75 Zbigniew A. Konczacki, Jane L. Parpart, and Timothy M. Shaw, eds.. Studies in Economic
History o f Southern Africa: South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland, Vol. 2 (London: Frank Cass, 1990).
76 Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons, eds.. The Roots o f Rural Poverty in Central and Southern
Africa (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1977).
77 Kowet, “Land, Labor, Migration and Politics."
78 Schapera, M igrant Labor and Tribal Life.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

148

These jobs required some education including basic literacy at a primary level. Thus a
small cadre of primary school teachers developed. Such groups of people were necessary
for the protectorate enterprise as a link between the peasants and the proletarians, but
they also became essential in making the whole economy of the protectorate viable. The
access to education, regardless of how mediocre, was the only important economic
transformation that occurred during the protectorate era. In terms of material
development, the traditional protectorate leadership achieved less for their communities.
A reversal of that was not seen until Botswana achieved its independence in 1966.
The lack of economic achievement during the protectorate era does not suggest that
colonial leaders played a less important role in the Botswana’s development. Rather,
while the traditional leaders used their time in winning the “war” of sovereignty by
preventing direct British colonization and South African annexation, they put material
development at the bottom of the priority list to be tackled by the next batch of leadership
under the tutelage Seretse Khama.

THE LEADERSHIP OF SERETSE KHAMA
Seretse Khama was bom in Serowe to the Bangwato Royal Family in
Bechuanaland in 1921. After the death of his father in 1925 and that o f his mother in
1930. Seretse was put under the custody of his uncle, Tshekedi, the then regent of the
Bangwato Throne. In 1931, at the age of ten, Tshekedi sent Seretse to school at Lovedale
in South Africa. Later, Seretse attended schools at Adams College in Natal, Tiger Kloof
in Rhodesia, and in 1945, he left from Cape Town to study law at Oxford University.79

" Henderson, “Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation.”
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Marriage and Exile
After one year in Oxford, Seretse moved to London. At a dance at Nuffled House
in June 1947, he met Ruth Williams. They fell in love and married in September 1948.80
The marriage outraged Tshekedi who felt that his nephew did not consult him. In addition
to his uncle, authorities in Southern Rhodesia and in South Africa also protested against
the marriage. Both countries used their influence through the office of the High
Commission in South Africa to induce the British to ban Seretse from Bechuanaland. The
process through which the banishment was undertaken was by deception. In early 1950,
Seretse Khama was invited to London to discuss the constitutional position of his
marriage to a white woman. Once in London, he was asked to renounce his chieftaincy
and Seretse declined to do so. Based on his refusal to renounce the chieftaincy, he was
banned from returning home to Bechuanaland.81
During his exile in London, Seretse became involved with the decolonization
discussions that were taking place in British political life. As he became more involved in
the British political life and in the decolonization process, Seretse modified his attitude
towards the office of the chieftaincy. When the relationship between him and his uncle
improved, Seretse intensified his efforts to return home. In 1956, Seretse Khama
reluctantly renounced the chieftaincy and agreed to return to Bechuanaland as a private

80 John Redfem, Ruth a n d Seretse (London: Gollancz, 1955).
81 Ibid.
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citizen with the proviso that he could participate in the political life in the protectorate of
Bechuanaland.82

The Return to Bechuanaland
On October 10, 1956, Seretse returned to Bechuanaland with the intention o f re
establishing himself as a cattle farmer.83 Seretse’s return coincided with political reforms
that had been initiated by the High Commissioner. The protectorate administration, based
on instructions from the High Commissioner’s office, was gradually phasing out the
principle of hereditary rule and was replacing it with a limited form of local
representative democratic system. Based on his uncle’s recommendation, Seretse
accepted a position as an assistant Tribal Secretary that allowed him to follow Tshekedi
to tribal meetings. Despite these developments, Seretse downplayed any interest in active
national political leadership, even though he had been involved in development
discussions with the then District Commissioner of Serowe. It was only after the death of
Tshekedi in 1959 that Seretse began to assert his political position.84
Prior to Tshekedi’s death, Seretse had been encouraged to play an active role in
the process of political change. In 1958, as an assistant to his uncle, he attended both the
Joint Advisory Council (JAC) and African Advisory Council (AAC) meetings with
Tshekedi and made contributions to the debates o f both organizations. In the JAC, he
supported a call made for the creation o f a Legislative Council (Legco) by Tshekedi and

82 Henderson, “Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation.”
83 “Seretse Given a Delirious W elcome,” New Age (Johannesburg), Vol. 2. No. 51 (October 18,
1956).
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Russel England.85 After the death of Tshekedi in 1959, Seretse took over his uncle’s
position in the Tribal Council.
At some time before the Legislative council meeting in June in 1961, Russell
England approached Seretse Khama with a proposition of forming a political party.
Seretse respectfully declined Russell’s suggestion and expressed no interest at the time.
Despite this seeming disinterest. Seretse continued to play a role in the legislative council.
According to Henderson, Seretse was operating on a similar traditional realm like his
grandfather Khama the Great and Tshekedi, his uncle, all before him. He was concerned
about the issue of stability and racial harmony. He opposed communism and approved of
discussions and negotiations as strategies towards resolutions o f conflict of interest.86

The Formation of Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)
In August the same year, Seretse met President Kennedy’s Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs George Mennen Williams during the envoy’s visit to
Botswana.

87

Shortly after the two men met, during the November 1961 session of the

legislative council, Seretse called together a caucus o f Legco African members and urged
them to consider forming a political party. With the nod of the African members, Seretse

84 Henderson, “Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation.”
85 Russell England was born in Poland but identified himself as a British Bechuanalander. He was
agriculturist turned settler fanner and by that time had lived in Bechuanaland for forty years. See Parsons,
Henderson, and Tlou, Seretse Khama 1921-1980.
84 Henderson, “Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation.”
87 Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou. Seretse Khama 1921-1980.
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founded the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP).88 To his dismay however, Chief Bathoen
and Chief Mokgosi disassociated themselves from the party.89 At the party’s inaugural
meeting in Gaborone in 1962, its leadership was diverse. There were few white members,
and a significant number of the members were heirs to the traditional chiefs.90 At the
inaugural, Seretse Khama was elected president of the party, and the vice-president
position was given to Archie Tsoebebe. Benjamin Steinberg, a white trader and a cattle
owner, was elected treasurer.91

The Consultation Constitutional Talks
At the beginning of 1963. the secretariat of the protectorate administration invited
the leaders of the three political parties, Philip Matante of Botswana People’s Party
(BPP), Seretse Khama of Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), and Motsamai Mpho of
Botswana Independence Party (BIP), together with the traditional chiefs to attend
constitutional talks at Lobatse.92 At the constitutional talk, a plan was devised to forge a
unified leadership between the traditional chiefs and the new emerging political officials.
In a more cautious fashion, the leaders made concessions to each other and agreed on a
political equation that would serve the interest of both parties and the nation at large. The

88 Ibid.
89 Quett Masire was a well-educated journalist who prior to joining Botswana Democratic Party
worked for Bantu W orld as a correspondent. He was a self-made man who possessed a large herd o f cattle
and later became the President of Botswana after the death o f Seretse Khama in 1980.
90 Samatar, An African Miracle.
91 Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou. Seretse Khama 1921-1980.
92 Parson, Succession to High Office in Botswana.
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new generation political parties’ leaders reserved an un-contested place for the traditional
leaders in the new legislative assembly underlined by a constitutional guarantee. The
traditional leaders, in tum, voluntarily transferred the national institutional legitimacy to
their heirs who had become the new political officials. In a bipartisan manner, the two
groups of leaders put Tswana national interests beyond their personal interests to build a
united leadership.93
The smooth transition and leadership unification can be traced to the membership
of the BDP and the leadership provided by Seretse Khama. At the outset K ham a adopted
the concept of political socialization.94 Based on that concept, the elements o f the BDP
were drawn from the then newly reformed tribal councils in all the territories, whose
members were mostly the heirs of the traditional leaders.93 By using that strategy, Khama
assured his party of political legitimacy in that the choice of the membership defused
potential power struggles in his would-be nation. Moreover, his choice of mem bership
signaled that his party stood for a unified nation as opposed to the inter-tribal federalism
that existed at the time.96 Furthermore, by adopting political a socialization strategy,
Khama implicitly minimized the concept of tribal politics that has commonly undermined
nation-building efforts in Africa.

93 Ibid.
94 Here political socialization is defined as a gradual orientation o f various com m unity member
into participating in national political process. See Michael Jones-Correta. “Different Paths: G ender,
Immigration and Political Participation” International Migration Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Sum m er 1998):
326-49.
95 Parson, Succession to High Office in Botswana.
96 ‘T h e Role o f Chiefs Today” Botswana Daily News, 27 November 1969.
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To solidify legitimacy, traditional leaders were included in the new political
machinery in two ways. First their heirs who were in the tribal council that had become
part of the BDP were included in the political process. In addition, Khama supported a
constitutional mechanism for guaranteeing the chiefs a place in the new legislative
assembly in the form of a House of Chiefs.97 Those political moves allowed Khama to
forge a bond between the new political officials and the old traditional leaders.98 Khama’s
political transformation was well orchestrated and executed with the right socially
legitimized class, to the extent that the roles and functions of social classes were
maintained to avoid social conflict and political instability.
In essence, the transition was smooth and the leadership was unified for two
reasons. First, most of the new political officials were heirs to the traditional chieftaincies
whose political institutions had ruled in the territories since precolonial times. Second,
colonialism had preserved the traditional leaders and their institutions without subverting
them and replacing them with new leaders. Seretse Khama. for example, was the heir to
the Bangwato royal family. Chief Bathoen, who by constitutional arrangement, sat in the
House of Chiefs was a traditional ruler o f the Bangwaketse royal house.99 The
smoothness of the transition was also due to the fact that the changes related only to the
political apparatus and not to the vicissitudes of the power base. In other words, the
Botswana constitutional talks that prepared the nation for independence was mainly

97 Parson, Succession to High Office in Botswana.
98 Randwezi Nengwekhulu, “Some Findings on the Origin o f Political Parties in Botswana,” Pula,,
Botswana Journal o f African Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1979): 47-76.
99 Kogsi Sir Beepitsto, the current Botswana Ambassador in the United States, is the son of C hief
B athoen.
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related to the political machinery than changes in political power as occurred in other
African nations during the decolonization process. This partially accounts for much of the
success of the transition that assured the future political stability and economic growth of
Botswana.

The General Election Towards Botswana’s Independence
The Lobatse constitutional arrangements of August 1963 changed the political
landscape of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Thereafter, the important political issue at
hand was no longer about cooperation and conflict; rather it was the concern for the
principles and policies of future governance. After the talks, political developments
advanced smoothly, and in 1964 the secretariat announced March 1st, 1965 to be general
election date.

ino

The three registered political parties, Botswana Independence Party,

Botswana People’s Party, and Botswana Democratic Party intensified their campaigning.
The BDP was represented at all 31 constituencies; the BPP contested in 26 constituencies,
and the BIP contested in 24 constituencies. On March 1st, 1965, the elections were held
peacefully all across the territories. The election results came in slowly from the
beginning but when the votes were finally tallied, the BDP won by a landslide victory,
capturing 28 out of the 31 seats. The BPP managed to secure three seats with its leader,
Matante being elected in Francistown. The third party, BIP, did not secure any seats. Out

100 Konczacki, Parpart. and Shaw, Studies in Economic History o f Southern Africa.
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of 140,788 votes cast, Seretse Khama’s BDP received 113,167; Philip M atante’s BPP
received 19,964; and Motsamai Mpho’s BIP received only 6,491 votes.101
On March 9th, 1965 the new cabinet was swom in with Seretse Khama as the first
Prime Minister. In his inaugural address to the new legislative assembly, Khama set a
developmental agenda for Botswana. He emphasized democratic principles, efficiency,
and education as the important attributes that the country needed. In conjunction with
those Khama made it clear to his countrymen that, due to the lack of qualified Batswana.
his government was adopting a policy of slow localization for the civil service. This, he
argued, was important because the country needed an efficient bureaucratic system to
effectively administer the aid that the country was receiving towards development. Based
on that need, the prime minister told his people that his government was retaining all
foreign expatriates who wanted to stay and work in the country. Emphasizing the scarcity
of resources and the dependency of Botswana on foreign aid, Khama emphatically told
the people, especially the leadership, to refrain from waste and corruption. The avoidance
of corruption later became the theme in many of his speeches, which helped foster a lack
of tolerance for corruption in Botswana. 102
After the general assembly elections in 1965, national political events proceeded
quickly. On the morning of September 30th, 1966 Botswana became independent with
Seretse Khama swom in as its first president. Botswana adopted an open parliamentary
democracy with a president and national assembly, which comprise Elected Members, an

101 Dieter Nohlen. Michael Krennerich, and Bernard Thibaut, eds.. Elections in Africa: Data
Handbook ( NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), 113.
102 Naomi Mitchison. Mochudi Dairies No. 13 (NY: University o f New York Press, 1965).
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Attorney General, and the House o f Chiefs.103 Seretse Khama and members o f his
leadership team had built a nation out of the territories that his uncle Tshekedi had
protected from being colonized by the British. The same territories that his grandfather,
Khama the Great, 81 years earlier, had unified into a confederacy and for which he sought
British protection.104

EVALUATION OF BOTSWANA’S DEVELOPMENT SINCE INDEPENDENCE
At independence, the economy of Botswana depended on a meager agriculture
production supplemented with migrant labor remittance from South Africa.105 The per
capita income of the population was estimated at $50, and the country had about twenty
miles of tarred road, with its capital Gaborone still under construction. Besides traditional
herbalists, no modem healthcare facilities were in existence for most of the local
residents.

106

Statistically, there were only 247 primary schools in Botswana with a total

enrollment not exceeding 75,000 or half of the school age population.107 There were only
1,400 students enrolled at the secondary school level (Table 4-1). Jobs were scarce in
Botswana therefore people were forced and work in mines in apartheid South Africa.

103 Peters, Dividing The Commons.
104 Parsons, “Victorian Triumph o f An African Chief.”
105 Cathie, Food Security.
106 Parson, Succession to High O ffice in Botswana.
107 Republic o f Botswana, Transitional Plan fo r Social Economic Development, School o f Oriental
and African Studies Library (London: London University Press, 1966).
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Table 4-1
Education Enrollment in Botswana 1966-95
1980

1985

1990

116

171

223

283

319

63.0

71.0

91.2

105

114

112

3.9

12.1

18.3

32.3

56.9

104

7.5

15.4

18.8

29.0

42.5

63.5

.140

.465

.928

1.77

3.68

5.50

1966

1970

75

83

Primary Sch Enrollment Rate %

50.0

Secondary Enrollment (in’ 000)

1.4

Primary Sch. Enrollment (in’000)

Secondary Enrollment Rate %
University Enrollment (in’000)

—

.083

1975

1995

Sources: Clark J. Leith, Botswana: A Case Study o f Economic Policy Prudence and
Growth, Washington DC: World Bank, 1999; Republic of Botswana, Transitional Plan
fo r Social Economic Development, London: London University Press, 1960

As Table 4-1 shows, the trends however have changed since independence.
Primary school enrollment has gone from 75,000 in 1966 to 319,100 in 1995. That
translates into a yearly average compound growth of 5.4%. Meanwhile, secondary school
and university enrollments, from a much lower base at independence, have grown at
double digits growth rates. Improvements have also occurred in other human
development sectors. For example, the healthcare system fared badly when the country
came under the leadership of Seretse Khama. As depicted in Table 4-2, there were only
four doctors to every 100,000 people and only about 1,000 hospital beds in the country.
Today, Botswana’s healthcare system has considerably improved. Virtually all urban and
83% of the rural residents are within 10 miles of a primary care facility.108 This has
resulted in a dramatic fall in the infant mortality rate from 95 per 1000 live births in 1970

108 Kwesi Dugbatey, “National Health Policies: Sub-Saharan African Case Studies 1980-1990,”
Social Science and Medicine, Vol. 49 (1999): 223-39.
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to 58 in 1997.109 The improvement has largely been due to leadership's policy and
strategies, which since the mid-1970s have emphasized the widespread provision of
primary health care.
Since 1980, the government has expanded the health care system by increasing the
hiring o f nurses in the primary care clinics (Table 4-2). Compared to other sub-Saharan
African countries, where the average is 50 nurses to every 100,000 people, Botswana has
217 nurses to every 100,000 people. Similarly, there are 24 doctors to every 100,000
people in Botswana as compared to the region’s average of 11 doctors to every 100,000
people. In addition to human development, Botswana has experienced an increase in its
per capita income. In 1998, the per capita income of Botswana was $3, 070 as compared
to the $50 at the time o f independence. Moreover, the country’s per capita income in
1998 was six times sub-Saharan Africa’s average per capita income that stood at $500.'10

Table 4-2
Botswana Health Care
*A/A 95
1966

1980

1985

1990

1994

4

15

17

18

24

11

—

124

156

216

217

50

1.00

2.0

2.5

3.2

3.3

Doctors per 100,000
Nurses per 100,000
Hospital Beds (in‘000)

Sources: Clark J. Leith, Botswana: A Case Study o f Economic Policy Prudence and
Growth, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999
*A/A 1995: The African Average.

109 World Bank, Development Progress Indicators (Washington, DC: W orld Bank, 1999).
110 World Bank. World Development Indicators. 1997.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m is s io n of t h e cop y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

The above economic picture supports the testimony of many social science
observers in sub-Saharan Africa who have positively evaluated Botswana’s economic
performance.111 The evidence clearly shows that Batswana living conditions since
independence have far surpassed those of the protectorate era. To some, the cause of
Botswana’s success has been attributed to the country’s revenues from its mining
industries.112 Others have associated the economic improvement to the ethnic
homogeneity of the country.113 These factors have clearly contributed to the overall
development of the country, but they are not sufficient conditions to explain Botswana’s
achievement because the mining wealth could have been squandered, as is obvious from
other countries experiences.114 There are countries in the region such as Nigeria, Gabon,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ghana that possess mineral endowments that are
greater than those of Botswana. However, none of these countries has experienced the
level of growth that Botswana has nor has any utilized its resources effectively to upgrade
the living conditions of its people. By comparison, in spite of the doubling of the
country’s population, the real GDP of Botswana has increased about tenfold since

111 Christopher Colclough and Stephen McCarthy, The Political Economy o f Botswana: A Study o f
Growth and Distribution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); Charles Harvey and Stephen R. Lewis,
Policy Choice and Development Performance in Botswana (Basingstoke, South Africa: Macmillan, 1990);
J. R. Parkison, “Botswana: Adjustment to Wealth,” in Chris Milner and A. J. Rayner, eds.. Policy
Adjustment in Africa: Economic Studies in Economic Development, Vol. 1(Basingstoke, South Africa:
Macmillan, 1992): 197-219.
1.2 Stephen R. Lewis Jr., ‘T h e Potential Problems o f Diamond-Dependent Development,” in
Charles Harvey, ed.. Papers on Economy o f Botswana (London: Macmillan. 1981): 14-28
1.3 Smith. Case Studies in Economic Development.
114 Gould. Bureaucratic Corruption.
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independence, and in most years the country’s economic growth has been in double
digits.115
From Botswana’s political and economic achievements since its independence, it
is hard to doubt the country’s prosperity. But then, one may legitimately ask, how did
Botswana manage to achieve this impressive growth with improvement in its human
development? Just as some associate Botswana’s success with its diamond revenues,
others hold the conviction that the success of the country’s economic growth and
improvement in living conditions is associated with the country’s leadership quality.116 It
is the latter conviction that this study postulates. Towards supporting that argument, the
next section focuses on some of the economic policy methodologies that Khama and his
successors have used to achieve the current economic status of Botswana.

Khama’s Solicitation and Utilization of Foreign Assistance
After Botswana’s independence, Seretse turned his attention to the financial issues
he deemed critical for his country’s development. To secure more finance for his
country’s budget and economic development, Seretse and Quett together with a *eam of
negotiators went to London to secure a post independence British contribution to match
Bechuanaland’s financial needs.117 Thereafter, Khama devised a strategy for future
development assistance. He flew to Israel where he sought and received commitments
from the Israeli government to assist Botswana with technical aid in dry-land farming and

115 John A. Wiseman, ‘T h e Slow Evolution o f the Party System o f Botswana." Journal o f Asian
and African Studies. Vol. 33. No. 3 (August 1998): 241-64.
116 Samatar. An African M iracle; Harvey and Lewis. Policy Choice.
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water development. In addition to Great Britain and Israel, Seretse Khama solicited aid
from other parts of Europe and North America.118
By the early 1970s, Khama’s solicitation of aid and his democratic political
ideology began to pay dividends. Nordic countries, the United States, Canada, and West
Germany responded with multifaceted assistance. Botswana received grants, volunteers,
and technical aid in such areas as healthcare, education, water, road construction, and
economic development administration. The country’s donors were diverse and consistent
with aid, and Botswana leaders used the foreign aid strategically, with most of it going
into social services. Norwegian aid was primarily channeled into healthcare and road
construction, while Swedish aid was directed towards water development for people and
livestock in rural areas. Aid from the United States focused on provision of primary and
secondary education as well as private sector developments while aid from Great Britain
was used for balance of payment adjustm ents.'19 After securing financial aid. Khama and
his government turned to institution building to create an environment for the effective
utilization of resources toward development.

Khama’s Institution Building
At independence Botswana’s economy was in poor condition and needed to be
resuscitated. To do that, Seretse Khama embarked on building effective institutions. Out
of the many institutions he built, the Ministry o f Finance and Development Planning

117 Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou, Seretse Khama 1921-1980.
"® Stephen John Stedman, ed., Botswana: The Political Economy o f Democratic Development
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993).
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(MFDP) and the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) have become hallmark institutions
in Botswana’s economic growth. In order to make the institutions effective and efficient,
policies were designed to shield them from particularistic interventions by the group’s
individual members. The successors of Khama, former president Masire and, now, Festus
Mogae have adhered to the same approaches to enable them to protect the collective
interests of the country as opposed to personal gains.

Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP)
Established in 1970, the MFDP is the institutional brain to the economic policy
making process. Its central role includes overseeing the complex development planning
and Botswana’s budgetary process. By maintaining the no tolerance for corruption policy,
which became the theme in Seretse Khama’s public speeches during his presidency, the
institution thoroughly checks for corruption in all national dealings in two w ay s.120 First,
before any project is included in the country’s development plan, sectoral ministries are
obliged to justify the project’s economic viability. Projects that pass the viability test are
the only ones included in the annual development budget as a precaution to avoid budget
deficits and corruption. Second, to avoid corruption in the MFDP itself, the institution
and the government have created monitoring and auditing systems to ensure and enforce
proper legitimate use of public funds.121 This has allowed the government and its leaders

119 Cole lough and McCarthy, The Political Economy o f Botswana.
120 Carter and Morgan, From the Frontline.
121 Jan Isaksen, Macroeconomic Management and Bureaucracy: The Case o f Botswana. Research
Report No. 59 (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of Africa Studies, 1981).
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to hold all public officials accountable for abusing their office and, as such, minimized
systematic corruption and excessive rent seeking in the institution.122
In Botswana, the stringent practices of institutional autonomy and accountability
to ensure efficiency and effectiveness are not limit to the financial sector. The leaders
apply similar standards to the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC), one of the important
institutions that serve the interests of the general population. It was established in 1966 as
a non-profit institution to cater to the needs of livestock owners. Also operating
autonomously and adhering to the policy against corruption, the BMC has become very
effective and beneficial as the sole exporter of meat and it’s by-products for both the
peasantry and the dominant classes. The commission has successfully generated capitalist
economic development in the livestock industry for the last three decades. It manages its
financial affairs without falling into the two main traps of African parastatals: huge losses
and heavy extraction of resources from producers.123 The commission has increased
supplier/producer prices and consistently returned bonuses to producers despite
monopolistic power. For the last twenty years, the BMC’s affiliate, the Ministry of
Agriculture’s Animal Health and Production Department, has helped the rural livestock
owners by keeping the country disease-free, particularly from foot and mouth disease.124

122 Kenneth Good, “Corruption and Mismanagement in Botswana: A Best C ase Example,” The
Journal o f M odem African Studies Vol. 32, No. 3 (1994): 499-521.
121 Samatar, An African Miracle.
124 Ibid.
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The achievements of both MFDP and BMC in Botswana’s economy stand in
sharp contrast with the general decay of African public institutions.125 The problems of
African institutions fundamentally represent the incapacity of African leaders to create
institutions capable of successfully imposing a developmental agenda. These failures
emanate from the leaders’ inability to recognize that their collective interest requires
discipline within the leadership ranks. That is. the need to protect state institutions from
themselves and other interest groups. The achievements of the MFDP and the BMC
demonstrate that Botswana’s leaders, unlike their counterparts in other sub-Saharan
African countries, do realize their social responsibility and the necessity of building
effective public institutions which ensure society’s common interests. In Botswana the
elements responsible for this leadership success include a disciplined leadership
consciousness and an efficient accountable civil service shielded from power politics.126
Khama adopted similar precautionary measures in other policy areas, especially in
monetary, trade, and mining policies.

Policies in Mining and Trade
Botswana’s independence in 1966 was followed by the discovery of diamond
deposits in the country. With cautious planning, Khama negotiated with private investors
in the mining industry to receive a portion o f the equity in the mining operation at no
charge for his country. By the arrangements, he was able to extract for his nation a

1:5 Zambia, Botswana’s neighboring country, has some of the worst managed parastatals
institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. See Kenneth Good, “Systemic Agricultural Mismanagement: The 1985
'Bumper' Harvest in Zambia," The Journal o f M odem African Studies, Vol. 24, No. I (March 1986): 25784.
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significant share of continuous mineral revenues. In addition to the distribution of the
revenues from the mining operations between the nation and foreign investors, the leaders
strategically bought into capturing a share of the market rents by participating in the
Central Selling Organization (CSO). As a member of the cartel, this allowed Botswana to
obtain long-term access to high profits in mineral rents.127 The policy has paid off for
Botswana by generating most of its national revenues from the diamond mining industry.
The careful leadership planning and policies are not only directed to the mining industry
but are also applied to the trade industry.
In trade, shortly after independence, Seretse Khama embarked upon export
promotion to strengthen the trading position of Botswana. First, he renegotiated
Botswana’s trading position in favorable terms within the South African Custom Union
(SACU), of which the country had been a member since 1910.128 The renegotiated
arrangement has allowed Botswana to earn more revenues as its imports grew rapidly
with the growing diamond revenues.129 Khama and his successors have utilized the
regional trade association to reach other markets. The provisions of the arrangement
allow members to have transit rights through other members’ territories with goods for
other destinations. Since Namibia’s independence in 1990, the provisions have allowed
Botswana to gain another route to a seaport besides those o f South Africa.

126 Leith, Botswana: A Case Study o f Economic Policy.
127 Harvey and Lewis, Policy Choice.
128 Cathie, Food Security.
' 2', Clark J. Leith, ‘T h e Static Welfare Effects o f a Small Developing Country’s Membership in
Custom Union: Botswana in South African Customs Union,” World Development. Vol. 20, No. 7 (1992):
1021-38.
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On the international arena, Khama played a key role in securing market access for
Botswana’s beef. He personally attended the Lome Convention to arrange for his country
to receive a special provision of 90 percent rebate on European Union (EU) import levy;
thereby allowing Botswana to receive a net price nearly equal to the internal European
price for its beef exported to the EU.130 Even though beef exports are modest relative to
diamonds, the widespread ownership of cattle allows this trade policy of Khama to have a
positive effect over a large part of the population, especially farmers in the rural areas.

Botswana's Monetary Policy After Independence
Botswana’s financial sector was basic in 1966 when independence was achieved.
Currency in circulation was the South African rand and banking activities were provided
by agencies, which opened a few hours a week.131 With the prospects of growing
revenues from minerals, the leaders decided to issue a national currency for Botswana. In
1974, the leadership began preparation for the country’s own central bank, and a new
currency, the pula, was launched in August 1976.132 In establishing monetary policy to
manage the licensing of financial institutions and foreign exchange reserves, Khama
adopted a transparent system to regulate monetary affairs.133 His administration placed
monetary affairs under the joint management of the Central Bank and the Ministry of

130 Clark, J. Leith, “Botswana’s International Trade Policies,” in J. S. Salkin, ed.. Aspects o f the
Economy o f Botswana: Selected Papers, 527-548 (Oxford: James Curry, 1997).
131 H. C. L. Hermans. ‘T h e History o f the Bank o f Botswana,” Bank o f Botswana Research
Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 2 (September 1996): 1-48.
132 Hudson. ‘T h e Establishment o f Botswana's Central Bank.
133 Republic o f Botswana, A Monetary System fo r Botswana: Government White Paper,
Government Paper No. I (March 1975).
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Finance and Development as a strategy to check government fraud and to prevent any
potential corruption.134
In 1982, due to high influx of revenues from newly discovered mining centers, the
country accumulated a substantial balance of payments surplus. To prevent inflation the
leadership, under president Quett Masire, refrained from unnecessary expenditures and
devised new ways to put Botswana’s money to effective use. The leaders did two things
in this regard. First, operating on a fixed exchange rate, the government set the country’s
rate of exchange level below what would have been indicated by the equilibrium flow .lj5
Masire’s policy allowed Botswana to deliberately avoid “Dutch Disease,” a well known
economic problem caused when a strong currency undermines exports. Second, the
government devised a strategy, with the World Bank’s cooperation, to invest its excess
foreign reserves to eam more revenues for the country.136 President Masire turned his
nation’s excess foreign reserves into an income earning property for their country. Today,
the use of excess foreign reserves to generate income has become second only to the
diamond industry as an income generating instrument for Botswana.iy7
Since independence, Botswana’s leaders have strategically devised three major
revenues sources to fund social developments. The first one relates to the mining
industry, which since independence has consistently generated high revenues for the

134 Herman, ‘T h e History of the Bank of Botswana.”
135 Clark J. Leith, “Botswana's Exchange Rate Policy,” Bank o f Botswana Research Bulletin, Vol.
14. No. 2 (September 1996): 21-35.
136 Lina K. Mohohlo. "Central Bank as a Protector o f National Wealth: Botswana’s C ase,” in J. S.
Salkin, ed.. Aspect o f the Economy o f Botswana: Selected Papers, 241-271(Oxford: James Curry, 1997).
137 Ibid.
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country. The second one is the renegotiated of the customs union arrangements in
conjunction with trade arrangements with the EU, which also continue to generate
revenues for the country. The third is the strategy devised by the leaders to use excess
foreign reserves to generate more revenues. Botswana’s leaders have managed to channel
most of the revenues towards improving basic living conditions.
Large portions of the revenues spent by the government have gone into basic
infrastructure, including electricity, water, roads, and government services to the mining
and agriculture sectors. These expenditures have been growth promoting, because without
such infrastructure and service very little growth would have occurred. The ongoing
success of the country’s economic improvements has been mostly due to the quality of
the country’s leadership.

DOES BOTSWANA’S ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT MEAN DEVELOPMENT?
If the definition of development means the reduction o f poverty,138 then the
argument can be made that Botswana is on the right track. However, if development is
defined, as the acquisition of the ability to produce diverse goods and services to satisfy
the population’s needs, then Botswana, like many other African nations, has not been
successful. The nation does not produce most o f its industrial needs. The reason for this
deficiency is because Botswana lacks the technological industrial capacity needed to
manufacture its own industrial goods. In economic terms, it does not have the

138 George Akeya Agbango. ed.. Issues and Trends in Contemporary African Politics: Stability,
Development and Democratization (NY: Peter Lang, 1997).
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comparative advantage in industrial production due to a lack of scientific culture in
creation.
This deficiency is obvious by looking at its production sectors. Despite the
country’s accomplishments in economic growth, a careful observation reveals that the
structure of its economy is dominated by mining and service sectors. Those two areas
have grown considerably since independence. As Table 4-3 shows, the mining industry,
which was at only an exploratory stage during independence, grew to 31.6% of the
national GDP in a decade. By 1986, due to more discoveries of mining centers, the sector
constituted more than half of the country’s GDP. As of 1998, mining was still
commanding 48.0% of the national economy. Simultaneously, the service industry
reached a high of 50.5% of GDP in 1996 and declined slightly to 48.6% in 1997.
Conversely, the agriculture sector has continuously declined from 25% of GDP in 1976 to
3.40% in 1997. Similarly, the manufacturing sector of the country that was 6.8% in 1976
has also consistently declined throughout the years to 4.7% of G D P in 1997.
The inference here is that Botswana’s economy lacks growth in its industrial
sector; hence, the dwindling of its industrial production sector in the overall economy.
This suggests that while the leaders have been effective in devising monetary and trade
policies, they have failed in other important areas. Despite their high moral convictions
that have helped to improve living conditions for the people, they have failed to devise a
coherent progressive policy towards establishing scientific culture; a culture that is
needed to help gravitate the nation towards industrial creativity and ultimately induce
industrialization.
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Table 4-3
The Structure of Botswana National Economy 1976-97
% of Gross Domestic Product

1976

1986

1996

1997

Agriculture

25.0

5.5

3.8

3.4

Mining Industry

31.6

58.3

45.7

48.0

6.8

5.1

4.7

4.7

Service

43.5

36.2

50.5

48.6

Private Consumption

60.9

37.3

30.0

28.4

General Govt. Consumption

18.2

22.0

28.2

26.8

Imports of Goods & Service

62.4

47.3

35.3

37.5

Industrial Manufacturing

Sources. World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank,
1998).

Botswana’s Scientific Culture
As Table 4-3 shows, the size of the country's industrial production signals that
there is very little scientific culture in Botswana. By all accounts, basic science and
intermediate science courses are part of the country’s school curriculum up to the
university level.139 However, the leaders have failed to synergistically integrate scientific
education and industry.140 In this case, Botswana, just like the rest of sub-Saharan African
countries, has no definite scientific policy that attempts to establish long-term scientific
culture towards industrialization. The industrial related technology that is being pursued
in Botswana is small scale technology known in many African countries as Appropriate

139 Carr, “Intermediate Technology in Botswana.”
140 Ahmad, “Science and Technology.”
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Technology (AT).141 AT focuses on devising technologies that are deemed suitable and
applicable to rural food production and processing. From a development perspective, the
major problem with AT is that it is more labor intensive and less technologically oriented,
and therefore lacks the potential to assist in developing the culture needed for Botswana’s
industrial development.142 For that matter, Botswana cannot claim that adopting AT will
propel it towards scientific culture capable of industrialization and ultimately assist it in
attaining sustainable economic development.143
In other words, Botswana lacks adequate national policies aimed at establishing
scientific culture of creation suitable for industrialization and sustainable economic
development as defined in chapter three. For this reason, and despite its high moral code
of ethics that minimizes corruption, Botswana is not yet developed. What Botswana’s
leadership, however, has done is to distribute social services to benefit its citizens by
using the revenue from its depleting natural resources endowments. This they have been
able to do because, as the improvement of the country shows, the leadership has fostered
one of the two aspects of the prerequisite cultural elements of development mentioned in
chapter three, namely, moral culture. The evidence shows the veracity of this occurrence
because corruption is low in the country, and the leadership has been altruistic to provide
social services to the population.144 In comparison with other sub-Saharan African

141 Aaron Segal, “Appropriate Technology: The African Experience," Journal o f Asian and
African Studies, Vol. 27. Nos. 1-2 (1992): 124-33.
142 Francis Stewart, ed.. Macro Policies fo r Appropriate Technology in Developing Countries
(Boulder: Westview, 1987).
143 R. S. Eckaus. “Appropriate Technology: The Movement Has on A Few Clothes On,” Issues in
Science and Technology, Vol. 3, No. 2 (W inter 1987): 62-71.
144 Good, “Corruption and Mismanagement in Botswana."
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countries, as the human development indicators have shown in this case study, the leaders
have devised effective policies to improve the living conditions of their citizens.

SUMMARY
This chapter has shown that the precolonial Botswana leaders organized their
societies based on the political rule of an inherited hierarchical system underpinned by a
patron client economic system.145 In those days, the leaders established a well-entrenched
political and economic apparatus that served the mutual interests of both the ruled and the
rulers. Economically, production in Botswana at the time was mostly agrarian, and the
elite and leaders controlled the distribution of land and owned most of the cattle that were
used for both production and consumption. Through their cattle loaning (mafisa) system,
the political leadership was able to establish a social fiduciary' relationship that supported
and maintained social stability.
The social system was maintained by inducting young people into the social strata
by age regimentation. The process instilled a sense o f group unity among the Tswana
youth by acting as a catalyst to create unanimity among Batswana by erasing tribal
differences.146 That social methodology, created by the precolonial leaders, facilitated the
creation of a Tswana-dom that crystallized in the ethnic homogeneity founded in
Botswana today.147 In precolonial days, social matters concerning the whole community
were democratically deliberated in traditional wards (kgolta). In times of security crisis,

145 Parson. Succession to High Office in Botswana.
146 Tlou. "A Political History o f Northwestern Botswana.”
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leaders like Khama the Great rallied other traditional chiefs to form military alliance to
repel attackers from their territories. By these organizational strategies, political and
economic issues were managed by leaders to serve the welfare of their communities and
to facilitate social development.
In the mid 1800s. the migration of the Afrikaner Boers into the interior of Africa
brought them into conflict with the Tswana nations. The Tswana sought an alliance with
the British government that later turned into a protectorate agreement. Politically, the
protectorate was underlined by a parallel rule that allowed the protectorate administration
and traditional rule to exist simultaneously, but mutually exclusive from each other. The
arrangement obliged the British to recognize the traditional leadership as autonomous
authorities without impinging on their legitimacy to rule. The arrangement also made the
British government treat the Bechuanaland protectorate as part of the Dominions. The
association of Bechuanaland with the Dominions allowed the territories to remain
autonomous with their indigenous internal political institutions and its leadership with
less foreign institutional influence. This characteristic made Botswana’s colonization
different from other African colonies that experienced both direct and indirect foreign
institutional colonial controls that came with leadership different from what existed prior
to colonization.148
When the British attempted to change the protectorate arrangement of Botswana
by replacing it with direct colonial rule, the traditional leaders resisted the change and

147 Smith. Case Studies in Economic Development.
148 Michael Crowder. West Africa Under Colonial Rule (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1968); Crocking , “Colonial Rule and the Legal Factor."
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preserved their legitimacy. Tshekedi Khama. the traditional leader of the Bangwato at the
time, took the High Commissioner to court to stop it from imposing outright colonization
on Botswana. In addition to his efforts against the British, Tshekedi successfully used the
United Nations to prevent South African from annexing the High Commissioner’s
territories of which Botswana was part. By Tshekedi’s relentless efforts, traditional
leaders consciously averted Britain’s colonization and South Africa’s annexation
attempts. The leaders efforts preserved Botswana’s domestic institutions with their
legitimacy without creating polarization among its social elements. This legacy has
played a crucial role in Botswana’s political and economic development. Despite colonial
leaders’ political accomplishments, they were unable to transform Botswana’s economy
to benefit their people materially. The territories were turned into labor reserves to serve
capitalist interests in South African mines. At independence, Botswana was plagued with
high unemployment and with a very poor economy.
As the new leader of independent Botswana, Seretse Khama emphasized and
strengthened the culture of self-reliance and internal discipline. He stressed the
importance of democracy in decision-making through a combination of traditional and
modem institutions and designed the actions o f his government to promote such attitudes.
Khama emphasized moral principles that avoided corrupt attitudes among leaders and
brought about economic growth and prosperity for his people. In search o f benign paths
towards economic growth, he began modernization by grafting institutions such as the
MFDP and BMC on roots of traditional moral values under the principles of kagisano:
unity, harmony, and sense of community. He did that by emphasizing rural development
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and human development by providing clean water, education and health facilities for his
people.
Today, with effective governance and little corruption, Botswana’s per income
capita stands above $3000. Leaders since the death of Khama in 1980, such as former
president Quett Masire and current president Festus Mogae, have followed the moral
culture laid by Khama. Both leaders have taken actions and made policies that meet the
needs of their people in villages. Improvements have been done to develop cattle raising
by providing grazing land for the poor. However, these actions by no means suggest
Botswana has solved its development problems.
Botswana’s economy still remains agrarian with most of its revenues coming from
raw materials in the mining industry. There is hardly any industrialization in Botswana
due to lack of scientific culture to empower creativity and technological innovations.
Unfortunately, the leaders have failed to design policies that could establish the scientific
culture needed to make sustainable economic development possible. However, in
comparing both economic and political standards in Botswana with other countries in the
region, Botswana leaders have made great progress in laying a moral cultural foundation
upon which development can flourish.
The development of Botswana has undergone three leadership phases, with each
phase adding some progressive dimension to it. The first phase was led by Khama the
Great, who laid the foundation for ethnic homogeneity by bringing different tribes
together under the Tswana-dom. Khama sought British protection against Afrikaner
Boers who attempted to overtake the Tswana territories. In 1895, he led a delegation of
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chiefs to London to oppose the annexation of their land by Cecil Rhodes o f South Africa
in order to protect the freedom of his people and their land.
Tshekedi Khama led the second phase during the ‘colonial’ era. During that time,
Tshekedi successfully resisted the British attempt to impose outright colonization and
preserved the established leaders legitimacy. The preservation of that legitimacy provided
the foundation upon which political stability has been provided for Botswana’s
contemporary development. The third, and the current phase, also began under the
tutelage of Seretse Khama. It started at the dawn of Botswana’s independence and it is
still unfolding. Seretse started the third phase by politically doing two things. First he
united the chiefs and the commoners by transforming the individual tribal councils and
their territories into the nation of Botswana. Second, he transformed the country’s rule of
inherited hierarchical system to an open democratic system.
Economically, Seretse transformed the previous production system that used to be
based on patron-client relations into one based on the class relations of capitalism. In
order to achieve a political stability, he transformed the traditional aristocrats into
elements of petty bourgeoisie. Knowing that economic development was the ultimate
goal that his people were seeking, he fostered an anti-corruption culture and built
autonomous, but accountable, institutions catering to collective interests. His personal
distaste for corruption prevented leadership kleptocracy, thereby enabling the nation to
channel available revenues from the mining industry into social services (e.g., education,
healthcare, and clean water) to improve the welfare of his people.
Before Khama’s death in July 1980, he had laid a moral foundation that has
become a guiding principle for his successors. The immediate successors o f Khama,
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Quett Masire and the current successor, Festus Mogae have adhered to democratic
principles, promoted intolerance for corruption, and sought bureaucratic efficiency in
serving the people of their country. No one knows for sure how and where the third phase
will end. For now, however, Botswana is an example in sub-Saharan Africa. The
country’s experience demonstrates how leadership and moral quality are central for social
and economic progress.
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CHAPTER V
LEADERSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF GHANA

Modem day Ghana occupies a land that used to be controlled by the Ashanti
Empire. However, until the emergence of that Empire, the area was occupied by different
nation-states such as the Fanti, Denkyira, and Dagomba. The nations had two types of
leadership namely Chieftaincy and Kingship. Chiefs headed tribal groups, and the Kings
headed hegemonic nations. Each of the leaderships organized their societies based on
their own set of rules and institutions. The communities were agrarian societies, which
also engaged in commerce. Moreover, the global capitalist economy affected them before
they were colonized in the late nineteenth century. Before the colonization, however, the
leaders failed to collectively organize their societies. Instead, they led their individual
states and waged wars against one another for political and economic control.1
Following colonization, the British put the nations together and named it the Gold
Coast. Thereafter, the British demoralized the traditional leaders, disenfranchising them
from the political economic decision-making process. In the mid twentieth century,
nationalist movements emerged to demand self-rule. In 1947, nationalists such as Joseph
B. Danquah and others organized UGCC toward the objective of nationalization. The
Gold Cost attained independence in 1957 under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, a
Ghanaian who had studied in the United States during the depression years.2 In 1966,

1 Fynn, Ashanti and Its Neighbours.
2 Kwame Nkrumah, The Autobiography o f Kwame Nkrumah (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons,
1957).
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military officers, led by Lieutenant-General E. K. Kotoka and Colonel A. A. Afrifa,
toppled in a bloody coup the elected government of Nkrumah. Between 1966 and 1981,
Ghana alternated from one military regime to another, which included intermittent
civilian leadership. This turmoil of political corruption and poor economic policies ruined
the country’s economy. Today, Ghana is considered one of the poorest countries in the
world.
W hen Ghana attained independence in 1957, the nation was the envy of its
neighbors. Though its economy was predominantly agrarian, it had foreign exchange
reserves in excess of US $300 million.3 The country was self-sufficient in food supply
and food imports had a negligible trade impact.4 Many African experts were optimistic
about G hana’s future development.5 Undoubtedly, judging from Ghana’s economic
position and its educated class at the time, there was no cause for alarm in terms of it’s
future prosperity. It was the leading world producer of cocoa, which was commanding
high prices on world market. The nation’s mining of gold and diamonds was not the
highest in the world, but both had good prospects. In addition, the forestry industry
provided some of the best wood in West Africa, together with the human potential that
was waiting to be tapped.
G hana’s current economic status has proven that the optimists overlooked the role
of leadership’s ability in establishing the appropriate culture to induce economic
development. Since Ghana’s independence, its leaders have taken the economic

3 Dickson A. Yeboah, “Control Theory Application to Economic Policy Analysis in Ghana,”
Applied Economics, Vol. 17, N o. 3 (June 1985): 395-419.
4 Gold Coast Annual Reports 1892-1954 (NY: Andronic, 1972).
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development of their country hostage by failing to establish a domestic culture that is
conducive to development. As the first national leader, Nkrumah failed to forge an
alliance between party officials and traditional leaders to create the needed political
stability upon which economic development could thrive.6
From the beginning of his leadership, Nkrumah avoided democratic dialogue. He
adopted instead a means of establishing a national stability through the legislative
Preventive Detention Act. In addition, he failed to establish high moral principles to
avoid corruption, allowing his party officials to use state economic institutions to satisfy
their personal interests as opposed to fulfilling collective national interests.7 In search of
economic development, Nkrumah failed to transform the traditional system into a
democratic capitalistic system, which values the force of self-motivation that unleashes
human creativity vital to economic development. Instead, he innovatively modified the
socialist economic system, which he thought was more closely reflective o f traits of the
African culture and which could have been operable in Ghana.8 This path, however,
stagnated the national economy. For failing to institute a combination o f capitalism with
high moral standards, Nkrumah legitimized corruption and it was intensified by his
successors, thus thwarting Ghana’s economic development. The legislative preventive act
also laid the foundation for an authoritarian political culture that his successors from the

5 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
6 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f Stability.
1 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f an Illusion.
8 Yuri Smertin, Kwame Nkrumah (NY: International Publisher, 1987).
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military leadership and civilians leadership modeled and effectively used to undermine
both political and economic developments.
In 1966, Nkrumah was overthrown in a military coup. Successive leaders adopted
both cultures of corruption and authoritarianism that have become the hallmarks of
development in Ghana. Both cultures together created the recipe for Ghana’s poor
economic experience over the last 43 years. In 1981, Rawlings’ military leadership took
over power and added a culture of political violence. For twenty years, he remained in
power legitimizing this type of malignant culture. The successive Ghanaian leaders after
Nkrumah not only adopted negative cultures o f development, but also abandoned all
industrial projects that had earlier been initiated by Nkrumah. The collective
achievements o f these leaders, through the cultures they have created and legitimized, are
amplified in Ghana’s underdevelopment and the poverty of its people.
This chapter focuses on the role of leadership in Ghana’s economic development.
It is divided into three sections, with the first dealing with the leadership in precolonial
Ghana. This section attempts to show how those leaders organized their societies towards
social development until colonization was imposed. It also sheds some light on how
colonization was imposed. The second section looks at colonial leaders and explains how
colonization in Ghana was different from a protectorate in administrative terms. It also
looks at the economic development in the colony under the leadership of Governor
Frederick Guggisberg and leadership of Ofori Atta, a traditional leader. The third section,
then, examines postcoionial leaders and the cultures they have established to the
detriment of Ghana’s economic development. This section itself is sub-divided into three,
with the first covering Ghana’s development under the tutelage o f its first President,
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Nkrumah. The second looks at what I term the interlude leadership era. It covers the
years from 1966 to 1981, when the leadership vacillated between military dictatorships
and civilian politicians until the second coming of Rawlings. Within this discussion, the
hypothesis of this chapter states that even though the nation o f Ghana is endowed with
mineral resources and human potential, national leaders have failed to establish the
appropriate political and economic environments to channel the resources into positive
development to the benefit the of Ghanaian public.

PRECOLONIAL GHANA AND ITS POLITICAL ECONOMY
Modem day Ghana was once occupied by various small nations of Fanti,
Denkyira, Dagomba, and other tribes until the emergency of the Ashanti Empire in the
seventeenth century.9 Politically, there were two kinds of leadership in precolonial Ghana.
The first kind was chieftaincy. Chiefs, with their administrative and judicial systems that
headed tribal groupings, formed the top of the chieftaincies. The second type of
leadership was the kingship. At the top of that system was the king. He headed an
imperial system of a hegemonic nation, similar to that of the Ashanti Empire during the
precolonial era.10 Many of the tribal nations’ leadership systems were hierarchically
organized with succession following inheritance o f different lineages. The Dagombas
followed paternal inheritance, while the Ashantis followed maternal inheritance. The
leaders administered the operations o f their communities with the assistance of three

9 The best narration of the groups that constituted precolonial Ghana is contained in Fynn, Ashanti
and Its Neighbours.
10 Ayittey, Africa in Chaos.
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different institutions. These were, the Privy Council, Council of Elders, and Village
Assembly of Commoners.11
The Ashanti Empire was created under the leadership of Osei Tutu. However, it
was other leaders such as Opoku Ware and Osei Bonsu who turned the nation into an
empire by militarily conquering other nations.12 The central government of the empire
was in the hands of a Union Council, which was guided by the Ashanti constitution and
headed by the King of Ashanti. Even though the Ashanti political system was effective
from the beginning, it later became ineffective due to the expansion o f the empire.
Incorporation was, therefore, kept to a minimum, allowing autonomy for conquered
nations under the imperial rule.Ij The problem with the Ashanti political machinery,
however, was that conquered people did not identify their corporate interests with the one
of the empire. This indifference caused the Ashanti Empire to suffer a series of internal
revolts. Consequently, rising instabilities prevented social transformation and the
crystallization of the conquered nations into a homogenous society. In other words, the
Ashanti leaders’ method of building society through military conquest, as opposed to
consociational democratic approach, had an inherent instability that prevented social
homogeneity in precolonial Ghana.14
Economically, the nations were agrarian societies that also engaged in commerce.
The means of production were mainly land. For that reason, leaders supervised the access

11 Ibid.
12 Fynn, Ashanti a nd Its Neighbours.
13 David E. Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955).
14 Ibid.
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to land to ensure that those who wanted to farm were not denied that opportunity. Leaders
used their supervisory role to bind to them those on whom they depended for political
support.13 However, the leaders did not monopolize the means of production and hardly
extracted tributes from citizens except on a volunteer basis in the form o f gifts. The
general cultural sentiment of leaders avoided placing restrictions on individual economic
activity because they perceived intervention as producing an economic welfare burden on
the entire society. In that regards, the leadership created the necessary cultural conditions
for their citizens to engage in progressive economic activities.16
In commerce, precolonial Ghana consisted of great trading nations and was rich in
natural resources such as gold, ivory, and spices. On the southern shores, the nations
engaged in international commerce with agents of various European nations.17 All the
nations regarded the trade with Europeans as important because it was seen as a means to
procure guns that enabled them to embark on political and economic expansion.18 The
competition for access to trade directly with Europeans made the Ghanaian leaders
shortsighted and selfish, thus preventing them from rallying themselves into a unified and
homogenous society for mutual social benefits. The myopic leadership in precolonial
Ghana enhanced tribal divisions that, in tum, prevented political and social cohesion prior
to the colonial tribal demarcation at the colonial epoch. In other words, precolonial Ghana

15 Wickins, An Economic History o f Africa.
16 M. J. Fields, Social Organization o f The Ga People (Accra, Gold Coast: Government of Gold
Coast Printing Press, 1940).
17 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
18 W. E. F. Ward, A H istory o f the G old Coast (London: Allen and Unwin, 1948).
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did not become a social melting pot like the United States, even though the federal
characteristics o f the Ashanti constitution were comparable to that of the United States.19
Despite civil wars and the lack o f able leadership to construct a homogenous
society, corruption among leaders was eschewed by institutional arrangements in
precolonial societies. For example, chiefs in Ashanti were prohibited by law to meet with
any foreigner without a member from the council of elders. Such a traditional injunction
was intended to enhance the sanctity of the leadership and also check the misuses o f
power. Violations resulted in immediate removal from office.20 Apart from the
leadership’s inability to form a homogenous society, the nations were free of corruption
and leaders maintained economic and political stability to ensure social welfare until
colonization.

Was Ghana Colonized?
As previously defined in chapter four, colonization is an arbitrary imposition of
rule and authority by a stronger nation over a weaker one, with the intention of the ruler
to economically exploit the ruled. During such imposition, the ruler sets the laws and
regulations of the weaker nation to the advantage of the strong and to the disadvantage of
the weak.21 Was this what happened in precolonial Ghana? The competition for trading
with the Europeans formed the primary cause of the tribal fighting in Ghana. The internal
domestic tribal wars left the nations to defend themselves against each other.

19 For a brief review o f the Ashanti Constitution see Fynn, Ashanti and Its Neighbours.
20 Ayittey, Africa in Chaos.
21 Picard, The Evolution o f M odem Botswana.
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Consequently, they became collectively vulnerable to outside influences. For that reason,
the Fantis at the coast affiliated themselves with the European traders as a shield against
the Ashanti because of the European’s firepower.
Part of the trade between the nations and the Europeans was in the slave trade,
which was taking place clandestinely despite the fact that it was outlawed in 1807.22 In
the first half of nineteenth century, the British government’s dissatisfaction with the
company of merchants’ inability to prevent the slave trade in conjunction with the killing
of Charles MaCarthy by the Ashantis led the British to withdraw the company’s charter
and to contemplate abandoning the Gold Coast.23 The British Merchant Companies, on
the other hand, found the business there valuable and, in 1830, sent George MacLean to
take care of their forts at the coast. He was given limited jurisdiction and was restricted to
the narrowly prescribed area of the settlements only. It was under MacLean’s jurisdiction
that the first real social and political impact of Western institutions made themselves felt
on the coastal people.24 Through his own personal honesty, MacLean gained an esteemed
local reputation as a judge, a reputation that went beyond his official duties at the forts.25
The Fanti chiefs brought their disputes to MacLean to settle whenever there was one
among the chiefs. Though his position was unofficial, the chiefs accepted his adjudication
without question. It was within this judicial sphere of influence that MacLean affected

22 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
23 Ibid.
24 Apter, The G old Coast in Transition.
25 J. D. Fage ‘T h e Administration o f George MacLean on the Gold Coast, 1830-44,” G old Coast
and Togoland Historical Society, Vol. 1, Part 4 (1947): 22-35.
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later policies of British rule in the Gold Coast. In 1842, after MacLean had established
peace between the Fantis and Ashantis and commercial activities were flourishing, a
committee in England recommended that the control of the Gold Coast be reverted back
to the Crown and that the government recognize the informal method of jurisdiction that
MacLean had established.26
MacLean’s system had no legal foundation but had arisen only out of necessity. It
was given legitimacy and a formal recognition by the British government in 1843. In that
year, in an effort to clarify the relations between the English and the Fantis, an agreement
document known as the Bond of 1844 was signed by both parties.27 The agreement
contained a vague acknowledgment on the part of the Fanti chiefs of transfer of
jurisdictional power to the British. This concord stated:
1.

Whereas power and jurisdiction have been exercised for and on behalf
o f Her Majesty the Queen o f Great Britain and Ireland, within divers
countries and places adjacent to Her Majesty’s forts and settlements on
the Gold Coast; we, chiefs o f countries and places so referred to, and
adjacent to the said forts and settlements, do hereby acknowledge that
power and jurisdiction, and declare that the first objects of law are the
protection of individuals and property.

2.

Human sacrifices, and other barbarous customs, such as
panyarring, are abominations, and contrary to law.

3.

Murders, robberies, and other crimes and offenses, will be tried and
inquired of before the queen’s judicial officers and the chiefs of the
districts, modeling the customs o f the country to the general principles
of British laws.28

26 Ward, A History o f the Gold Coast.
27 Joseph. B. Danquah, T h e Historical Significance of The Bond of 1844,” Transactions o f the
Historical Society o f Ghana, Vol. 3 (1957): 1-15.
28 Apter, The G old Coast in Transition, 33-34,
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This above document sold the soul and sweat of the Gold Coast people into
colonization. The agreement coerced the coastal chiefs to abdicate their legitimacy and
authority to rule their territories and transfer those to the British government. The last
section of paragraph 3 of the Bond became the cornerstone of the colonization effort
because it de-legitimized the authority of the chiefs by setting aside their guidelines of
ruling embedded in traditional institutions. Second, “molding the customs of the country
to the general principles of British laws in the Bond became the central piece of the
British political objective of the Gold Coast.29 Though no protectorate was proclaimed,
nor was there any mention of a territorial cession in the document, the British took the
Bond agreement as a point of departure to unilaterally impose colonization on the coastal
areas. Though the Fantis might have been looking for protection against the Ashantis,
they did not have a mutual agreement with the British based on those facts. In that
context, the arbitrary imposition o f the British rule on the coastal people constituted
colonization rather than protection.30 Even if the implied protective argument is invoked
and accepted under that pretext, it would be hard to see how the Bond of 1844, due to the
parties involved, could have been applied to the Ashanti and the Northern regions in the
Gold Coast. This second condition substantiates the fact that the British rule in Gold
Coast was arbitrarily imposed and therefore constituted colonization.

29 Gocking, "British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony,”
30 Picard, The Evolution o f M odem Botswana.
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The Three Phases of Gold Coast Colonization
The colonization of precolonial Ghana by the British has always been treated as a
one-day event that was not well planned.31 This view of the former Gold Coast is
misleading because the region was not under a political structure that could have made
one-step colonization possible.32 The colonization of Ghana was gradual and took three
phases. The first phase was achieved with the Bond of 1844, by which the coastal leaders
were coerced into abdicating their inherited thrones to transfer their legitimate powers to
the Queen o f England.33 The second phase of the British colonization of the Gold Coast
was the annexation of the Ashanti province.
The years preceding the annexation o f the Ashanti province were filled with many
events making British control of the Ashanti desirable. Those events can be traced back to
1807 when the Ashantis conquered the Fantis, demolished one of the British forts, and
forced them to pay rent on the coastal land they occupied. Since that time the military
superiority o f the Ashanti became a dilemma for the British and the desire to do
something about it became apparent.34 In 1872, the transfer o f Elimina forts from the
Dutch to the British incensed the Ashantis. That anger, in conjunction with other political
incidents, led to an outbreak of another war, the sixth one, between the Ashantis and the
British and its allies on the coast. This time, the British decided to settle the matter for
good. In 1874, the British brought in troops from England with new technological

31 Donald Ray, Ghana: Politics, Economics, and Society (London: Fances Pinter, 1986).
32 Fynn, Ashanti and Its Neighbours.
33 Danquah, ‘T h e Historical Significance o f The Bond of 1844.”
34 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition; Fynn, Ashanti and Its Neighbours.
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fighting weapons. The contingent marched to Kumasi, the Ashanti capital, and defeated
the Ashantis and left the capital in flames. The war ended with the treaty o f Fomena,
which urged the Asantehene to renounce his suzerainty over the states that the Ashantis
had previously recognized in the MacLean Treaty of 1831.35
In 1895, due to the British suspicion of France’s possible encroachment from the
East, and German advancement from the West, they urged the Asantehene, Osei
Prempeh, to accept protection. Besides the demand for his submission, which Prempeh
refused, the British requested an immediate payment of an overdue indemnity of 50,000
ounces of gold. Confronted with the demand to pay such a huge sum of money and the
possible demise o f his kingdom, Prempeh reluctantly accepted protection but refused to
pay the money. As a punishment for refusing to pay, the British exiled him to the island
o f the Seychelles.36
The deportation caused an outrage among the Ashantis and led to the Yaa
Asantewaa war against the British in 1896, which the Ashantis lost.37 Following the war,
the British annexed the Ashanti Territory to the Crown colony in January 1902.38 The
annexation of Ashanti marked the second phase o f the British colonization o f the Gold
Coast. Simultaneously, with the Ashanti annexation, the British declared a protectorate
over the Northern territories and subsequently annexed the region. The annexation of the

35 Ward, A H istory o f the G old Coast.
36 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
37 The Ashanti war o f 1896 is often referred to as the Yaa Asantewaa War. Yaa Asantewaa was a
Queen Mother o f an Ashanti Town call Ejisu, located 12 miles from Kumasi.
38 Rooney, Kwam e Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in The Third World.
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Northern Territories marked the third phase of the British colonization of the Gold
Coast.39 The opening o f the twentieth century, therefore, found precolonial Ghana
completely colonized and divided into three divisions consisting of tw o colonies and one
protectorate.

British Colonization o f Ghana and its Administration
The colonization o f precolonial Ghana can be attributed to global changes. A t the
time, industrial competition made the need for global markets, raw material, and
investment opportunities imperative for the British. That political economic euphoria led
the British to identify new interests in colonial expansion and contributed to their desire
to colonize the Gold Coast.40 Therefore, the British decision to remain in precolonial
Ghana and eventually annex it as a colony is found in the commercial interests at home.
The British ruled the Gold Coast with a mixture of direct rule by a central
government and indirect rule. Under the system, a governor, assisted by an executive and
legislative councils and staff of political and technical officials, administered the
colony 41 Once the administrative apparatus was in place, traditional leaders were
subjugated by a deliberate strategic approach through which the colonizer de-legitimized
the traditional institutions. For example, in the Ashanti province, the leadership was
completely demoralized by literally deporting king Prempeh to the Seychelles Island.
After the deportation o f Prempeh, the Ashanti region was put under the administration of

39 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
40 Ibid.
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a British chief commissioner Sir Francis Fuller. He immediately dismantled whatever
institutional and leadership power was left in the Ashanti confederacy. Even in the
traditional courts where a few traditional subjugated leaders were allowed to adjudicate
trivial civil cases, British laws were in competition with traditional laws.42
Similarly, in the coastal areas where colonization had been imposed since 1850,
the traditional judiciary system was replaced by the British judiciary system.43 This
delegitimization of traditional institutions continued as a means o f taking local power
away from local leaders. In 1883, for example, a Native Tribunal Ordinance was passed
with no provision for traditional leaders to enforce their decisions when rendered. That
systematic elimination of the traditional leaderships' power and the implementation of the
British judiciary system in the Gold Coast are key differences between the colonization in
the Gold Cost and that of the protectorate system where local institutions were allowed to
operate without being subverted.44

COLONIAL LEADERSHIP AND THE GOLD COAST ECONOMY
There were two groups of leaders in the colony, those who came from Britain and
traditional leaders whose power had been appropriated. Before examining these two groups,
it is important to consider the structure of the colonial economy. The precoionial economy

41 A detailed description o f the Gold Coast’s government is given by Sir Frederick Lugard in Dual
Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London: Oxford University Press 1922).
42 Gocking, “British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony.”
43 David A. Kimble, A Political History o f Ghana: The Rise o f Gold Coast Nationalism, 18501928 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).
44 Gocking, “British Justice and the Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony"; Picard, The
Evolution o f M odem Botswana.
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was transformed from the predominance of the slave trade and forest commodities, such as
palm and rubber, to that of cocoa beans, gold, diamond, manganese, and timber. By 1911,
gold and cocoa constituted 76% of exports o f the Gold Coast as compared to 12% in 1901.45
Between 1946 and 1947, revenues from the crops quadrupled from 9.5 million to 41 million
British pounds sterling.46 As far as economic infrastructure is concerned, there was complete
railway service from the coastal town of Sekondi to Kumasi between 1919 and 1929, with
extended branch lines from Tarkwa to Prestea. During the same period, another railway
service was completed to link Accra, the national capital, to Kumasi through Nsawam.47 In
addition to the railroad tracks, 4,578 miles o f new roads were constructed. Moreover, a
harbor was completed at Takoradi to improve shipment of goods in and out of the colony.
The colonial development projects also included communication, medical, and education
facilities, with the first university being established in 1948.48

Leadership of Governor Frederick Guggisberg 1919-1927
Sir Gordon Guggisberg arrived in the Gold Coast in 1919. He was familiar with
the region. For a few months in 1914 he worked as a director of public works in the G old
Coast. During that time, he became convinced that it was only the lack of opportunity that

45 Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana (London: Oxford University Press. 1964).
46 Francis K. Danquah, “Rural Discontent and Decolonization in Ghana: 1945-51.” Agricultural
History, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Winter 1994): 1-19.
47 Frederick Guggisberg, The Gold Coast: A Review o f the Events o f 1920-1926 and the Prospects
o f the 1927-1928 (Accra, Gold Coast: Government Printing Press, 1927).
48 Kwame Arhin, “In Search for Constitutional Chieftaincy,” in Kwame Arhin, ed.. The Life a nd
Work o f Kwame Nkrumah, 27-52 (Trenton, NJ: Africa W orld Press., 1993).
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prevented Africans from reaching an intellectual development comparable to that of the
Europeans.49 With this spirit and conviction, Guggisberg was happy to be back in order to
help the people of Gold Coast develop their society. The first economic project involved
developing a scheme to improve and extend the Gold C oast’s national transportation
system that would expedite the shipment o f the colony’s agricultural products to the
world market. Guggisberg started with railroad construction. By 1927, he had laid 233
miles of railroad tracks out of the 250 miles that were surveyed.50
In spite of the governor’s disbelief in the development of the automobile industry
at the time and, therefore, a disinterest in constructing m otor roads, he built nearly 3,378
miles of new roads and reconditioned 1,310 m iles.51 Some o f them were tarred with
macadam making the colony’s motor roads the best in British tropical Africa.52 To reach
the world market, the governor proceeded to construct a harbor in 1921 at Takoradi,
which began commercial operations in 1928. At its completion, the harbor contained
wharves for cocoa, timber, and manganese exports, including sufficient storage and
loading space. Besides those facilities, the harbor had a petroleum berth equipped with
pipelines from ships to tanks located two and half miles inland.53 Guggisberg’s
Development Plan included extended communication facilities that increased both

49 Baron Sydney Olivrer, Dictionary o f National Biography: 1922-1930 (London: Muller, 1937).
50 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
51 Olivrer, Dictionary o f National Biography.
52 Rita Hiden, Plan For Africa: A Report Prepared fo r the C olonial Bureau o f the Fabian Society,
(NY: Oxford University Press, 1942): 149-55.
53 Frankel S. Herbert, Capital Investment In Africa: Its Course a n d Effects (N Y : NY University
Press, 1938).
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telephone and telegraph service. The governor’s economic infrastructure was topped off
with provisions for medical and educational services for human development.
In education, the governor appointed a committee to study the educational
situation in the Gold Coast. The committee submitted to him a report that recommended a
method by which the colony’s schools could be improved sim ilar to those, which have
been successfully established at Tuskegee and other institutions in the United States.54
Using this report, Guggisberg drew guidelines for his officials to improve education in
the colony. The guidelines emphasized the importance of teacher training, well-staffed
and equipped secondary schools, equal opportunity for boys and girls, and above all an
absolute necessity for character training so that the Gold Coast people could develop
personal worth and leadership potential.55 Compared to the laissez-faire atmosphere of
the nineteenth century when the missionaries provided little educational opportunities to
the local people, education had increased in the Gold Coast by the end of the first half of
the twentieth century. One outstanding success of the governor’s education plan was the
Prince of W ales College at Achimota. It became one of the best schools in modem
Ghana. Guggisberg financed most of the projects with loans and surplus money generated
by the economic boom that characterized the colony’s cocoa market in 1919 and early
parts of 1920.56
Contrary to the economic achievement of Guggisberg’s leadership, there was no
positive political development for local people. By the very nature of colonialism, the

54 Thomas Jesse Jones. A Study o f West, South, and Equatorial Africa (NY: NY University Press,
1922).

55Ibid.
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British judicial system was adopted to subdue local judicial and political institutions.
Political development plummeted to autocratic mle suppressing all democratic processes.
It obstructed justice and prevented local people from participating in decision-making that
affected their lives.

Nana Ofori Atta: Traditional Leadership in the Colonial Era
Ofori Atta, bom in 1881, was educated at Basel Mission in Akropong where he
studied to be a missionary. After graduation he changed his mind and worked as secretary
for his uncle, a paramount chief of Akim Abuakwa. In 1913, Ofori Atta inherited the
chieftaincy after the death of his uncle. Three years later he was selected to the provincial
council. In 1925, Guggisberg selected him to the colony’s legislative council, a position
he held until his death in 1943.57 While there, he worked to forge cooperation between
native council members in finding ways to influence the colony’s political process. In
1934, when two ordinances were introduced concerning water supply and the persecution
o f seditious acts, Ofori Atta and the rest of the native council members objected to the
ordinances due to their ill effect on local peoples.58 Despite the united protest of the
native council members, both bills passed at the same session by the usual vote of 20 to 9.
The twenty members who voted in favor were European members; the nine voting against

56 Guggisberg, The Gold Coast: A Review o f the Events.
57 Martin Wight, The Gold Coast Legislative Council (London: Faber and Faber, 1947).
58 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
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the bill were indigenous members. The outcome of the votes made the indigenous council
members feel helpless before the European majority members.59
Ofori Atta saw the problem as a lack of influence on the legislative council by the
indigenous and felt something had to be done. Rallying his colleagues together, he
presented a case of unfair representation in the council to the colonial office in London.
He accomplished that by urging his native colleagues to broaden their grievances in the
council to include their dislike for the constitutional set up and demand more political
power. In July 1934, he led a delegation and presented the case to the colonial secretary in
London. In the petition, Ofori Atta demanded the elimination of the official majority on
the legislative council, for a permanent native representation on the governor’s executive
council, and for the eligibility of non-chiefs as provincial members o f the legislative
council.60 Though the petition was rejected, Ofori Atta continued his call for political
change. Other political challenges involved getting the government to increase the
number of local people in the colonial civil service. This was an issue advanced by
Guggisberg but which was halted after his departure.
To expedite native training for future self-government, Guggisberg had initiated a
gradual inclusion of natives in positions usually reserved for Europeans. However, after
Guggisberg’s departure the program was halted, and, by 1938, the number of natives in
advance government positions was only 41 as compared to the 151 that had been

59 Ibid.
60 Gold Coast Government, Legislative Council Debate: Papers Relating to the Petition o f the
Delegate from the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti-Session No. 11 (Accra, Gold Coast: Government Press,
1934).
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projected by the Guggisberg administration.61 It was Ofori A tta’s belief that the
stagnation of native recruitment for advance positions was a deliberate attempt by
Guggisberg’s successors to slow the process of future self-rule. To resolve that problem,
Ofori Atta, once again, campaigned for the support of his colleagues. In 1938, he
proposed the acceleration program for native inclusion in high positions of government.
Because o f his persistence, the government developed a new policy for the civil service in
1939, which included an intermediate grade for native officers. When native officers
proved competent, they were sent to England for direct preparation and advancement in
the government’s civil service.62 While Ofori A tta’s political achievements were dismal,
his contributions in the area of economics were greater. One o f the economic acts that
won Ofori Atta respect was a boycott that he led against European cocoa buyers. The
protest was used to protect the economic welfare o f cocoa producers.63 The reasoning
behind Ofori A tta’s involvement was clear and simple. By the c h ie fs rationale, anything
that impinged on the marketing of cocoa had a direct economic impact on his people,
including himself, since he was also a farmer.64
Ofori A tta’s action to lead the boycott was prompted by an agreement reached
between cocoa buying companies. In 1936, the price of cocoa was set at forty-four British
pounds sterling per ton from twenty-one pounds in the early thirties. In the following
year, the European cocoa buying companies in the Gold Coast made a secret agreement to

61 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 66.
64 Dennis Austin, Joseph B. Danquah, and W. R. B. Akokoaso, A Survey o f a Gold Coast
Village (London: Oxford University Press, 1943).
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control the price in an attempt to prevent price competition between themselves.65 That
act by the cocoa buyers was the root cause for Ofori A tta’s action to lead the cocoa
boycott. He saw the buyers’ act as an attempt at price collusion that would have robbed
millions o f dollars from the cocoa producers. In order to prevent this from happening,
Ofori Atta rallied almost all traditional chiefs in cocoa growing areas and the farmers
union to take action together. The chiefs decided that the best remedy was to stop selling
their cocoa to the buying companies. To make sure the boycott became successful, Ofori
Atta held consultative meetings with cocoa producing fanners of the colony on the
subject o f halting cocoa sales to European buyers.
In October 1937, as the main cocoa season began, the farmers united under the
guidance of their chiefs, and the farmers unions and stopped selling their cocoa to the
European buyers. Not only did they refuse to sell their cocoa, they also boycotted the
retail stores of the companies connected with the cocoa buying companies.66 The boycott
continued until a representative from London, William Nowell, arrived in the Gold Coast
to negotiate a deal between the parties. In April 1938, a deal was struck in favor o f the
producers. A later report issued by the Nowell Commission strongly condemned the
buyers attempt to control cocoa prices.67 With his strong leadership commitment, Ofori
Atta was able to protect the economic interests of the Gold Coast cocoa producers.

65 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
66 Joseph B. Danquah, Liberty o f the Subject: Gold Coast Cocoa Hold Up and Boycott o f Foreign
Goods 1937-38 (Kibi: Gold Coast Press, 1942).
67 Ibid.
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As the evidence in this case study portrays so far, the colonial development legacy
was more positive in some areas than in others. In the economic arena, leaders were able
to transform the precolonial economy of slavery and spices trade to a more desirable
commodity based on cocoa production, an economic transformation that helped raised the
welfare of the people along with a greater moral and humanitarian touch. They also laid
an economic infrastructure and introduced some social services including education and
medical provisions for human development. However, while colonial leaders had been
partially successful in the economic arena, their achievements in the political sector were
minimal.
As Ofori Atta’s delegation to London demonstrated with its petition, native
participation in decision-making was non-existent. The colonial rule was autocratic, and
even when the legislative council was introduced in 1925, its membership excluded
representatives from both the Ashanti and the Northern territories.68 That action meant
that both the Ashanti and the Northern territories had no representation and were only
dictated to by their chief commissioner who was stationed in Kumasi.69 From those
political lenses, it can be asserted that Ofori A tta’s leadership was only regional as
opposed to national. He condoned the colonial autocratic divide-and-rule system and
failed to fight for the inclusion of the other regions in the legislative council. In essence,
he became a comprador for British rule and failed to provide the leadership needed for
unifying the colony towards social transformation and development.

68 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition.
69 Sir Francis Fuller, A Vanished Dynasty: Ashanti (London: Cass, 1968).
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Despite their political shortcomings, the evidence suggests that these colonial
leaders left a mixed legacy. The legacy had a positive economic development on one hand
and a negative political development on the other, yet without corruption and political
violence. That was the legacy mantel left to be picked up by subsequent leaders in the
postcolonial era. Whether or not that torch was progressively carried after independence
was achieved will be treated later. However, before discussing the postcolonial leaders
and their activities towards socio-economic development, attention is first given to an
examination of how self-rule was achieved in the Gold Coast.

Gold Coast’s Road to Nationalist Self-rule and the 1948 Riots
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, an increasing number of educated
commoners and their chiefs had crystallized into an opposition force against colonial
rule.70 However, a broad nationalist movement did not emerge until the 1948 riots in
Accra.71 Nevertheless, the immediate preceding years had witnessed political and
economic welfare changes. Prior to the 1948 riots, the dissatisfaction o f the Bums
constitution prompted a few educated elites and some businessmen to form the United
Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1947. The UGCC’s main objective was to attain selfrule for the colony at the earliest opportune time.72 The party recruited Kwame Nkrumah,
who at the time was studying in London, to become its general secretary. Those changes
amounted to nothing until the 1948 riots in Accra.

70 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition.
71 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f an Illusion.
72 Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (NY: NY University Press, 1957).
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The 1948 riots were triggered when a group of ex-service men marching to the
governor’s residence to present their grievances were fired upon by government police.
Two ex-service men were killed and Five people wounded. The disturbances continued
for two days and quickly spread to other cities and towns. Six UGCC leaders were
arrested and blamed for inciting the riots. The six men, included Kwame Nkrumah and
Dr. J. B. Danquah, became popular heroes and were widely acclaimed as the “Big Six.”73
A commission was appointed to investigate the cause of the riot. It determined that the
frustration over the lack of social mobility and limited opportunities in government
angered the educated classes.74 As a solution, the report recommended constitutional
reform and suggested the formation o f a native government. The publication of the study
and its recommendations became known as the Watson Report.75

The Constitutional Talks and the Birth of the Convention Peoples Party
In January 1949, the government invited thirty-eight people, including chiefs,
educated leaders, and some members of the UGCC, except Nkrumah, to discuss a new
constitution. The commission’s final report recommended the adaptation of a British type
of representative government for the Gold Coast without specifying a role for traditional
leaders.76 The report received high praise and became the building block o f the 1951 Gold
Coast Constitution. However, many people, including some educated elites whom the

73 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f an Illusion.
74 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
75 Ibid.
76 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition.
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report had favored, did not accept the constitution. The main flaw of the constitution,
according to its opponent, was that it gave little power to local people and their leaders.
As expected, by his exclusion from the constitutional talk, Nkrumah and his
growing supporters rejected the new constitution. The Accra Evening News, Nkrumah’s
newspaper, characterized the group’s position in regards to the constitution as follows:
As for us, we have already declared our stand with regards to the new
Constitution that only full Dominion Status...will satisfy us and by this
demand we shall stand and face all storms however strong they are.
Ghana must be free and free N O W .77
The above position brought Nkrumah into conflict with the UGCC leaders who
supported the constitution. The executive committee of the UGCC leadership felt
Nkrumah had betrayed the trust they had given him in his appointment as secretary of the
organization. This difference created a divide between Nkrumah and the UGCC leaders.
Therefore, Nkrumah together with his followers, which included K. A. Gbedemah and
Kojo Botsio, came to the conclusion that a separate political party was necessary. This
decision marked the beginning of a new type of nationalist movement in the Gold Coast,
one that appealed to the politically awakened masses, the Convention Peoples Party. On
June 12, 1949, Nkrumah and his followers founded the CPP. Nkrumah was careful to
explain to the rank- and- file o f the UGCC that it was their leadership that the CPP
opposed. The purpose of the opposition, he made clear, was that the UGCC leaders were
fighting for “full self-government within the shortest possible time.”78 On the other hand,

77 Quoted from Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence, 172.
78 Nkrumah, The Autobiography o f Kwame Nkrumah.
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the CPP was interested in gaining “self-government NOW.”79 After the formation of the
CPP, Nkrumah’s opposition to the constitution remained strong. He attacked it as a
‘Trojan gift horse” and as “ bogus and fraudulent”, speaking instead of the need for
“positive action.”80
In spite of the government’s warning that political strikes were illegal, the CPP
declared a nation-wide strike and boycott effective at midnight, January 8, 1950. On
January 20th, Nkrumah and his organizers were arrested, tried, and sentenced to prison.
While Nkrumah was serving his term in prison, elections for the 1951 constitution were
held on February 10, 1951.81 Extensive campaigning by the two parties dominated the
months preceding the elections. Leaders of the CPP, who had finished their prison
sentences, campaigned vigorously throughout the country. Nkrumah, who had stood for a
seat in the elections in one district in Accra, campaigned from prison with taped speeches
to the public. When the election ballots were counted, the CPP won a decisive victory.
Nkrumah won a seat from prison, and Sir Charles Arden Clarke released him on January
12, 1951, to form a government, in which, he was given the position of government
leader of business.82

79 Ibid.
80 Ibid. ; Nkrumah’s definition of positive action was “ the adoption of all legitimate and
constitutional means by which we could attack the forces o f im perialism in the country. The weapons were
legitimate political agitation, newspapers and boycotts, and non-cooperation based on the principal o f
absolute no-violence as used by Gandhi” in Nkrumah, The Autobiography o f Kwame Nkrumah, 111-112.
81 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
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DEVELOPMENT UNDER KWAME NKRUMAH’S LEADERSHIP
The years following the formation of the Nkrumah’s colonial government were
marked by some degree of economic development. The prosperity was due to the
accumulated surplus during the war and the high prices of cocoa in the world market. As
Table 5-1 demonstrates, when the first native government was formed, the Gold Coast
had 137.2m British pounds in reserves.

Table 5-1
Gold Coast (Later, Ghana) Reserves 1950-57
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957

Balance in Reserves (Millions o f Pounds)
113.3
137.2
145.1
160.1
197.4
208.2
189.8
171.4

Source: Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer; Ghana: End o f an Illusion, NY: Monthly
Review Press, 1968,45.

Despite the reserves balance from 1951 until independence in 1957, Ghana was
underdeveloped. The economy was narrow in its dependence on only cocoa and limited
mineral exports. Even though Guggisberg had made important advances in economic
infrastructure, basic public services o f all kinds needed to be expanded. In this regard,
Nkrumah continued the development strategy initiated by previous governments,

82 Ibid.
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providing agricultural services, improving road systems, and extending power and water
supplies to several parts of the country.83
In the social services, Nkrumah also extended services to both Ashanti and
Northern regions where those services were lacking, introducing free universal basic
education and healthcare. On some economic fronts, Nkrumah and his ministers showed
great maturity and prudence, while on others they were less successful due to the
emergence of corruption in the administration.84 The handling of large sums of money in
the interest of the nation opened the door of temptation to many ministers in Nkrumah’s
colonial cabinet. Corruption and misuse of national funds became rampant, leading to
inquiries on some ministers and resignations by others.85 Corruption also permeated the
CPP and its affiliated organs including the Cocoa Marketing Board.86

Nkrumah’s Political Challenge: Partial Reason for Political Instability
The first political challenge that faced Nkrumah dealt with the local government
administration. Prior to his ascendancy to power, Nkrumah was against the new
constitution because it gave little power to local leaders. He had described it as a Trojan
horse. After wining the elections, he decided to make good use o f the constitution during

83 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f an Illusion.
84 Smertin, Kwame Nkrumah.
85 Gold Coast Government, Report o f the Commission o f Enquiry in Mr. J. A. Braimah 's
Resignation and Allegations (Accra, Gold Coast: Government Press, 1954).
86 Gold Coast Government, Report o f Commission o f Enquiry in the Affairs o f the Cocoa
Purchasing Co. Ltd "The Jibowu Report," (Accra, Gold Coast: Government Press, 1956)
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the period until a new instrument of governance could be obtained.87 The problem that
faced Nkrumah was that he had to implement a constitutional ordinance for local
government that shifted power at the local level from the traditional leaders to political
party officials in the form of a representative local council.88 To the chiefs, the instrument
was deemed as undemocratic because the nature of the ordinance assigned them to the
political sidelines and transferred their traditional powers to local council members
leaving them with no role to play. In addition, the chiefs argued that the constitution gave
political officials, who happened to be in the CPP, domination over local as well as
og

national politics.

Most important to the chiefs was the shift in power. The change meant

a loss o f influence and revenue, and indeed, of their very position as leaders of the people.
Nkrumah recognized the problem himself, and it had influenced his decision, prior to his
wining the election, to oppose the constitution.90
A solution to the problem could have been to amend the constitution to include
the traditional leaders in power sharing, as Nkrumah might have thought about himself.91
An opportunity arose for Nkrumah to do that when the secretary of the colonial office
asked him to seek the opinions of chiefs and other political groups to a possible
constitutional change towards self-rule. In response to Nkrumah, many groups suggested

87 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
88 Gold Coast Government, Local Government Reforms in Outline: Government Ordinance o f
1951, No. 29 (Accra, Gold Coast: Government Press, 1951).
89 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
90 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f an Illusion.
91 This thought might have occurred to Nkrumah when he decided to use the 1951 constitution
until such a time that a new constitution could be approved. See Bourret, Ghana: The R oad to
Independence.
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that a second cham ber in the house be included in the constitution to accommodate the
chiefs. This institutional accommodation, the proponents argued, was important because
it would honor and safeguard the chiefs and their traditional roles. In addition, the
proponents believed that an upper house for the chiefs would have enabled them to add
their experience to the immature policies of the newly emergent parties.92 In essence, the
inclusion of the chiefs would have resolved the constitutional flaw of excluding them
from the national rule and could have acted as an alliance formation tool between the old
guard and the new political officials. To the dismay of many groups, Nkrumah rejected
the suggestions regarding the inclusion of the upper house that could have included the
traditional leaders in the national democratic building process.93 In essence, Nkrumah’s
government failed to make any provisions for the traditional leaders to participate in the
power sharing.
The above narration of the local government problem and Nkrumah’s refusal to
include the traditional leaders demonstrated that once Nkrumah gained power, he became
increasingly authoritarian. He refused to allow participatory democracy that could have
enabled stability to thrive, and his decision to do so meant he failed to provide the
democratic leadership needed for economic development. In response to the above
circumstances, the chiefs and their allies raised a staunch opposition to Nkrumah and his
party. The opposition caused, in many areas of the Gold Coast, violence in party

92 Apter, The G old Coast in Transition.
93 Rooney, Kwam e Nkrumah: Political Kingdom in the Third World.
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politics.94 In retrospect, Nkrumah’s refusal to allow traditional leaders to participate in the
political process was seen by the chiefs as dictatorial on Nkrumah’s part. That belief, in
turn, set the tone for non-cooperation on the part of the chiefs and led to the
crystallization of political instabilities in undermining economic development in Ghana.9s
As an outgrowth of the political opposition to Nkrumah, a new political party,
the National Liberation Movement (NLM), was formed in 1954 in the Ashanti region
with the support from the Asante King and his traditional chiefs.96 The party demanded a
federal form of government that Nkrumah rejected. Thereafter, the NLM adopted a new
strategy against the C PP and its request for self-rule.97 It allied with the Northern Peoples
Party (NPP) and, together, the parties sent a joint delegation with a resolution to Britain
that their territories wanted to secede from the Gold Coast. The succession bid became
not only a political nightmare but also a dilemma for Nkrumah because the Gold Coast
self-rule was based on the conditions that all the territories would remain together.98 By
its implication, any disagreement among the regions had the potential to jeopardize the
self-rule that Nkrumah was seeking. In fact, by the delegation’s request at the time, the
independence of the colony was in doubt. Fortunately, the situation was saved by Lennox

94 A. Hannigan, “Local Government in the Gold Coast," Journal o f African Administration, Vol.
12 (July 1955): 73-86.
95 Ibid.
96 Nkrumah, The Autobiography o f Kwame Nkrumah.
97 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
98 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
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Boyd, the secretary of state for the colonies, who visited the Gold Coast to broker a deal
between the three parties and amended the constitution.99
Many chiefs were embittered when they sensed that the country was falling under
the control of the CPP. The Ashanti chiefs were not the only group that distrusted
Nkrumah and his CPP. Antagonism developed in various regions based on the conflict
between sectional and national interest. In the Northern Territories, for instance, sectional
feelings also ran high. The conservative chiefs in the region looked askance at the
possibility of Southern control. The ambivalence made them cling to treaties of
friendships, trade, and protection that their former chiefs had signed with the British.100 In
fact, Northerners acceptance to join the Gold Coast in its transition to the nation o f Ghana
was based on the condition that the British would ensure that their regional rights were
protected in the constitution of Ghana.101 The roots of the ambivalence emanated from
their witness of Nkrumah’s intolerance to weave a natural cohesiveness essential for
political and economic developments in advancing the welfare of the people. Even though
Nkrumah repeatedly emphasized in his public statements the importance of fostering a
spirit of national consciousness in nation-building in Ghana,102 the irony was that under
his leadership the government never heeded that advice.
The evidence presented suggests that the years between 1951 and 1957, when
Nkrumah took over the colonial government, can be characterized as a “double edge

99 Apter, The G old Coast in Transition
100 R. S. Rattray, Tribes o f the Ashanti Hinterland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932).
101 London Times, September 18, 1956.
102 Nkrumah, The Autobiography o f Kwame Nkrumah.
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sword” in terms of development. On the economic front, there were some positive
developments, however the emergence of the corrupt culture undermined overall
economic achievements. On the political front, however, development was mediocre at
best. Nkrumah’s refusal to include traditional leaders halted any possible democratic
process in the country and accelerated the drifting apart between the leaders and their
people. In short, Nkrumah failed to lay the political cultural foundation upon which
economic development could thrive. At independence, Ghana had a fractured and divided
political structure with embedded animosity among various groups. The question that
faced Ghana at independence was whether Nkrumah could tum the country around, reach
out to the traditional leaders, and form a national union that could have laid a culture of
political stability needed for economic development.

Postcolonial Leadership in Ghana
On March 6th, 1957, Ghana gained independence and became the first subSaharan African nation to throw off the imperial yoke. At the time, it had adequate
foreign exchange reserves in excess of $300 million.103 The education system had
improved to include university level learning, and there were 4,882 primary schools with
an enrollment of 468,000 students.104 The health service was one of the best in subSaharan Africa with thirty government hospitals equipped with approximately 2,630

103 Yeboah, “Control Theory Application to Economic Policy Analysis in Ghana."
104 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
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hospital beds.105 The country also was self-sufficient in food supply and food imports
were negligible. In addition, the per capita income was about $242.106
Presently, the trends have changed for the worst because G hana’s economy has
deteriorated.107 On the national balance sheet, Ghana continues to have negative foreign
exchange reserves (see Table 5-2). In 1975, Ghana’s reserves were in the red at negative
$108 million. Twenty years later, in 1994, this figure improved only slightly to negative
$93 million. As Table 5-2 shows, the national debt rose from $721 million in 1975 to $
5.8 billion in 1995, including a rapid increase in debt service. This poor financial position
indicates that since 1975, the national economy has deteriorated constantly affecting all
essential developmental social factors including health and education.

Table 5-2
Ghana’s National Debt and Debt Service 1975-95 (Millions US$)

National Total Debt

1975

1985

1994

1995

721

2,257

5,463

5,874

57

159

367

370

-108

48

-93

-

Total Debt Service
Change in Net Reserves

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Washington, DC: World Bank,
1997.

105 Ibid.
106 Nkrumah, Neocolonialism.
107 Alan Roe and Hartmut Schneider, Adjustment and Equity in Ghana (Paris: OECD, 1992).
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Between 1994 and 1998, the share of public education expenditures as a
percentage of GDP remained roughly 3.6%.108 With the cost of inflation adjustment, the
overall education expenditure declined by 4 % annually.109 Within the same time as,
Table 5-3 shows, the share of education expenditure allocated to universities in the
country declined 8.3% while enrollment doubled.110 What is even more alarming is the
stagnation in enrollment of the country’s basic education system. Based on data from the
Ministry of Education, the enrollment in senior secondary schools declined from 236,000
in 1994 to 188,000 in 1998. In the junior secondary, the enrollment inched up from
693,000 in 1994 to 695,000 in 1998. In percentage terms the change was nominal with
only an increase o f 0.1 %. Primary school enrollment also rose slightly from 1,960 in
1994 to 2,027 in 1998, seeing an increase of 0.8%.
Together these figures indicate that between 1994 and 1998 there was less than
one percent annual growth in basic education. Given a population growth of 3 % these
figures imply a decline in basic education enrollment.111 There also has been deterioration
in the healthcare industry. For example in 1970, there were 9 physicians to every 100,000
patients in Ghana. Today, there are 4 physicians to the same number of patients.112 The
situation on the political front does not look brighter either, especially considering the

108 Sudharshan, C ., and Xiao Ye. Public Health and Education Spending in Ghana 1992-1998
(Washington, DC: W orld Bank, 1999).
109 Perran Penrose, Budgeting and Expenditure in Education Sector in 1995 (Accra: Ghana
Ministry o f Education, 1998).
110 Sudharshan and Ye, Public Health and Education Spending.
111 United Nations, Committee on the Rights o f the Child: Initial Report o f Ghana (N Y : United
Nations, 1995).
112 Sudharshan and Ye, Public Health and Education Spending.
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fact that five coups have led to five different administrations.11,5 Ghana has suffered
political violence and human rights abuses.

Table 5-3
Education Enrollment in Ghana 1990-98 (in thousands)
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1998

1,803

1,807

1,848

1,903

1,960

2,027

Junior Sec. Enrollment

569

592

629

660

693

695

Senior Sec. Enrollment

168

199

225

247

236

188

11

12

13

26

Primary Enrollment

University Enrollment

—

—

Source: C. Sudharshan and Xiao Ye, Public Health and Education Spending in
Ghana in 1992-1998. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999.

The above conditions suggest that Ghana has not only remained undeveloped but
it has also receded economically and politically. According to orthodox explanations,
Ghana’s problems, like the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, are caused by exogenous factors
such as globalization and the impact o f multinational institutions.114 There is no doubt
that those factors play a role in Ghana’s economic affairs, but they alone are insufficient
to explain the country’s economic underdevelopment since there exist examples o f
nations, such as Mauritius and Botswana, with similar exogenous environments that have
not fallen into such deplorable economic conditions.115 In contrast to this view, others

113 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f Stability.
114 George B. N. Ayittey, “How the Multinational Institutions Compounded Africa’s Economic
Crisis,” Law and Policy in International Business, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Summer 1999): 585-600; Rodney, How
Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
115 Samatar, An African Miracle.
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believe that Ghana’s economic problems are largely its own doing. This group of pundits
relates the current negative economic state of affairs in Ghana to bad policies, abuse of
power, and corruption.116 It is this school o f thought to which this research subscribes.
This study, explicitly argues that Ghana’s developmental problems are due to a lack of
leadership to establish a culture conducive to development.

Nkrumah’s Leadership in Postcolonial Ghana
As noted above, Kwame Nkrumah was not new to Ghanaian politics at the time of
independence. Nkrumah was bom in 1909 at Nkroful in the Nzima area of Ghana. During
the depression years, he lived and studied in the United States. After ten years in the
United States, he went to England to study and also helped organized Pan -Africanist
movement. In 1947, he returned to the Gold Coast as the Secretary General o f UGCC.
Nkrumah left the UGCC in 1949 and formed his own political party, the CPP in 1949. He
was the first native during the colonial rule to become a national leader of government
business from 1951 to 1957.117 He led Ghana to its independence and became its prime
minister and, later, the nation’s first president.
Prior to independence Nkrumah had a firm belief that national unity and stability
were essential for development.118 The issue became more compelling because political
quibbles between the various leadership groups immediately before independence had
divided the political groups to the point where the need to unify the nation for stability

116 Douglas Rimmer, Staying Poor: G hana's Political Economy, 1950-1990 (Oxford: Pergamon
Press. 1992).
117 Nkrumah, The Autobiography o f Kwame Nkrumah.
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towards development became imperative. The main duty, therefore, facing Nkrumah was
to patch the loose factions of the nation into a strong state. Prior to independence,
different political groups had submitted a petition to Nkrumah to amend the constitution
to include traditional leaders. Nkrumah, however, rejected that provision. The opposition
then resorted to political violence because they felt that the democratic means of
participating in political ruling was no longer a viable option. The opposition made a
couple of attempts to disrupt Nkrumah’s government. First, it tried to overthrow the
government and, later tried to kill Nkrumah.119 The above events, coupled with
Nkrumah's inclinations to exclude other political groups from sharing power, led him to
the conclusion that political “pluralism” was both inapplicable and dangerous in the
context of Ghana’s young independence.120 This decision caused Nkrumah to orchestrate
two political strategies, both aimed at achieving stability through authoritarian
dictatorship.
With the intent to secure national stability for development, Nkrumah used the
legislative process to adopt the Preventive Detection Act in July 1958.121 This act allowed
his government to arrest individuals suspicious of engaging in treason or subversive
activities, without sanction by judicial bodies, to be jailed for five days. Once arrested, if
the case was considered to be a threat against the state, then the person was tried in court;
otherwise, the individual was released. Nkrumah used such intimidation tactics to crack

118 Arhin, “ In Search for Constitutional Chieftaincy.”
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Company, 1970).
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down on democratic expression and established an authoritarian culture as a means of
maintaining stability and control.122
To enhance this authoritarian form of rule, Nkrumah sought for and received a
new constitution that bestowed upon Ghana the status of republican sovereignty. The
constitution allowed him to dissolve the provincial assemblies and transferred full
legislative and executive powers to the national assembly. The constitution also
weakened the regional powers and created a presidential position with broad powers
including cabinet appointments, making changes in governmental bodies, and also
making the president the commander in chief o f the army. After the constitutional
changes, Nkrumah called for a national referendum in the process o f selecting a president.
He asked the people to choose between him and the opposition leader for the presidency.
The referendum approved Nkrumah as the president by 89%.123
On July 1st, 1960, Ghana became a republic, and Nkrumah became the president.
Those political developments initiated by Nkrumah helped him to erase all that remained
of Ghana’s democratic features. In other words, the above actions by Nkrumah
immediately after independence transformed Ghana’s political system from the semidemocratic system that had previously existed to a complete dictatorial system. The
traditional domestic political institutions and their leaders were completely
disenfranchised from the official national political process. Until the morning o f the
February 24,1966 coup that toppled the CPP government, Nkrumah had removed any

122 L. Rubin and P Murray, The Constitution and Government o f Ghana (London: Cass. 1961).
123 Ibid.
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hint of a real democratic process from the political system and had turned the electoral
process into a political ploy.124
A second major political development was the transformation o f party politics in
Ghana from that of a multi-party system to a one-party system. To do this, Nkrumah
argued that Ghanaians needed to be conscious of their “Africaness.” He denounced the
multi-party democratic system as a Western concept that had no kinship with African
political culture and, as such, was incompatible for Ghanaian politics. In place of the
multi-party system, Nkrumah urged Ghanaians to adopt the one-party system, in this case,
his CPP.

I

The irony, however, is that, on the one hand, Nkrumah was disenfranchising

the traditional leaders, while, on the other, he was telling them to be conscious of their
Africaness in terms of political culture. By 1964, the one-party system was inaugurated
in disregard of the feelings of Nkrumah’s political opponents and Ghanaians in
general.'26
When Nkrumah made Ghana a one-party state, the CPP became the only political
institution through which citizens could participate in national politics. Therefore, many
Ghanaians who did not identify themselves with the CPP were excluded from the national
political process.127 By adopting the one-party system, Nkrumah also found a political
means to prevent his leadership from being accountable to the populace. In this context,

124 T. Jones, Ghana ’s First Republic 1960-1966 (London: Methuen, 1976).
125 George P. Hagan. “Nkrumah’s Leadership Style: An Assessment From a Cultural Perspective,"
in Kwame Arhin, ed.. The Life and Work o f Kwame Nkrumah, 177-206 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press,
1993).
126 Dominic K. Agyeman., “Social and Political Outlook," in Kwame Arhin, ed.. The Life and
Work o f Kwame Nkrumah, 147-157 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1993).
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Nkrumah’s political transformation represented a transfer from the political dictatorship
of the aristocracy of precolonial days to that of a contemporary dictatorial presidency. In
that regards, there was no political achievement as far as progressive democratic
development is concerned. There is no doubt that Nkrumah mobilized people in Ghana
and made them strike for freedom;128 however, his later actions purged civil liberties and
rights from Ghana’s political process and thereby halted Ghana’s democratic evolution
for many years.

POSTCOLONIAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER NKRUMAH
Despite Ghana’s good financial position at the time of independence, the national
economy was underdeveloped. The productive sector was backward with a lopsided
structure. Ghana’s main exportable commodity was cocoa beans, and most of its
industrial consumption commodities were imported. Taking that national position as a
point of departure, Nkrumah embarked on a new economic policy in which he sought to
do two things. His first goal was to diversify the agricultural sector, and the second
objective was to embark on industrialization.129 Knowing very well that Ghana’s
development cannot be financed by the price volatilities of cocoa, Nkrumah solicited
development assistance.130

128 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third world.
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Nkrumah’s Solicitation of Financial Assistance
Nkrumah had sought financial and technical assistance for G hana’s development
long before independence. In 1951, during his visit to the United States as the leader of
government business, he spoke of the need of technicians, machinery, and capital to
develop Ghana’s natural resources. He visited the United Nations in New York and
signed an agreement with the UN Secretary General to obtain technical aid from the
organization. The agreement allowed Ghana to receive multilateral aid from the
International Labor Organization, World Food and Agricultural Organization, World
Health Organization, and United Nations Educational Scientific Cultural Organization.131
On the bilateral level, Nkrumah campaigned for aid from both East and West. In
the West, Nkrumah sought aid from Europe and North American countries. In 1958, he
visited Canada and the United States. While in America, he was received by both
President Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon. Nkrumah used these occasions to appeal
for technical and financial aid. Canada responded generously to Ghana’s request for aid
from that time onward, donating millions of dollars in aid. Nkrumah used the Canadian
financial and technical aid to drill water wells in the Northern Territories of Ghana.
Assistance from the United States went towards the construction o f a hydroelectric dam,
the centerpiece of Nkrumah’s development project.132
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Nkrumah’s Economic Approaches
For the first couple of years of independence, Nkrumah adopted economic policies
based on liberal economic approaches laid down by Arthur Lewis. The policies adhered
to outright privatization without government intervention.lj3 However, since Ghana’s
private sector was limited, the nation had to rely on foreign private capital investment as
an instrument of economic development. But, despite Nkrumah’s incentives and
guarantees to foreign investors, there was a lack of private capital inflows that could
stimulate the economy. Ghana started to experience a large foreign trade deficit and sharp
decreases in currency reserves contrary to the gains that were supposed to have come
from economic liberalism.134 In the beginning of the 1960s, Nkrumah came to the
conclusion that development based on economic liberal concepts was inoperable and thus
adopted a socialist model. He made an official visit to the Soviet Union and subsequently
adopted a communist central planning system.135
Nkrumah’s plan was to mobilize available resources to implement
industrialization. In the agriculture industry, he embarked on a gradual withdrawal from
the monoculture specialization. Instead of relying on only cocoa as the export product,
Nkrumah planned to increase the production of maize, millet, yams, plantains, and meat
for domestic consumption and export. To accomplish that objective, Nkrumah established
state farms and created W orker’s Brigades for the countryside. The W orker’s Brigades
became one of the main avenues for job creation for young people. By the mid-1960s, the

133 Smertin, Kwame Nkrumah.
134 Ibid.
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program had created about 35,000 jobs and substantially reduced unemployment in the
cities.136
In the industrial sector, Nkrumah embarked on several projects throughout the
country. One of the largest projects was the completion of the hydroelectric dam.
Nkrumah saw the project as essential because it was to be the source of energy to run all
the industries in the country and also provide energy for residential use. In addition to the
hydroelectric dam, industrial development projects included the construction o f an oil
refinery, prefab house-building factories, chocolate factories, meat processing factories,
several canneries, and textile factories.137 Nkrumah’s development projects included
social services with a special emphasis on health services and education. As a leader of
government business, he had introduced free education. Ten years later, after
independence, he offered free and compulsory primary education for all school age
children in Ghana. Nkrumah was, and still remains, the only Ghanaian leader to link
scientific education to economic growth in a development approach. In health service, he
created universal healthcare for G hanaians/38 While Nkrumah achieved success in social
services and industrial sectors of the economy, his strategy for national development fell
short in establishing a proper institutional culture to support his development projects.

135 Nkrumah, Neocolonialism.
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The Cocoa Marketing Board
One of the institutions that was, and still is, central to G hana's development is the
Cocoa Marketing Board. The CMB coordinates the sales and marketing of Ghana’s most
exportable product, cocoa. It was established in 1948 with the purpose of buying cocoa at
a lower producer price and selling it at a higher price on the world market. The objective
was to use the difference as a reserve fund to insulate cocoa producers from world price
volatility when needed.139 When Nkrumah took over the CMB from the colonial
government, he did not design effective policies to shield it from particularistic
interventions by CPP members, so as to enable the institution to protect the collective
interest o f Ghana’s development. The CMB had no auditing and monitoring system in
place to ensure proper legitimate use of public funds or prevent corruption. The loose
institutional cultural atmosphere allowed it to be used by its officials as carte blanche in
corrupt activities without accountability.140
As with other African public institutions, the CMB became less useful to the
cocoa producers it was suppose to serve.141 Instead it served political elites, who freely
extracted resources from producers by plundering the CMB. During Nkrumah’s
leadership, much of the money generated from the CMB ended up in the hands of
dubious elements of the CPP.142 Even though Nkrumah had “spoken and warned that

139 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f an Illusion.
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bribery and corruption were evil and needed to be stamped out,” 143 he failed to take direct
measures to establish non-tolerance policies against corruption, thus allowing his officials
of the CMB to engage in corrupt deeds that harmed the collective national well-being. In
essence, Nkrumah’s failure to make the institution autonomous from political interests
hampered the role the CMB was designed to play in Ghana’s economic development. By
the time Nkrumah’s government was toppled on February 24, 1966, the CMB had
become the source of patronage for CPP followers.
On February 24, 1966, Nkrumah was in China when a military junta led by
Lieutenant General E. K. Kotoka and Colonel A. A. Afrifa toppled his regime. For a
certain period thereafter, Ghanaian leaderships vacillated between military officers, who
seized power through coups, and civilians who acquired power through elections. That
routine of leaderships became the pattern in Ghana’s political economy until Lieutenant
Jerry Rawlings staged his December 31, 1981, coup and stayed in power for the following
20 years. That period from 1966-1981, which I consider as the interlude era, warrants a
special analysis.
Before examining the interlude leaderships, however, it is important to note that
by the time Nkrumah was overthrown, he had begun to lay an industrial base for Ghana’s
material development and had complimented that with basic education and health
services. Unfortunately, he had also established a political culture that was
uncomplimentary to economic development because it neglected democratic practices
that are essential for development. Nkrumah also nurtured a corrupt culture by not
confronting the corruption of party officials. In regards to institutional building, he failed

143 Ibid. 63
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to build checks-and-balances into the CMB when it came under his administration. The
lack of effective institutional policies allowed the institution to be used for individual
interests as opposed to economic development. However it has to be noted also that on
some economic fronts, Nkrumah achieved progress while on others his success was
limited due to external factors that were beyond his control. Nkrumah’s ascendancy to
power came during the early stages of cold war politics with two com peting development
political ideologies between the West and the East. This created a hostile external
environment for all the newly independent African nations and their leaders. In attempt to
avoid the cold war conflict, Nkrumah subscribed to a neutralist ideology and made Ghana
a member of the non-aligned movement.144 However, the non-aligned strategy did not
free Nkrumah from external influences.
Economically when Nkrumah came to power, he had expected to industrialize
Ghana with Western aid and investment. However many western donor countries
curtailed development aid to Ghana. Moreover, the private investments that Nkrumah had
hoped for from the west to stimulate Ghana’s development did not materialize. Western
governments, including Great Britain who had temporary broken diplomatic relations
with Nkrumah’s administration, used their positions in world financial institutions to
prevent Ghana from securing international development loans.145 Consequently,
economic growth in Ghana began to decline. In response to western countries’ action,
Nkrumah changed his economic strategy from a capitalist market system to a socialist

144 W. Scott Thompson, G hana’s Foreign Policy 1957-1966 (Princeton: Princeton University
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economic system and strengthened relations with the Soviet Union. Nkrumah’s action
prompted western countries to categorize him as a communist ally, which led to greater
economic isolation from the west.
External forces also offered support to Nkrumah’s political opponents to
destabilize his government and its policies. In 1962, Ghana’s opposition party with the
assistance of foreign collaborators made an assassination attempt on Nkrumah’s in the
town of Kulungugu as they sought to overthrow his government.146 These external
conditions had collective adverse impact on Nkrumah’s development efforts and
objectives. To some extent, these external influences did undermine the country’s social
and economic progress during the Nkrumah years continue to impact contemporary subSahara African leaders’ development policies.

THE INTERLUDE LEADERSHIP ERA IN GHANA
As mentioned above, Lieutenant General E. K. Kotoka and Colonel. A. A. Afrifa
led the February 24, 1966 coup in concert with a few military and police officers. The
group formed the National Liberation Council (NLC) as their government body, and
chose Lieutenant General Joseph A. Ankrah as the Head of State. The NLC became the
first group of the interlude leaderships. Politically, the NLC also became aware o f the
importance of stability if Ghana was to economically develop. It, however, abstained
from a democratically consociational approach. On the contrary, the leaders adopted
repressive methods to silence potential opposition and crack down on democratic

144 Thompson, G h a n a ’s Foreign Policy1957-1966.
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principles. Approximately one week after the coup, the NLC adopted a preventive
detention strategy through a decree that allowed the military the right to imprison any
person without charge or open trial.147 The NLC made no attempt to solve the
antagonistic relations among the different socio-political groups that undermined political
unity. Rather, they clung to power by adopting repressive tactics through decrees and
Ghana remained politically polarized.
Economically, Ankrah and his military colleagues made no efforts to transform
the economy or to improve productivity as Nkrumah had attempted to achieve. Instead,
the NLC cut social services, including education and health care. In the industrial sector,
the NLC leadership abandoned all industrial development projects that Nkrumah had
initiated. These projects included a meat processing plant, sugar factory, canneries, and a
car manufacturing plant. In addition, they privatized 78 state-owned companies.148 After
abandoning the projects, Ankrah and his group awarded national contracts to their
associates in return for bribes. With that behavior, the NLC leadership legitimized and
strengthened the already corrupt culture established in Ghana. The suspension of the
projects exacerbated the negative economic situation and resulted in unemployment for
the first time in Ghana.149 Abandonment of projects, increased in corruption, and the rise
in unemployment led to negative economic growth in all sectors of the economy
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including agriculture. Growth in agriculture was 0.6% in 1966. In 1967, however, it
reached 1.6%, and, declined in 1968, to 0.8 % .150
With a deteriorating economy characterized by high inflation and corruption, the
Ghanaian society became discontent with the NLC. Political agitation and labor strikes
increased. In view of public discontent with the economic conditions, NLC handed
power to a civilian government in 1970. The NLC leaders who proclaimed themselves as
liberators became the first, but not the last, to disappoint Ghanaians by failing to correct
the economic culture for which the leaders themselves had blamed their predecessors. It
is worth noting that, while the NLC leaders abandoned industrial projects, they held on to
their forerunners corrupt practices.151 In retrospect, they followed a similar political
economic culture established by Nkrumah, yet with a somewhat more damaging effect
because they suspended social services in education and health. On August 29, 1969, an
election was held, and the Progress Party, which was favored by the NLC, won the
election with 58.7% of the votes.152 On March 1, 1970, Afrifa, the then Head of State
handed power to Dr. Kofi A. Busia as the new Head of State.

The Leadership of Dr. Kofi A. Busia 1970-1972
Busia was an Oxford educator and a former opposition party leader during the
struggle for Ghana’s independence. He went into exile in England soon after Ghana’s
independence and remained there until Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966. When he
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became the premier, Ghana was still entangled in political instabilities that he had helped
to create in the 1950s.1:53 In conjunction with the political problems, there were still the
economic problems that had been intensified by policies of the N L C .154 The question for
Busia was simple, would he be able to find a solution to the problems of which he
contributed?
Politically, Busia amended Ghana’s constitution but failed to correct the
undemocratic flaw that prohibited the traditional leaders from participating in the political
process. Instead, he amended the constitution and fired 568 government high officials
from different tribes, which Busia said his government could not trust.155 Busia’s action
deepened the polarization in Ghana, making any chance of political unity and stability
impossible. In the economic arena, he did not make any attempts to diversify or transform
Ghana’s economy. He continued with the privatization of public industries that NLC had
initiated. To increase productivity he put the remaining government industries on a selfsufficiency basis and abolished replacement funds for obsolete equipment. In other
words, spare parts needed for public industries could not be ordered. His policies
worsened the already dilapidated Ghanaian economy.
To resuscitate the economy, he devalued the cedi, increased taxes, raised interest
rates, increased gasoline prices, abolished universal medical care, and finally eliminated
free basic education for children.156 The elimination of access to medical care resulted in
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a deteriorating quality of life for the poor who could not afford to get medical care on
their own. Likewise, the elimination of free basic education stopped some children from
poor families from receiving education. In that regard, Busia’s policies became anti
development more so than pro-development. He made no efforts to limit the corrupt
practices that had flourished under his predecessors. In fact, corruption escalated during
his administration due to further economic deterioration. The impact o f his austerity
measures made the administration very unpopular. In 1972, approximately two years after
Busia took office, Colonel Ignatius Acheampong overthrew the elected Busia
government.157 Busia left Ghana’s political scene with nothing achieved towards
development. The democratic deficiency, which he had correctly identified twenty years
earlier before becoming a premier, was left unresolved.158 Economically, his monetary
policies did not revive the negative growth trends that Ghana experienced. In human
development, his austerity measures did more harm than good to the poor by preventing
them from receiving medical services for themselves and education for their children.
One practice however, that Busia assisted in promoting and legitimizing was corruption.

The Leadership of Ignatius Acheampong
Acheampong’s regime under the National Redemption Council (NRC), which
later became the Supreme Military Council (SMC), broke away from the policies of the
previous governments. In an attempt to find a solution for Ghana’s political disunity,
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Acheampong proposed and held a national referendum between 1977 and 1978 for what
he described as Union Government (Unigov). He suggested that Ghana abolish party
politics and adopt a system of government where both the military and the civilian jointly
rule the nation.159 Ghanaians viewed Acheampong’s Unigov as the same one-party system
that Nkrumah had once tried to impose. Even though the referendum was approved, the
opposition was so strong that the idea was aborted. Economically, Acheampong set up a
consultative committee to evaluate the country’s economic problems. Thereafter, he
revalued the Ghanaian currency that had suffered devaluation under Busia’s
administration. Acheampong restored some of the public social service that previous
administrations had halted. He launched an “Operation Feed Y ourself’ program, by
which he convinced the nation to stay away from imported foods and to grow more food
for domestic consumption.160 Acheampong reinvigorated the national sector o f the
economy by nationalizing some companies outright and buying 55% shares o f others such
as Ashanti Goldfields. In 1972 he made a unilateral decision to pay what he termed as
“just” national debt and forgo what he considered an “unjust” debt. Those he deemed as
just were placed under 10 years moratorium.161 The unilateral action made Acheampong
very unpopular with Western creditors and foreign direct investment to Ghana rapidly
declined.
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In governance, army officers who lacked expertise ran most of the government
bodies. Lack of expertise and favoritism increased bribery and corruption. At
Acheampong’s time, young women were given millions o f cedis worth o f import
licenses, which they often resold for about two times their value. Besides the department
heads, the members of the ruling body of the SMC not infrequently abused their power.
Acheampong himself personally interfered with the operations of the Bank of Ghana,
where he instructed the overprinting and over-issue of cedi notes.162 He personally
granted unqualified concessions to his associates in contravention of government policies
and regulations. In addition to the abuse of power, the regime was fraught with other
social evils such as illegal arrests.163 Economic hardships increased in 1974 when prices
of cocoa dropped and prices of oil increased. To mitigate the suffering o f the people,
Acheampong increased subsidies; however, by 1978, the economic situation in G hana
had become unbearable.
In the midst of the economic turmoil, there was a palace coup, in which
Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Akuffo replaced Acheampong as the Head o f State. The
only economic pronouncement Akuffo made was to emphasize the promotion of private
enterprises, development o f free-market system, and the need for aid from Western
countries.164 Politically, sometime late in 1978, Akuffo reaffirmed his government’s
intention of transferring power to a constitutional government in July the following year.
Akuffo’s intended transfer of power did not happen before Flight Lieutenant Jerry John

162 Yeboah, “Control Theory Application to Economic Policy Analysis in G hana.”
163 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f Stability.
154 Ibid.
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Rawlings overthrew his regime on June 4th, 1979. Like other military leaders before him,
Akuffo could not find a formula for a political coalition that could have brought national
political unity. Neither was he able to establish a favorable economic culture to help
Ghana recover from its economic decline.

Leadership Under Jerry John Rawlings
The June 4th coup of 1979 that brought Rawlings to power was staged by a group
of junior officers who called themselves the Armed Forces Revolution Council (AFRC).
In regards to concrete political and economic changes only a few, if any, had a definite
view of how to proceed.165 The AFRC consisted of a group of men with frustrations that
were shared by most Ghanaians due to economic hardships coupled with a lack of sense
of political direction by previous leaders. “Cleansing” the society of negative phenomena,
including corruption and distrust of leaders, was the sole objective of the group who
made themselves national leaders through the barrel of a gun.166
In their attempt to clean house, Rawlings and his men set up military tribunals
and made a decree that individuals found guilty in actions against the state would be
subjected to capital punishment.167 Defendants of the first trial by the tribunals were 33
army officers, of which three were former heads of state. The AFRC sentenced all three
former Heads of State and many other military officers to death and carried it out with the
public watching the firing squad at Teshi near Accra. The first round of killings took

165 Zaya Yeebo, Ghana: The Struggle fo r Popular Power (London: New Beacon Books, 1991).
166 Kevin Shillington, Ghana and the Rawlings Factor (NY: St. M artin’s, 1992).
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place on June 16 and thereafter on June 29th, 1979.168 Within a few weeks, Rawlings
killed many Ghanaians faulted for the country’s economic problems. Market women,
whom the government suspected of overcharging sales prices on items, were sent to
prison or flogged in public. One day of August in 1979, Rawlings and a group o f soldiers
went to Makola, one of the main markets in the capital and destroyed the market.169
Today, the area where the market once stood is called “Rawlings Park” which ironically
has become a monument to his brutalities.170
Besides intimidations, killings, and confiscation of property from civilians, the
emergence of Rawlings failed to produce any positive political or economic gain for
Ghanaian society. At best, the June 4, 1979 coup can be characterized as an explosion of
social antagonism driven by constantly deteriorating living conditions. In the midst of the
chaos, the AFRC allowed the already scheduled election by the previous Akuffo
administration to take place. On September 24,1979, Rawlings transferred power to a
civilian government under the leader ship of Dr. Hilla Limann.

Leadership Under Hilla Limann
When Limann took over the reigns of power, he faced the same lingering
economic deterioration and political instability that previous leaders had tried to suppress
through dictatorship. To resuscitate the economy, Limann made a trip around the world

167 West Africa, June 26, 1979.
168 West Africa, July 2, 1979.
169 Shillington, Ghana and the Rawlings Factor.
170 Yeebo, Ghana: The Struggle fo r Popular Power.
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looking for aid but refused to accept IMF and World Bank’s structural adjustment
programs.171 With less consumer products on the market, inflation escalated and, in turn,
exacerbated the corrupt culture that already existed. Workers who felt the economic
hardship turned to the streets to demand immediate solutions, which the Limann’s
government could not deliver. In trying to overcome workers’ protest and strikes,172
Limann resorted to various repressive methods like arrest and detention rather than
engaging in democratic dialogue with workers and other groups.173 To make matters
worst, a corruption scandal broke up in Limann’s ruling party where the general secretary
and the chairman of the party misappropriated funds from the party’s coffers. The money
that the party leaders squandered was a bribe that a foreign company had paid to secure
the job of printing Ghana’s currency.174 While the corruption case was unrevealing, Jerry
Rawlings took advantage of the workers discontent with the economy and staged another
coup to overthrow Limann’s government on December 31,1981.
Rawlings’ second regime marked the end of the interlude leadership era. It is
important to note that all the interlude leaders had followed sim ilar pattern of economic
and political policies. In the political arena, each had criticized the others for being
dictatorial, yet they all adopted repressive mechanisms to enforce stability. None of the
leaders could devise a political consociational approach to form a democratic platform to

171 Jeffrey Herbst. The Politics o f Reforms in Ghana, 1982-1991 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1993).
172 There were estimated 70,000 people on strike in Ghana in 1981 during the Limann
administration due to workers discontent. United Nations, Yearbook on Labor Statistics (Geneva: United
Nations, 1982).
173 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f Stability.
174 West Africa, November 30, 1981.
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enhance political development that could ensure stability. Unfortunately, for democratic
development, Rawlings’ first regime introduced political violence. The civilian leaders
during the interlude era failed to amend the constitutional flaw that brought about the
political instabilities in the first place. Instead of forging alliances with different political
groups to establish a strong nation state, leaders like Busia played the tribal card to make
the situation worst.
Economically, the NLC administration that came to power after Nkrumah
abandoned all industrial development projects, including a food-processing plant.
Thereafter, all the leaders’ economic policies hinged on going around the world to look
for aid rather than focusing on building productive sectors of the economy to stimulate
domestic production. AH the leaders within that time period pursued monetary economic
policies that undermined human development. Busia cut funds from education and health
care, which made it hard for the poor to improve their living conditions. While
Acheampong restored some of the educational and health care services, he nationalized
foreign companies. In addition, he unilaterally declared a policy of none-payment of
national debt. That policy halted the inflow of foreign direct investment into Ghana and
slowed the nation’s economic growth. Another common denominator among Ghanaian
interlude leaders was their inclination towards corruption. Even though corruption had
started during Nkrumah’s regime, it escalated during this time period. In essence, the
interlude leaders failed to correct the corrupt culture and the political repression that they
had condemned before coming to power. Instead, they adopted the same cultures and
inadvertently legitimized them. They also failed to transform the Ghanaian economy or
improve the lives of Ghanaians.
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GHANA UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF RAWLINGS 1981-2001
In evaluating leadership in Ghana, the solution to both economic progression and
cohesive political stability provides the best litmus test because Ghana has been free from
foreign threats since the precolonial era. The only foreign threat that Ghana faced was
colonialism,175 which in itself was made possible due to internal territorial political
instability in precolonial days.176 Fortunately, the attainment o f independence in 1957,
and the subsequent gaining of republic status in 1960 by Kwame Nkrumah dismantled
colonialism.177 Therefore, when Rawlings returned to power in 1981, the problem of
economic underdevelopment and political instability were readily apparent.

Jerry J. Rawlings
Jerry John Rawlings was bom in 1947 at Dzelukope in the Volta Region of
Ghana. His mother is an Ewe from Volta Region and his father was a Scottish citizen
who was once on duty in the Gold Coast during the colonial days. As a boy, Rawlings
attended school at Achimota College. After completing his secondary education, he went
to military training school and enrolled as an Air Force cadet. In 1978 he was
commissioned as a Flight Lieutenant.178 Rawlings first came on the Ghanaian political
scene in June 1979 when he was released from jail by junior officers to become a leader

175 Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
176 Fynn, Ashanti and Its Neighbours.
177 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
178 Shillington, Ghana and the Rawlings Factor.
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o f a coup. On September 24, 1979, he handed over the reign of government to a civilian
government. Nearly two and half years later, he staged another coup and toppled the very
civilian government he helped to install. Thereafter, he ruled Ghana by dictatorial decree
for twelve years, transforming himself to become a civilian leader after democratic
political elections and remained in power for eight more years.
Immediately after the December 31, 1981 coup, Rawlings told Ghanaians that the
reason for his return to power was to rearrange the foundations of G hana’s politics
through the transformation of social, economic, and political relationships. In other
words, he intended to establish a democratic system where all citizens would participate
in national decision-making.179 He suspended the constitution of 1979 and his Provisional
National Defense Council (PNDC) assumed national power with him as the chairman.

Bureau of National Investigation
Politically at the time of the coup, the PNDC was made of different factions with
only one common denominator. The commonality involved waging holy war to free
Ghana from corrupt imperialists and their masters in the west so as to enable Ghana to
redistribute national resources equally among its citizens.180 But, to do that required a
political formula for national stability. To build political stability, Rawlings, just like his
predecessors, decided to use intimidation and repressive mechanisms to coerce other
factions in the PNDC and the whole country to succumb to his dictatorial ways.

179 Pellow and Chazan, Ghana: Coping with Uncertainty.
180 Herbst, The Politics o f Reforms in Ghana.
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Rawlings and his security chief, Kojo Tsikata, successfully established
institutions to facilitate the creation of a dictatorship and to assist in cultivating fear in
Ghanaians. Among the institutions created for those purposes, the most successful and
important one is the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI). The BNI was restructured
from a previous special branch of the police force in 1982. Its main functions were to
arrest, detain, and execute anti-PNDC elements and its agenda of dictatorship. Through
the BNI, violence became decentralized and was perpetuated by autonomous groups in
the armed forces and civil society.181 It operated by relying on intimidation and political
repression to silence the public. Executions and torture carried out by the BNI had
frequently come from the direct instructions of Rawlings. One case in point was the death
of Alhassan Atusnab, a cook of a German friend o f Rawlings. Soldiers on the orders o f
Rawlings beat the cook to death on a July 1st, 1989, on suspicion that the cook had stolen
a 100 Deutschmark.182
The violent purge of civilians after the 1981 coup by the BNI led to the period
between 1982 and 1990 being one of the most sordid times in Ghana's political history.
The political repression led to what later became known as a culture o f silence. The
method used by Rawlings to create that culture included torture, imprisonment, and
executions. In Africa, Emperor Bokassa had used similar tactics in the Central African
Republic, Idi Amin used it in Uganda, and Samuel Doe used it in Liberia. In the 1950s,
Nkrumah established the culture with Prevention Detention Act. Thirty years later,
Rawlings re-enforced it with widespread human rights abuses.

181 Yeebo, Ghana: The Struggle fo r Popular Power.
,8- Ibid.
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Rawlings’ Economic Development Approaches
Rawlings’ first economic act was to set up an Economic Review Committee to
assess the extent of Ghana’s economic crisis. Based on a socialist framework, the
committee came up with a formula with three tenets to steer Ghana towards development.
First, they decided to deal with corruption in business, state corporations, banking, civil
service, and personal taxation. Second, the committee recommended that wealth be
redistributed to the people. Finally, the third tenet o f Rawlings first economic approach
was for the nation to solicit aid from socialist countries.183
To tackle the problem, the PNDC set up a citizen’s vetting committee to deal with
corruption. It set up defense committees to take care o f the distribution of wealth by
confiscating from the rich and giving to the poor. In regards to the solicitation for aid,
Rawlings sent delegations to Libya, Cuba, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union to seek
assistance. Unfortunately for Rawlings, the hope that aid from socialist countries would
lift Ghana out of its economic chaos proved fruitless. With the exception of Libya, the
socialist aid that Rawlings had banked on to assist his revolution was not forthcoming.184
In other words, the implementation of the three prescriptions based on the socialist
framework did not bring any relief to Ghana’s economic crisis, and Rawlings was forced
to change strategies. He approached the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World
Bank for financial assistance and was granted a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)

183 Emmanuel Hansen and Paul Collins, ‘The Army, T he State and the Rawlings' Revolution in
Ghana,” African Affairs, Vol. 79 (January 1980): 3-23.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

242
package by the two institutions. Rawlings was encouraged by these institutions to shift
his economic policy away from redistribution and instead concentrate on increasing
industrial and agricultural production.185 In view o f that recommendation, Rawlings
embarked on an Economic Recovery Program (ERP).186
In order to implement the program, Rawlings and his finance minister contacted
the chairman of the Trade Union Congress and asked for the support of the workers. On
December 30, 1982, Rawlings launched the ERP under the auspices of structural
adjustment. In line with the program, Rawlings made cutbacks in government
expenditures, devalued the national currency, and removed subsidies on essential
consumer items. Price control mechanisms were also removed.187 The devaluation was
immediately felt because it resulted in an inflation rate of 174% in 1983. The price
increases were not well received by Ghanaian workers, people rioted in the streets of
Accra and in other cities throughout the country as a show of resistance to the Economic
Recovery Program by Rawlings and his PNDC.188
To explain the high prices, Rawlings called a rally at Tema. It, however, ended in
confusion when workers bluntly told him they were dissatisfied with his budget.
Infuriated, Rawlings burst into anger and the workers jeered him. He then reacted by
smashing his microphone to the ground and storming off in an armored car. The budget

184 D. Rothchild and E. Gyima-Boadi, “Ghana’s Economic Decline and Development Strategies.”
in John Ravenhill, ed., Africa in Economic Crisis, 254-285 (NY: Colombia University Press, 1986).
183 Herbst, The Politics o f Reforms in Ghana.
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187 Herbst, The Politics o f Reform in Ghana.
188 “Report on the 1983 Budget,” People's Daily Graphic, 24 April 1983.
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issue and the manner in which Rawlings handled it reduced the PNDC’s image at home,
but the government’s image with the international agency soared. The World Bank
sponsored a donor’s conference for Ghana in Paris in November 1983. At the conference,
the PNDC unveiled its long-term economic plan that included privatization of
government enterprises. At that juncture, the World Bank agreed to loan Ghana $120
million if the latter agreed to compensate Lonrho company for sequestration in 1972 of its
55% stake, a condition to which the Rawlings’ team immediately agreed.189 In other
words, the government took a loan in 1983 to pay for an investment that had gone sour a
decade earlier.190
In the monetary sector, Rawlings allowed the Foreign Exchange Bureau to freely
quote their buying and selling of other foreign currencies simultaneously with the cedi.
Those actions in concert with the devaluation plunged the value of the cedi as much as
545% between 1983 and 1986. The cumulative effect w as the spread of poverty in
Ghana.191 Other methods of implementation of the program included intensification of
workers retrenchments, privatization of government plants, and abandonment of welfare
services, including education and healthcare. These policies were not different from the
ones that Rawlings predecessors had implemented to slow human development from
reaching the poor sector of the society.192

189 Yeebo, Ghana: The Struggle fo r Popular Power.
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R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n p rohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

244

Economic Policies in Mining and Forestry
Among all the policies that Rawlings adopted under the ERP, two areas that were
especially harmful were in the natural resources sector o f mining and forestry. In the
mining industry, the government issued about fifty licenses in 1985 to foreign companies
prospecting for gold mining without negotiating in good faith. The conditions of the
licenses did not disclose the benefit that Ghana would receive from the deals. But, it was
known that about ninety percent of all profits were allowed to be repatriated immediately
to offshore investors.193 Such deals tell the story of how Rawlings, through corruption,
sold out Ghana’s resources. As one foreign mining manager described it, “the change has
come about entirely because the PNDC has made foreign investment attractive. We can
export profits, have tax concessions, and our foreign exchange retention rate has doubled.
They changed the rules of the game.” 194 The above testimony of a foreign investor
reveals how Rawlings’ economic policy depleted the national resources without
benefiting Ghanaians.

Mismanagement and Corruption in the Forestry
Mismanagement and corrupt activity that Rawlings nurtured was also evident in
the forestry industry. A number of timber companies, agents, and officials in the
government became involved in illegal activities that resulted in widespread corruption in

193 Yeebo, Ghana: The Struggle fo r Popular Power.
194 Home Front Newsletter, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Ghana High Commission in London, March 1988 ): 8
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the timber industry.195 A case in point involved Silviconsult, a consulting company that
advised the Ghanaian government to set up a Tim ber Export Development Board to
promote Ghanaian Timber abroad and to help Ghanaian Timber Merchants to obtain
better prices. Fraudulently, Silviconsult agents accepted orders from sister companies at
low prices and passed them through to the Tim ber Export Development Board. The
representatives of Silviconsult, acting as double agents, turned around and sold
overpriced equipment to Ghanaian timber com panies.196 This example is only one of
several, the network of corruption in the timber sector is much wider. The web of
corruption in the Rawlings’ government spanned across PNDC officials, timber
merchants, senior civil servants, and some officials in the World Bank. Between 1986 and
1989, the National Investigations Committee investigated about thirty different cases of
corruption in the timber industry and found that within that time period more than $38
million was siphoned from Ghana’s foreign exchange by corrupt officials and their
foreign accomplices in the industry.197
Unfortunately, these corrupt practices were not restricted to the mining and
forestry industries alone, nor did only lower officials participated in such corrupt
practices. Corruption permeated the executive branch of government officials, including
Rawlings himself. According to a former PNDC member. Sergeant Allolga Akata-Pore, a
former confidant of Rawlings, the former head o f state and his national security officer,
Kojo Tsikata, had dipped into the national coffers as well. According to Akata-Pore,

195 William Keegan, “Forest Pay as Ghana Loses O ut,” Financial Times (February 8, 1989).
196 Ibid.
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Rawlings and all the members of PNDC were embezzling huge sums of money from the
National Consolidation Fund. The officer confessed to having participated in these
actions. 198

Evaluation of the Economic Recovery Program
The success of Rawlings’ economic program since coming to power is debatable.
By some economic indicators, ERP and its adjustment program have been successful in
controlling inflation and reducing the government deficit. It is estimated that, between the
mid-1980s and 1990s, the program helped Ghana’s economy grow 5 % a year for a
decade.199 With this evidence, Ghana was hailed as the IMF ‘s great success story in
economic development.200 While the fiscal policy section of Ghana’s budget might have
improved due to reduction in subsidies, it did not set the economy on a development path.
In the industrial sector, Rawlings’ economic policies have adversely impacted the
development of Ghana’s local industries. Faced with competition from abroad, they are
unable to sell goods and foodstuffs that are locally produced. For example, companies
like the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation, and major textile companies are unable to
compete with imported goods and therefore go out o f business.201 The result is the virtual
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absence o f a manufacturing base, while the economy remains underdeveloped and
dependent on imports. This condition, in tum, creates more economic problems through a
balance of payment deficits. In the social sector, the ERP has had a negative impact on
families through workers’ retrenchment.
The introduction of the ERP came with retrenchment as part o f the
conditionalities originally devised at the donors’ conference in Paris.202 At the
conference, the Rawlings’ team was urged to make substantial cuts in labor as a way of
reducing wages and salary bill.203 The first target of the retrenchment program was the
Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (COCOBOD). As a result, the staff o f the COCOBOD
fell from over 100,000 in 1982 to 40,000 in June 1989.204 Other government corporations
suffered a similar fate including the State Fishing Corporation and the Ghana W ater &
Sewerage Corporation. In the public service sector, healthcare and education were also
affected. At the completion of retrenchment, a total o f 107,166 people were dismissed
from their jobs.205 As stated early, if the litmus test for Ghana’s leadership is how the
leaders rally the people towards solving economic problems to benefit the people, then
the above evidence points to the failure of Rawlings’ leadership. However, others do not
share this evaluation o f Rawlings. For instance, a recent article in the New York Times
described the Rawlings’ leadership in a “borrowed robe” as a success and hailed his
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transfer of power as “ An African Success Story.”206 Such assessments appear to give
credit to Rawlings for supposedly voluntarily and democratically relinquished power.

Ghana’s Road to Democracy under Rawlings
Jerry Rawlings had promised a democratic framework in the national decision
making process. Towards this end, he organized the Workers Defense Committee (WDC)
and Popular Defense Committees (PDC) as democratic vanguards.207 However, after
realizing that the two organs had too large role in the decision-making process, he merged
the PDC and the WDC together and renamed it the Committee for the Defense of the
Revolution (CDR). He shifted the CD R’s functions from taking part in decision-making
to that of a conduit for interpreting and explaining to the people the “aim of the
revolution” as defined by the central government.208 Rawlings also realized that if the
promise of involving the masses in the decision-making process was to be fulfilled, then a
well-defined democratic framework had to be deduced. In place of liberal Democratic
Party politics, Rawlings set up a National Commission for Democracy (NCD) and
entrusted it with building a network that would become the instrument of a democratic
process. In 1987, the NCD submitted its “blue book” report to the PNDC on how best to
institutionalize participatory democracy and recommended that elected local assemblies
be the vehicles through which people can participate in the decision-making process.209

206 “An African Success Story,” New York Times, January 8,2001.
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Between 1987 and 1988, the NCD, under the instruction of the PNDC, drew a
comprehensive voter’s register and increased the number of administrative districts from
65 to 110. 210 Out of that data, the PNDC created a structure and established functions for
a future elected district government and proceeded to conduct an election for district
assemblies on a non-partisan basis. The condition was similar to the one- party selection
process that had been previously suggested by both Nkrumah and Acheampong. The
pattern o f the district assemblies’ elections did indicate that Rawlings was not interested
in implementing a true democratic system in Ghana. This assessment is fair because all
the candidates for the district assemblies had been affiliated with the PNDC. Moreover,
the government, without holding an election had appointed about one-third of all the
assembly members of all the districts.211 In practice, therefore, all the members of the
district assemblies were associates of Rawlings who made the entire process
undemocratic.
The undemocratic nature of the process drew high criticism from a broad
spectrum of opposition groups in Ghana. The most vocal among the opposition was the
Ghana Bar Association. It organized public opposition against the Rawlings’ process. The
opposition adopted the line of liberal democracy and called on Rawlings to lift the ban on
political parties, release political prisoners, set up constituent assemblies, and draw
up a new constitution. This internal pressure coincided with external pressure from
international organizations and donors who demanded that Rawlings adopt democratic

210 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f Stability.
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political practices.212 In 1990 the opposition members saw the Rawlings’ NCD and the
district assemblies with two views. First, they viewed the developments as an attempt by
Rawlings to “finesse a constitutional legitimacy” for his PNDC government. Second, they
saw it as another one-party system similar to Acheampong’s ill-fated Unigov experiment
of 1977 to 1978. Based on those perceptions, the opposition members joined together to
form the Movement of Freedom and Justice (MFJ) and built a whirlwind of momentum
to steal the democratic initiative from Rawlings and his PNDC.213
W hen Rawlings and his advisors realized the opposition’s legitimate strategy, they
reneged on their so call democratic enlargement policy. In a dramatic change of events,
Rawlings decided to rely on his ready network of district assemblies to compete for
power. W ith this strategy, Rawlings made a quick tum around and laid out a new political
agenda where he asked the NCD to produce a report to recommend a “way forward”
towards a Consultative Assembly, a proposal for a new constitution.214 In other words,
both domestic and external forces compelled Rawlings to abandon his national one-party
system to join a liberal multi-party democratic process.
In March 1991, the NCD published its report and recommended the adoption of a
multi-party system. Simultaneously, a special committee o f constitutional experts was set
up to formulate a specific constitutional proposal, which was to be placed before the

a Conference on Democratization and the 1992 Elections in Ghana, August 5-6, 1993, School o f Oriental
Studies London.
212 W orld Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. A Long Term
Perspective Study (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989); Ray, G hana Politics, Economics, and Society.
213 M ike Oquaye, ‘T h e Ghanaian Elections o f 1992. A Dissenting View,” African Affairs, Vol. 94,
No. 375 (April 1995): 259-75.
2,4 Ibid.
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consultative assembly.215 From then on, the democratic process took on a new dimension
and matters proceeded at a faster pace. By the end of July 1991, the Constitutional
Committee published its proposal to be considered by the consultative assembly. In
August, the proceedings of the Consultative Assembly began, and at its opening, a time
table was set for the return to a full constitutional government with a national election
scheduled to be held in the third quarter of 1992.216

The Election of 1992
In May 1992, Rawlings lifted the ban on party politics. Almost immediately, eight
parties formed included the National Democratic Congress (NDC) o f Rawlings and his
associates.217 Presidential and parliamentary elections were held on November 3 and
December 29, 1992, respectively. With his network of the district assemblies, Rawlings
won the presidential election and his party won most of the parliamentary seats.218 On
January 7, 1993, Rawlings became the president of the Fourth Republic.
Politically, Rawlings could not rally the political muster to correct the
constitutional flaw that had laid the foundation for Ghana’s political instabilities to unify
the country. Economically, Rawlings continued the structural adjustment program that
was entering its second phase and was dominated by the privatization of state-owned

215 E. Gyimah-Boadi, “Notes on G hana’s Current Transition to constitutional Rule," Africa Today,
Vol. 38, No. 4 (Fall 1991): 5-17.
2,6 Ibid.
217 Oquaye, ‘T h e Ghanaian Elections o f 1992. A Dissenting View. ”
2,8 Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thibaut, Elections in Africa: Data Handbook. 435.
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enterprises. The national debt expanded and interest payments increased. Rawlings failed,
like his predecessors, in establishing high moral and ethical standards among his official
cadre. His first term ended without much improvement in the Ghanaian economy and the
country still remains industrially underdeveloped due in part to corruption and public
sector mismanagement.
The 1996 elections had a little competition, yet the NDC managed to win a victory
with Rawlings winning a second term presidency with 57.5% o f the votes.219 Rawlings
second term ended in 2000, and his Vice-President John Atta-Mills became the
presidential candidate for NDC. At the 2000 elections, the opposition, New Patriotic
Party’s (NPP) candidate, Joseph A. Kuffor beat Atta-Mills in a run off election. On
January 7th, 2001, Rawlings twenty-year rule in Ghana came to a peaceful end when he
transferred power to the elected president from the opposition party.220

TOWARDS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OR CONTINUED DECLINE?
Utilizing the UNDP’s human development index, Ghana is economically
impoverished.221 By the same token, if development is defined as earlier stated in chapter
3, then here too Ghana, just like many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, is not

219 Ibid. 438.
220 “An African Success Story,” New York Times, January 8, 2001.
221 According to the United Nation’s human index definition, development is when a nation is able
to translate its economic gains into improving the living standard conditions o f its citizens and residents.
See, Mark McGillvray, 'T h e Human Development Index: Y et Another Redundant Composite Development
Indicator?" World Development , V ol. 19, No. 10 (October 1991): 1461-68.
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economically developing.222 This is so because, after twenty years of Rawlings’ structural
adjustment policies, Ghana still depends on imports for its consumer goods. The reason
for this is that the economic program has not helped Ghana to develop the industrial
capability needed to enable it to manufacture industrial goods to satisfy its domestic
needs. In economic productive terms, Ghana lacks the comparative advantage in
industrial production and, as such, its economy is still dominated by agricultural raw
material simply because it lacks the scientific culture o f creation for economic
industrialization.
As Table 5-4 shows, a careful observation o f the economic structure of Ghana
reveals that the agricultural sector has remained approximately 50 % of the country’s
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since 1975, while the manufacturing sector has been
declining. The manufacturing sector since 1975 has declined from 13% of the GDP to 5.9
% in 1995. Prior to 1985, the decline in manufacturing within one decade had been from
13% in 1975 to 11% in 1985. Within the same timeframe of ten years (1985-1995), when
Rawlings implemented his economic policies, the manufacturing sector, which
demonstrates the ability to create and thus constitutes development as defined in chapter
3, did decline from 11% of the GDP to 6.5 %. It further deteriorated from 6.5 % to 5.9%
between 1994 and 1995, a significant indication that economic policies under Rawlings’
leadership have made Ghanaians economically worse off than they were prior to his
coming to power in 1981.

This work defines development as a nation’s ability to acquire scientific culture that enables it
to technologically produce diverse industrial goods. See chapter three o f this work.
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Table 5-4
The Structure of Ghana’s National Economy 1975-95
% O f Gross Domestic Product
Agriculture

1975
47.7

1985
44.9

1994
46.4

1995
46.3

Mining Industry

21.0

16.7

16.0

15.8

Manufacturing Industry

13.9

11.5

6.5

5.9

Service

31.3

38.4

37.7

37.9

Private Consumption

73.3

84.0

83.8

77.5

General Govt. Consumption

13.0

9.4

11.6

12.4

Imports of Goods and Services

18.4

13.6

36.9

33.5

Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Washington, DC: World Bank,
1997.

Again, Table 5-4 also indicates that the agriculture sector has remained fairly
constant between 44.9% and 47% of the GDP from 1975 to 1995. The services sector,
which includes education and health services, increased from 31.3% to 38.4% between
the same periods. However, from 1985 to 1995 the service sector remained relatively the
same, between 37.7% and 38.4%. However, when an inflation rate of 27.7%, which was
seen to be the lowest recorded in Ghana within that time period, is taken into
consideration, then social services have been deteriorating since 1985.223 Ghana faces
serious development problems because the economy as a whole lacks industrial capacity
as demonstrated by its dwindling manufacturing sector. From a developmental
perspective, the country’s situation is troubling because it suggests that the leaders have
not been able to establish the cultural attitudes and behavior necessary for development.
As this case study shows, leaders have legitimized low moral culture that have resulted in

223 Oxfam, Ghana Country Profile 1998-1999 (London: Oxfam. 2000)
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corruption and human rights abuses, both of which are detrimental to development. The
leaders have also failed to devise coherent progressive policies towards achieving a
scientific culture o f creation.

What Are the Moral and Scientific Cultures in Ghana?
As noted above, the level of corruption among party affiliates and the COCOBOD
institution in Ghana since Nkrumah’s time demonstrate that there is low moral conviction
on the part of Ghanaian leaders. The corrupt behavior has been prevalent in all
administrations. During the Rawlings' period, corruption skyrocketed in institutions such
as the National Timber Export Board. There was also a rise in human rights violations.224
As far as the scientific culture is concerned, Table 5-4 reflects the decline in
growth o f Ghana’s industrial manufacturing sector. Although basic and intermediate
science was part o f Ghanaian school curriculum up to the university level in early the
twentieth century, the country does not have the industrial scientific ability to induce
industrialization.225 The importance of scientific culture in Ghana’s development, with
the exception of Nkrumah’s leadership, has received virtually no attention from Ghanaian
leaders.226 Since 1966, they have failed to integrate scientific education into national
economic development policies. In fact, since the leaders of the 1966 military coup
abandoned industrial projects that were under construction, Ghana’s idea of development

224 Herbst, The Politics o f Reforms in Ghana.
225 J. Anamuah-Mensah, “Science Education as a Tool for National Development: The Missing
Framework,” Unpublished Paper presented at Eastern W ashington University, May 1998.
226 Ibid.
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has always been based on export promotion as opposed to industrial promotion. Indeed,
the neglect o f research and development is not unique to Ghana, but it is a common
phenomenon in the entire sub-Saharan Africa w o rld .227
In Ghana, the lack of a development vision by leaders has led all postcoionial
leaders, with the exception of Nkrumah, to avoid meaningful scientific policies as a way
of achieving economic development. In place o f intensive economic research and
development, Ghanaian leaders have adopted small-scale technology known in Africa as
Appropriate Technology (AT).228 As mentioned in chapter four, AT focuses narrowly on
technologies suitable for rural food processing and production. It is also labor-intensive as
opposed to being technological oriented. Hence, it lacks the potential to stimulate an
industrial culture essential for economic development.229 For this reason, Ghanaian
leaders cannot claim that adopting AT policies will propel the country towards a scientific
culture capable of fostering industrialization and sustainable economic development
capabilities.
While Ghana’s first leader, after independence, theoretically formulated scientific
culture policies that could have assisted the country in attaining sustainable development,
he had little time to practically establish such a culture before he was deposed.
Unfortunately, Nkrumah’s successors have been less motivated to formulate and
implement adequate policies that take scientific culture into account. In addition to the
absence of scientific culture, the leaders have lacked the high moral discipline to abstain

227 Ahmad, “Science and Technology."
228 Segal, “Appropriate Technology."
229 Stewart, Macro Policies fo r Appropriate Technology in Developing Countries.
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from indulging in corruption. Therefore, they have been unable to foster the appropriate
culture for material economic development. After forty-three years of independence,
Ghana, a nation endowed with natural and potential human resources, remains one the
poorest and underdeveloped countries in the world.230

SUMMARY
This chapter has shown that precolonial Ghana was occupied by different
autonomous nations such as the Ashanti, Fanti, and Dagomba. The nations had somewhat
similar political and economic institutions headed by chiefs and kings.231 Chiefs headed
tribal groupings while the kings presided over hegemonic nations such as the Ashanti
Empire. Precolonial leaders were selected through a hierarchical inheritance system, and
they administered their societies in a participatory democratic fashion. Leaders
administered their societies with the assistance of three different political institutions,
namely the Privy Council, Council of Elders, and Village Assemblies of the Commoners.
Economically, the nations were agrarian societies that engaged in subsistence
farming and commerce. Land was the main factor of production and its supervision by
leaders made them very important and powerful. The economic role of leaders made them
aware of their social status and moral obligations to the wider societies. Leaders refrained
from monopolizing means of production and extracted little tribute from citizens.232
There were institutional checks-and-balances to limit the misuse o f power. Leaders

230 Rimmer, Slaying Poor: G hana's Political Economy.
231 Ayittey, Africa in Chaos.
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created a high moral culture, void of corruption, which facilitated citizen engagement in
progressive economic activities. Through such political and economic synergism, the
individual societies maintained social stability.
At the same time, none of the leaders, with the exception of Osei Tutu of Ashanti,
were able to establish a political system with the purpose of integrating the nations into a
homogenous society. Ashanti leaders used military conquest as a method o f building a
homogenous empire. To manage the Ashanti Empire, the leaders created an imperial
system under the supervision o f the Union Council headed by the Ashanti king and
guided by the Ashanti constitution.233 Due to unequal treatment from the Ashantis,
conquered nations did not identify their interests with the empire as a corporate union.
The indifference flowing from that disconnection led to revolts. The instabilities
prevented the crystallization o f the nations into a unified and homogenous society.
As commercial societies, the competition to gain access to European trade also
intensified tribal rivalries. That fracture left them to defend themselves against each other
and made each tribe vulnerable to outsiders. Under the circumstance, the Fantis gravitated
to the European traders in search of security against the Ashantis. Through the
association, the British colonized the Fanti in 1850 through an agreement known as the
Bond of 1844.234 In contrast to the Fantis, the Ashantis waged one hundred years of war
with the British to ward off colonization. They accomplished and maintained this goal
until 1902 when they were defeated and colonized. The colonization of the Ashanti

232 Wickins, An Economic History o f Africa.
233 Fynn, Ashanti and Its Neighbours.
234 Danquah, 'T h e Historical Significance o f The Bond of 1844.”
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occurred simultaneously with the annexation of Dagombas in the North. These three
phases of gradual imposition of the British rule constituted the colonization of Ghana.235
Colonial rule subjugated all indigenous leaders together with their institutions and
rules to those of the colonial administration. The colonial leaders sent from Britain
imposed British rules, and de-legitimized the chieftaincy to the extent that the nature of
leadership lost its respect among its own people. Politically, the subjugation of traditional
leaders and the imposition of British rule are the key differences between colonization in
the Gold Coast and protectorate in other parts o f Africa. One of the earlier colonial
leaders to arrive in the Gold Coast was Frederick Guggisberg. In 1919, when he arrived in
the Gold Coast his administration focused on economic development as opposed to
political development.
Despite the negative political impacts, there were some positive economic
consequences from colonization. Guggisberg laid and improved the Gold Coast’s national
transportation system. He laid railroad tracks to help expedite the shipment of the
colony’s agricultural products to the world market. Besides the railroad tracks, new
automobile roads were constructed in conjunction with a harbor at Takoradi. The
governor topped his infrastructure plan with development in education and medical
services for the colony. By 1929, the colony’s economy had been transformed from the
predominance of slave trade and forest commodities such as spices, palm produce, and
rubber to that of cocoa beans, gold, diamonds, manganese, and timber.236 On the

235 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
236 Hiden, “Plan for Africa.”
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traditional side. Ofori Atta was one of the first leaders to serve on the colonial legislative
council. Politically, he led a delegation to England to ask for constitutional change to
allow more local people on the legislative council. He also worked hard to increase the
number o f natives in the colonial civil service. Economically, he led a boycott against
colonial cocoa buyers who had conspired to cheat cocoa producers. Despite his efforts in
both economics and politics, he failed to provide national leadership because he failed to
speak for the nation as a whole and became a comprador for the British system of divideand-rule.
Colonial rule lasted until 1946 when nationalist movements started to demand
self-rule. In 1947, nationalist leaders formed the UGCC with the objective of attaining
self-rule for the colony. The nationalist movement reached its climax in 1948 when a riot
in the capital turned into a national disturbance. After the riot, constitutional talks held in
1949 adopted a British type of political structure that excluded traditional leaders from
the national political system. Nkrumah, one o f the opponents o f the constitutional
framework, broke away from the UGCC to form the CPP. Elections were held in 1951,
and the colonial government transferred power to Nkrumah and his victorious CPP party.
Nkrumah’s quest of power prevented him from making political concessions to include
the traditional leaders. Economically, he advanced the policies that were in place and
increased education and health services to other parts of the country where they were
lacking.237 However, large amounts of government funds created temptation and brought
corruption to Nkrumah’s regime.

237 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
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Prior to independence, Nkrumah had an opportunity to change the constitutional
flaw that had undermined national politics. He, however, refused to do so. Instead, he
adopted the Preventive Act of Detention in 1958 as a means of stabilizing the nation. In
doing so, Nkrumah laid the foundation for a dictatorial political culture that also, in tum,
laid the foundation for Ghana’s political instability.238 In the end, Nkrumah could not
forge a leadership consensus to build a stable foundation to facilitate socio-economic
development.
After independence, Nkrumah first pursued liberal economic policies but switched
when they failed to yield positive results. He then adopted a socialist approach to
economic development. This inward-orientation transformed Ghana’s economy and
initiated industrial projects throughout Ghana from a meat processing plant to car
manufacturing plant.239 Nkrumah, however, failed to provide moral leadership against
corruption. His party members turned the CMB into a corrupt institution and used it to
extract money from producers to satisfy the personal interests of party officials as
opposed to broader national interests.240 Corruption and political agitations led to a
downward spiral in the economy, and the opposition took advantage to support the
military to stage a coup to overthrow Nkrumah’s government in 1966.
The overthrow of Nkrumah’s regime marked the beginning o f the use of military
in the resolution of political conflicts in Ghana. From that time until 1981, Ghana moved
from one military junta to another with intermittent civilian rule creating the interlude

238 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f Stability.
239 Smertin, Kwame Nkrumah.
240 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f an Illusion.
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leadership era. The interlude leaders failed to formulate economic policies to alleviate
Ghana’s economic crisis. Instead, they all adopted austerity measures to cut social
services which caused economic hardship for the poor. In some cases, the cutbacks
denied education to poor children. Interlude leaders, starting from Ankrah and Afrifa in
1966 to Limann in 1979, all abetted the legitimization of corruption and political
suppression of traditional leaders.241 The interlude leadership ended when Rawlings
returned to power in 1981.
Politically, Rawlings maintained authoritarian rule under his PNDC for 12 years
before contesting elections in 1992. As an elected leader Rawlings ruled until 2001.
During this period, he was unable to resolve the political flaws that continue to
undermine the political and economic stability of Ghana. Socially, Rawlings inspired
bullyboys within the military, specially trained commandos and BNI agents to use brutal
force against the civilian population. In the immediate aftermath o f the 1981 coup,
military brutality became a thorny problem in Ghana. Rawlings set up military tribunals
that condemned people to death by public firing squad, and killed many citizens including
three former heads of state.242
Economically, Rawlings adopted structural adjustment programs as an economic
development strategy. The conditions o f these programs required the removal of social
subsidies, devaluation o f cedi, and privatization of government enterprises, which led to

241 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f Stability.
242 West Africa, July 2, 1979.
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an unemployment of 107,000 workers.243 His policies in mining and forestry also
increased corruption to the extent that in one year more than $38 million was siphoned
out of the forestry industry.244 After almost 20 years of Rawlings’ ERP, Ghana is
overburdened with debt and its per capita income stands around $400. The policies have
also brought massive increases in the cost of living for the poor, and the country remains
un-industrialized with most of its revenues coming from raw materials. There is little
industrialization in Ghana due to a lack of scientific culture that is required to empower
scientific creativity and technological innovations. All evidence points to the fact that
Ghana’s underdevelopment is mostly a result of its own doing, due in large part to the
inability of its leaders to establish social cultures conducive to economic development. In
place of a socio-scientific culture that promotes development, the leaders have established
and legitimized corrupt and dictatorial cultures that Rawlings furthered through
legitimization of political violence.245
The postcolonial leaders have made both the economic and political situation
worse. By legitimizing corruption, dictatorship, and political violence, they have
undermined the economic progress made during the colonial days. In so doing, the
postcolonial leaders have made Ghana one of the poorest countries in the world.246
Ghana has experienced three leadership phases. The first one was the precolonial
leadership; the second was the colonial leadership, and the third is the current

243 Yeebo, Ghana: The Struggle fo r Popular Power.
244 Keegan, “Forest Pays as Ghana Loses Out.”
245 Herbst, The Politics o f Reforms in Ghana.
246 International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (W ashington, DC:
International Monetary Fund, 1983).
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postcolonial leadership. The precoloniai leaders managed their individual societies
economically well but waged wars among themselves without establishing a homogenous
society. The colonial leaders embarked on a course of meaningful economic development
but without a democratic political apparatus. Unfortunately, the postcolonial leaders have
undermined development by establishing a corrupt culture that siphons national financial
resource for personal use as opposed to being utilized for national development. Political
leaders have been less motivated to establish a scientific culture of creation to spur
industrialization and sustainable development.
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CHAPTER VI
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Evidence from the case studies suggests that since independence Ghanaian leaders
have fostered and legitimized a low moral culture, which has produced endemic
corruption. Moreover, the leaders have been unable to establish scientific culture to
induce industrialization. In addition to these conditions, Kwame Nkrumah’s first
government constitutionally disenfranchised traditional leaders from Ghana’s
postcolonial political order. The problem however was that with previous local patterns
of socialization and political participation by chiefs, Nkrumah’s action created resentment
from the chiefs. Successive leaders, since Nkrumah, have continued this practice of
excluding traditional chiefs who have local political support and the loyalty of rural
people. This exclusion of traditional leaders from national governance has, for a long
time, crystallized into opposition by local leaders and their supporters towards many
development policies that have been formulated by postcolonial leaders. These conditions
have collectively contributed to economic underdevelopment and abject poverty in
Ghana.1 It was also seen that Nkrumah’s initiative to transform the economy towards
industrialization was incomplete. Since his ouster, his successors have abandoned
industrialization and have adopted monetary economic policies with little attempt to
transform the monoculture productive system of Ghana.2 Politically, Nkrumah adopted

1 Rimmer, Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy.
2 Nkrumah initiated industrialization as means of transforming G hana's productive system, but he
did not adopt capitalist methodology. For Nkrumah-s socialist economic system see Smertin, Kwame
Nkrumah.
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authoritarianism through legislative acts and disenfranchised traditional leaders from
participating in national politics. Nkrumah’s successors have followed a similar political
path.3 The last 20 years of Rawlings’ administration further widened the negative political
culture to include human rights abuses.4
In contrast to Ghana, Botswana has enjoyed greater economic progress. The
country’s economic conditions improved because its leaders have been successful in
establishing a high moral culture to curtail corruption. Immediately after independence,
Seretse Khama emphasized and strengthened the culture of internal moral discipline. His
personal distaste for corruption prevented his officials from kleptocracy; thereby ensuring
financial resources were used for social services such as education and healthcare.5 In
production, Khama was able to transform the previous production system, based on
patron-client relations, into class relations based on capitalism, to induce economic
growth.6
Politically, Khama stressed the importance of democracy and structured his
government to achieve this political ideal. In terms of political socialization, he and his
party leaders allowed traditional leaders a role in the governing of Botswana by
incorporating chiefs in the legislative assembly through constitutional means. This
political inclusion of traditional leaders and their followers enabled Botswana to maintain
political stability. Khama’s successors have adhered to political socialization to enhance

3 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f Political Stability.
4 Shillington, Ghana and the Rawlings Factor.
5 Charlton, “Exploring the Byways o f African Political Corruption.”
6 Samatar, An African Miracle.
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Botswana’s pluralist democracy. His successors have also adhered to high moral culture
with no tolerance for corruption practices. By establishing high moral culture, Botswana’s
economy is doing better than that o f Ghana. The explanation lies in Botswana’s
leadership’s ability to establish high moral culture, as one of the prerequisites cultures
needed for development.7 By the same token, the stagnation of economic development in
Ghana is explained by its leaders’ inability to establish a high moral culture capable of
preventing corruption in order to channel financial resources to human development.
The difference in the protectorate system that existed in Botswana during the
colonial era in contrast to that of direct rule in Ghana explains why Botswana leaders are
able to establish a high moral culture to benefit their country. The protectorate system
allowed the traditional leaders and their institutions with their moral obligations to the
people to be preserved in the postcolonial era. The inability of contemporary Ghanaian
leaders to establish high moral culture is partially attributed to direct colonial rule. Direct
rule eliminated the traditional leadership class and, in its place, created a new leadership
group who had no fiduciary relations or moral obligation to the local people.
The divergence in leadership behavior, partially explains the economic progress of
Botswana in comparison to Ghana. Botswana’s annual per capita income rose from $50 at
the time of independence to over $3000 in 1997, while that of Ghana only rose from $242
at the time of independence to about $400 in 1997. The economic difference is also
reflected in educational attainment between adults and children in both countries.
Botswana’s illiteracy rate is 30%, while Ghana’s stands at 36%. At the elementary level,

7 Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”
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school enrollment for children in Botswana is 112% compared to 76% in Ghana.8 Despite
the difference in economic improvement that favors Botswana, both countries are still
industrially undeveloped due to the absence of a scientific culture, which could assist
them in being more self-sufficient by enabling them to produce industrial goods
domestically. The inability of leaders in both countries to establish scientific culture finds
support in their adherence to Senghorianism. This philosophy, used by Senghor as a
defense for African self-identification, postulates that scientific culture is not an African
cultural trait as it is in the western European culture.9 Strict adherence to this philosophy
by the first postcolonial leaders of Ghana and Botswana, Nkrumah and Khama
respectively, made them less inclined to consider or pursue scientific culture as a tool for
fostering economic development. Successive leaders o f both countries have also
neglected scientific culture, thereby leaving their societies technologically behind and
developmentally bankrupt.
As already mentioned, the information from the previous two chapters offers
convincing evidence that there is a vast difference in the economic prosperity of the
people in Botswana vis-a-vis their regional Ghanaian neighbors. This evidence also
shows the dissimilarities that emanate from their respective leaderships' policies and
systems of governance. However, such a conclusion neglects any qualitative theoretical
explanation and comparative analysis. This chapter attempts to fill that void in three
ways. First, it compares the similarities and differences in leadership in Botswana and

8 African Development Bank, Basic Indicators on African Countries (Abidjan. Ivory Coast:
African Development Bank, 1999).
9 Senghor, Prose and Poetry.
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Ghana relative to their countries’ economic development. We look at leadership
differences during the colonial era, and how leadership transferred power to postcolonial
leaders. The second section reviews the economic status of both countries immediately
after their independence and compares them to their current economic status. The section
uses the LCD theoretical model to explain the difference in the economies relative to the
leaderships’ ability in fostering moral and scientific cultures. Third, in this chapter, I use
the colonial factor and Senghorian dimension to elucidate why the leaders are able, or
unable, to establish high moral and scientific cultures needed to stimulate economic
development in their respective countries.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCE IN LEADERSHIP AND ECONOMICS
In terms of economic similarities, both precolonial Tswana and Ghanaian
communities were affected by the global capitalist economy long before they became
politically affiliated with Britain under colonization.10 Aside from being influenced by the
capitalist system, the two were agrarian societies. Subsistence farming in forest
commodities dominated the economy of Ghana, while cattle rearing was dominating in
Botswana. In both countries, leaders played important roles in the economies because
they owned or controlled the means of production in the form o f cattle and land.11Both
communities also engaged in commerce. The Ghanaian communities traded in forest
commodities such as spices, rubber, and also engaged in the slave trade. The Tswana

10 For information on precolonial Ghana coming in contact with capitalist economy, see Fynn,
Ashanti and Its Neighbours. ; For information on precolonial Botswana com ing in contact with capitalist
economy, see Picard, The Evolution M odem Botswana.
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communities traded in cattle with their neighboring communities. In colonial days,
however, the economies of the two countries changed. Ghana’s economy was
transformed from slave and spice trade to commercial crop of cocoa beans, gold, and
diamonds. The economy of Botswana became dominated by capitalist activities such as
supplying wagon trains, controlling trade, and other capitalist opportunities.12
Both economies prospered during the colonial era, with the Ghanaian economy
benefiting the most. In Ghana, cocoa exports quadrupled and revenues from the crop
increased.13 This generated income for most local inhabitants and provided revenue for
economic infrastructure and development. Governor Frederick Guggisberg, for example,
partially financed his development projects including railroad tracks, education, and
medical services with surplus cocoa revenues.14 Botswana also experienced economic
growth in the earlier stage of its encounter with capitalism but was later subordinated by
capitalists in their need to create a labor reserve out of Botswana’s citizens.15 In addition
to turning the territories into a labor reserve, capitalists also restricted Tswana from
participating in other forms of economic activities such as trade.16
Unfortunately for Botswana, its leaders could not do very much to assist in
alleviating the economic hardships because the main factors of production (land and

11 Parsons, ‘T h e Economic History o f Khama’s Country” ; For earlier economic system in Ghana
see Wickins, An Economic History o f Africa.
12 Palmer and Parsons, The Roots o f Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa.
13 Danquah, “Rural Discontent and Decolonization in Ghana."
14 Guggisberg, The G old Coast: A Review o f the Events.
15 Massey, Case o f Colonial Collaboration.
16 Best, “General Trading in Botswana.”
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cattle) had been strategically constrained by British and South African governments. The
British government devised means of taking lands, while the South African government
put discriminatory restrictions on Tswana’s ability to export their cattle into its country.17
However, even against those odds, some traditional leaders tried to invigorate the
economy. For example, Kgosi Isang Pilane of BoKgatla organized a Tribal Boring
Scheme and drilled boreholes to get water for cattle grazing land for his subjects.18 In
comparison to Botswana, the traditional leaders in Ghana had a more positive impact on
their economy because there were less colonial restrictions on how they could use their
lands vis-a-vis Botswana’s traditional leaders.19 For example, Ofori Atta, a traditional
chief, was able to lead a boycott against European cocoa buyers in Ghana when he felt
that the buyers’ price collusion could have robbed local cocoa producers of substantial
resources.20 In colonial politics, however, the Ghanaian traditional leaders had less impact
in contrast with their Botswana counterparts because o f differences in the protectorate
and direct rule systems.

COLONIAL DIFFERENCES IN PROTECTORATE AND DIRECT RULES
In terms of colonial affiliation, Botswana became part of the British Empire with
the establishment of a protectorate over the former Bechuanaland in 1885.21 The

17 Palmer and Parsons, The Roots o f Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa.
18 Konczacki, Parpart, and Shaw, Studies in Economic History o f Southern Africa.
19 Those interested in how other traditional leaders were involved with the development o f the
cocoa economy in colonial Ghana see Danquah, “Rural Discontent and Decolonization in Ghana."
20 Danquah, Liberty o f the Subject.
21 Parsons, ‘T h e Economic History o f Khama's Country.”
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protectorate system was tied to a parallel rule arrangement, where the protectorate
administration and the local rule were simultaneous but mutually exclusive from each
another.22 Under the mechanics of the system, there was only British supervision of the
central traditional government since the British did not directly govern the local people.
The protection offered by the British affected only external affairs of the territories,
including matters dealing with European affairs in the protectorate. Moreover, it allowed
the chiefs to manage their internal affairs without interference.23
Unlike the protectorate in Botswana, the British colonization o f Ghana entailed
direct governance of the local people that came in three phases. The first involved the
colonization of the coastal areas in 1850 through the Bond o f 1844. That direct rule was
followed by an annexation of the Ashanti province in 1902, with a simultaneous inclusion
of the Northern territory.24 To avoid competing authorities once the colonial apparatus
was in place, the British subjugated traditional leaders, preventing them and their people
from participating in the national decision-making process.25 Another profound
distinction between the two systems was in the judiciary sectors of the two countries.
Under the direct rule, the traditional judiciary systems in Ghana were replaced with the
British judicial system that forced traditional leaders to abdicate their right to
adjudicate.26 In Botswana, however, traditional leaders dealt with judicial matters

22 Shillington, The Colonisation o f The Southern Tswana.
23 Ibid.
24 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
25 Lugard, Dual M andate in British Tropical Africa.
26 Kimble, A Political History o f Ghana.
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concerning the indigenous people under their kgotla judicial system. This helped to
preserve the moral obligations, rule o f law, and legitimacy of leaders in Botswana. In
Ghana, by contrast, the competition between the customary laws and British colonial laws
brought about non-compliance of traditional laws, which resulted in social polarization,
illegitimate leaders, and changes in moral values.27
Based on the above differences, traditional leaders in both countries had different
roles during the postcolonial era. In colonial Ghana, traditional leaders had been
ostracized, humiliated, demoralized, and in many instances forced out of their political
positions, making their impact on development mediocre at best. Under the protectorate
affiliation, however, Botswana leaders maintained virtually all their domestic roles and
had more impact on the domestic political process.28 Compared to their counterparts in
Ghana, two Botswana chiefs, Tshekedi Khama and Chief Bathoen, played significant
roles in ensuring their country was not polarized through colonization. The leaders waged
relentless campaigns against British efforts to colonize their country and, in so doing,
indirectly preserved their society’s moral obligation based on the Tswana tradition of
kagisanoP
Tshekedi’s challenge and resistance to the British was only one of the fierce
political campaigns he and his colleagues had to wage in protecting Botswana from going
under foreign rule. On another occasion, Tshekedi waged international war through the

27 Gocking, “Colonial Rule and the Legal Factor. ”
28 Picard, The Evolution o f M odem Botswana.
29 In regards to South Africa’s attempt to annex Bechuanaland see Landell-Mills, ‘T h e 1969 South
African Custom Union Agreement” ; On the British attempt to colonize Botswana see Picard, “Role
Changes Among Field Administrative in Botswana.”
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United Nations to prevent Jan Smut of South Africa from indirectly annexing Botswana
through an annexation attempt on South West Africa.30 With social cohesiveness under
the protectorate system, Tshekedi devoted the latter part of his life to organizing tribal
councils in the territories from which his nephew, Seretse Khama, selected the members
of his Botswana Democratic Party to lead the country to independence and to its current
economic prosperity.31 The above activities are indicative of how the protectorate system
enabled Botswana’s chiefs to orchestrate political strategies that preserved their moral
values and guided political developments in a gradual evolution that offered stability for
Botswana’s postcolonial development. In contrast, the direct rule in Ghana produced a
different leadership scenario. Ghana was divided into three regions and administered
separately to prevent collective national leadership from posing a threat to the colonizer.32
On the regional levels, leaders were subjugated, de-legitimized, and baned from
adjudicating and maintaining social order. The above-narrated colonial difference shows
that both colonial systems offered different leadership contingencies in the two countries
at the dawn of their colonial eras and well into the postcolonial era.

Transition to Postcolonial Leadership in Botswana and Ghana
In comparison to Ghana, where the transition to postcolonial leadership started
with political agitation,33 the British Protectorate Commission initiated Botswana’s

30 Crowder, ‘Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South W est Africa.”
31 Khama, The Case fo r Bechuanaland.
32 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
33 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f an Illusion.
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transfer of power to postcolonial leadership without societal conflict. It was initiated by
introducing the British democratic style of politics in an attempt to phase out the
country’s traditional principle of hereditary rule.34 Ironically, the commission used the
traditional leadership forum by encouraging chiefs, their heirs, and other Botswana
citizens, including those of foreign descent, to form a Joint Advisory Council (JAC) and
an African Advisory Council (AAC) as transitory organizations. Tshekedi Khama, the
chief of the royal house of Bangwato, Seretse K ham a’s uncle, sat on both councils.35
When Seretse returned to Botswana in 1956, Tshekedi recommended that he accept a
position as an assistant tribal secretary. In 1958, a legislative council (1egco) was created
to allow Botswana to take care of its external affairs with minimum protectorate
administrative supervision.36 The establishment o f Legco and the advancement of the
political process towards autonomous self-rule led to the formation of three political
parties in Botswana. Among the three parties was the Botswana Democratic Party, which
Seretse Khama headed.37
By contrast, the transition arrangements for the transfer o f power from colonial to
postcolonial leaders in Ghana were not clear-cut. The transition was not initiated by the
colonial administration, but rather was marked by political agitation between locals and
the colonizer as well as between the locals themselves. The rivalry was due to the nature

34 Picard, The Evolution o f M odem Botswana.
35 Ibid.
36 Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou, Seretse Khama 1921-1980.
37 Ibid.
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of the direct colonial ru le /8 The antagonism developed because, during the consolidation
of the colonial rule, the British created another group o f leaders by allying itself with
local educated elite through the legal prism to protect its economic interest.39 Later,
however, the British faced challenges emanating from some o f the educated groups, such
as the Aborigines Rights Protection Society, which wanted to protect their national lands
from being taken over by the colonizer. With those challenges from some of the educated
groups, the British changed its policy and allied itself with the traditional chiefs in line
with a new indirect rule policy.40 That vacillation of colonial policies within the local
elements created two problems for the transition. First, the turbulence created two
leadership groups (the traditional leaders and the educated elite), both o f which wanted to
inherit power from the colonizer. Second, it created a dilemma for the colonizer because
there was no unified national leadership group to be utilized as a medium for the
transition process.41 Therefore, in contrast to Botswana where the protectorate had
preserved the leadership group for the transition, direct colonial rule eliminated
traditional leaders and created leadership uncertainty in Ghana.

Botswana’s Leadership and Power Transition
As Botswana moved closer to the transition of power, the protectorate secretariat
invited officials of the political parties and the traditional leaders to constitutional talks in

38 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
39 Gocking, “Colonial Rule and the Legal Factor."
40 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition.
41 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third W orld; Fitch and Oppenheimer.
Ghana: End o f an Illusion.
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1963. Due to the nature of the protectorate arrangements, the secretariat realized the
important role of the traditional leaders and called a special meeting to consider the
position of the chiefs in the ongoing political process.42 The chiefs’ role in the process
was deemed critical because, during the protectorate era, they were basically allowed to
govern their tribal territories according to their social institutions and thereby maintain
law and order without foreign intervention. For that reason, the new political officials
recognized the role the chiefs could play in the administration o f the country. It was
acceptable therefore, at the constitutional talks, to include a house o f chiefs in the
legislative assembly, so the chiefs could share power and play a central part in the
national affairs.43
The inclusion of the chiefs in Botswana’s Legislative Assembly meant two things
that were essential for the country’s development. First, the transition of power would
reside in both groups of leaders. This prevented the emergence of domestic political
rivalries that might compete for power as happened in the case o f Ghana.44 Second, the
inclusion of chiefs meant tribal loyalty was secured. The traditional leaders were of great
value. Their presence offered political legitimacy and contributed to a more effective
local government. The traditional leaders, like their emerging political officials, also
shared the need to build a unified domestic leadership and made the necessary
concessions in that regard. They transferred their national legitimacy to the new political

42 Parson, Succession to High Office in Botswana.
43 Picard, The Evolution o f Modem Botswana.
44 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
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officials.45 In essence, the protectorate conditions made it possible for the new political
leaders to realize the importance of the traditional leaders and, in that regards, reserved an
un-contested place for them through the House of Chiefs in the Legislative Assembly. By
the same token, the traditional leaders reciprocated by transferring the national
institutional legitimacy to the new political officials. With those arrangements, a unified
domestic leadership was created for a smooth transition of power into the postcolonial era
in Botswana.
In a way, the transition was smooth. The leadership in Botswana was unified
partially because the protectorate system allowed the transformation to be orchestrated
and executed with the right socially legitimized class, to the extent that nothing changed
as far as the functions of social classes were concerned. In a more abstract manner, the
traditional leaders knew they were transferring power to their heirs who were becoming
political officials. For example, Seretse Khama and other leaders o f the Botswana
Democratic Party, who were becoming the new political officials, were heirs to the
various royal families in the territories.46 In that context, because o f the protectorate
system, the change in Botswana from the colonial era to the postcolonial era involved
only the political apparatus, not a change in the leadership group.

Ghana’s Leadership and Power Transition
The background history of Ghana’s transition to postcolonial power was a short
one, lasting from 1947 to 1957. Nevertheless, the immediate preceding years had

45 Parson, Succession to High Office in Botswana.
46 Ibid.
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witnessed national political movements. Many of the most highly educated citizens and
some chiefs joined the opposition to colonial rule. That led to the formation of the UGCC
in 1947 as a political organization. However, steps towards self-govemment did not
occur until the infamous riot of 1948.47 In investigating the causes o f the riot, an
appointed commission concluded that the riot reflected the frustration of the educated
classes with the lack of opportunities in Ghana. As a remedy, the commission
recommended constitutional reforms to be followed with a government made o f local
citizens.48
Based on the commission’s report, the colonial government invited thirty-eight
people to formulate a new constitution. The group was composed o f chiefs, educated
leaders, and some members of the UGCC, the only political organization at the time.
Unlike the transitional group in Botswana, the absence of a national traditional leadership
forum in colonial Ghana and the presence of two competing leadership groups made the
transition different. Given the structure of the direct colonial rule, the constitutional
commission overlooked the role of the traditional chiefs and did not discuss power
sharing between traditional leaders and new emerging political officials.49 Instead, with
the colonial influence, the commission adopted a British type o f representative political
structure that meant a transformation from the traditional inherited political system to a
new democratic process, the effect of which sidelined traditional leaders and their

47 Apter, The G old Coast in Transition.
48 Ibid
49 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
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followers. By the end of the talk power was subtly transferred to the educated classes with
the chiefs being left out of a role in the national constitutional rule.50
In retrospect, the direct colonial rule made the conditions feasible for power to be
taken from the legitimate traditional leaders and given to a new group that held no
collective legitimacy. Direct colonization did that, first, by usurping the legitimate
authority from the traditional leaders during the initial consolidation o f power. At other
times, it usurped power by the arbitrary removal of chiefs from their positions.51 Second,
direct colonialism made the transfer o f power to educated groups possible because, after
one century of its rule, it had positioned itself as the natural source o f legitimate authority.
This belief created an illusion in the minds of the commission members about the
irrelevancy of traditional leaders and their role and also enabled the commission to
exclude them from participating in the constitutional rule.
Therefore, based on the differences in direct colonization in Ghana vis-a-vis the
protectorate in Botswana, the transition of power in Ghana brought about two changes.
First, there was a change in the political apparatus from that of an inherited system to a
representative form of government. Second, there was a change from the previous
traditional leadership group with legitimacy to a new educated leadership group without
legitimacy. On the leadership front, Ghana had a new leadership group without power
sharing and was backed by foreign colonial legitimacy without domestic legitimacy,
while Botswana had a continuous amalgamated leadership which had been made possible
by its protectorate colonial legacy.

50 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f an Illusion.
51 Gocking, “Colonial Rule and the Legal Factor."
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ECONOMIES OF BOTSWANA AND GHANA: BEFORE AND AFTER
INDEPENDENCE
During the colonial days, capitalist interests subordinated most economies in
Africa. That situation also applied to the economies of Botswana and Ghana. During the
protectorate era, Botswana was turned into a labor reserve to serve mining interests in
South African goldmines. That goal was achieved by a strategy devised by capitalists to
tum some of Botswana’s citizens into wage earners by selling their labor for low wages
by working in South African mines.52 Even in Botswana agriculture, capitalists
orchestrated strategies to restrict access to land through the creation of free hold farms as
a means of forcing farmers into selling their labor.53 Through such strategies and others,
like trade, the protectorate economy of Botswana was undermined by the capitalist
system.54
By the time Botswana attained its independence, a large part of its population
supplemented their living with income remittance from their relatives who worked in the
mines in apartheid South Africa.55 At independence, poverty had escalated and the
average annual per capita income of the Batswana was approximately $50. Modem
healthcare facilities were not in existence to cater to the needs of the local residents, and
people had to depend on traditional herbalists.56 In education, the problem was even

52 Picard, The Evolution o f M odem Botswana.
33 Legassick, “Gold, Agriculture and Secondary Industry.”
54 Best, “General Trading in Botswana."
55 Cathie, Food Security.
56 Parson, Succession to High Office in Botswana.
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worse because only half of the school age children had facilities to attend school and
there were only 1,400 students enrolled in secondary schools.57 Botswana’s capital,
Gaborone, was still under construction, and the country could boast of only twenty miles
of tarred road.58 Financially, Botswana had to depend on Great Britain to balance its
meager national budget.59
In comparison to Botswana, Ghana was in a strong economic position at the time
of independence. The colonial leadership, under Governor Frederick Guggisberg,
undertook extensive economic infrastructure development. There were railroads tracks
connecting all major cities in the southern part of the country. Ghana’s healthcare service,
as noted in chapter five, was one of the best in sub-Saharan Africa. There were about
thirty well-equipped government hospitals with approximately 2,630 hospital beds
catering to a population of less than three million.60 Unlike Botswana, educational
facilities in Ghana were adequate with close to 5,000 primary schools and a student
population of 468,000. In addition, higher education was well advanced with a university
having been established in 1948.61 Financially, Ghana was in a comparatively better
position than its Botswana neighbor and had approximately $300 million in its foreign

57 Republic o f Botswana, Transitional Plan fo r Social Economic Development.
58 Parson, Succession to High Office in Botswana.
59 Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou, Seretse Khama 1921-1980.
60 Bourret, Ghana: The Road To Independence.
61 Ibid.
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exchange reserves.62 On the average, Ghana’s per capita annual income was about $242
in comparison to Botswana’s $50 per capita at the time.63
Since the early days of independence, the economic fortunes of both countries
have reversed. Botswana’s economic and social improvements have surpassed that of
Ghana’s. On the micro level, the annual per capita income of Botswana is over $3,000 as
compared to Ghana’s per capita income of approximately $400.64 In education, the adult
illiteracy rate in Botswana is 30%, while in Ghana the adult illiteracy rate stands at 36%.
In basic education, where Botswana had only half of its school-age children enrolled
during independence,65 enrollment is up 112%. In contrast, Ghana’s education enrollment
is 76% for school age children. Comparatively speaking, Botswana has a higher ratio in
the area o f primary education than does Ghana, and it also has a higher rate in adult
literacy.66
However, both countries are still engaged in the production of raw material.
Ghana’s economy is dominated by its major exports o f cocoa, gold, and timber.
Botswana’s economy is dominated by the diamond mining and cattle industries.67 As raw
material producers, both Botswana and Ghana depend on imports for their industrial
consumption needs. Botswana imports 80% of its industrial products from neighboring

62 Yeboah, “Control Theory Application to Economic Policy Analysis in Ghana."
63 Nkrumah, Neocolonialism.
64 African Development Bank. Basic Indicators, 1999.
65 Republic o f Botswana, Transitional Plan fo r Social Economic Development.
44 African Development Bank, Basic Indicators, 1999.
47 Lewis Jr., ‘T h e Potential Problems o f Diamond-dependent Development.”
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South Africa,68 while Ghana buys its industrial needs primarily from European nations.
Financially, there has been a vast difference between the two countries since their
independence. At independence, Ghana had a considerable amount of foreign exchange
reserves.69 However, its financial position has substantially deteriorated. Since 1975,
Ghana has had negative net reserves in its foreign accounts. In addition, the country’s
national debt has soared from a mere $721 million in 1975 to over $5 billion in 1997.70
By comparison, Botswana had no reserves at independence and therefore, it had to
depend on Great Britain for post-independence financial contribution to supplement its
budgetary needs.71 For what can be considered as a dramatic change of events, Botswana
had over $5 billion in excess of its foreign accounts in 1998. In collaboration with the
World Bank, it devised a strategy to invest the excess foreign reserves to earn interest
revenues.72
This financial comparison makes it clear that Botswana’s monetary position is
better than that of Ghana’s, in the sense that Ghana has become a debtor nation while
Botswana has become a lender nation. Another profound change that has occurred in both
countries that is important in measuring economic development lies in healthcare service.
Improvements in healthcare relate to life expectancy, infant mortality rate, and access to
clean water, all of which are considered to be reasonable gauges o f economic

68 Cater and Morgan, From the Frontline.
69 Yeboah, “Control Theory Application to Economic Policy Analysis in Ghana.”
70 World Bank, World Development Indicators. 1997.
71 Colclough and McCarthy, The Political Economy o f Botswana.
72 Mohohlo. “Central Bank as a Protector of National Wealth."
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development.73 At independence, the average Ghanaian had access to a universal free
healthcare service, while the average Batswana, at independence, had to depend on
traditional herbalists for their healthcare needs.74 These days Botswana’s healthcare
service looks different. The infrastructure has been well developed with district primary
health care facilities and teams scattered across the country providing services to the
people.75
In relation to Botswana, Ghana’s healthcare service is now characterized by a
lopsided allocation of resources favoring urban inhabitants. Rural dwellers have only
limited access to health services. At the managerial level, Ghana’s health service suffers
from qualified labor shortage and problems with poor management.76 These conditions
have put Ghana’s healthcare service on less favorable terms in comparison to Botswana.
For example, while 83 percent o f rural residents in Botswana live within ten miles o f a
primary healthcare facility, only a few rural dwellers in Ghana have access to health
services.77 On the national level, there are four physicians to every 100,000 patients in
Ghana, in contrast to twenty-four physicians to the same number of patients in

77 World Bank, Better Health in Africa: Experience and Lessons Learned (NY: Oxford University
Press. 1994).
74 Parson, Succession to High Office in Botswana.
75 L. Owuor-Omondi, D. Atlholang, and R. Diselco, Botswana: A National Health Status
Evaluation (Gaborone: Botswana M inistry o f Health, 1987).
76 World Bank, World Development Report: The Challenge o f Development (NY: Oxford
University Press, 1991).
77 Dugbatey, “National Health Policies."
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Botswana.78 In comparing the general population, 60% of Ghanaians have access to
health services compared to 88% of their regional neighbors in Botswana.79
Clearly, Botswana’s leadership policies have helped the country to improve
healthcare services better than that of Ghana. The above improvement has made
Botswana’s human development impressive, with the one exception of HIV infection.80
The result of Botswana’s health improvement is that there has been a dramatic fall in its
infant mortality rate from 95 per 1000 live births in 1970 to 58 per 1000 live births in
1997, as compared to Ghana’s infant mortality decline from 100 per 1000 live births in
1970 to 73 per 1000 live births in 1997.81 Life expectancy in Botswana, before
accounting for the impact of HIV/AIDS, has risen from 50 years in 1966 to the upper 60s
by the mid 1990s, while life expectancy in Ghana only stood at 58 years by the mid
1990s.82
Using the UNDP’s Human Development Index definition of economic
development as the ability of a country to translate economic gains into improved living
conditions,

RT

the preceding analysis suggests that, since independence, Botswana’s

economy has fared comparatively better than Ghana’s. This is the case because, among
the several economic development indicators, Ghana is trailing Botswana. There is a

78 Leith, Botswana: A Case Study o f Economic Policy.
79 Dugbatey, “National Health Policies.”
80 World Bank. African Findings: Botswana, A n Example o f Prudent Economic Policy and
Growth (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000).
81 World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999).
82 World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1997.
83 McGillivray, ‘T h e Human Development Index.”
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common consensus in the literature that Botswana’s recent economic success is due to its
wealth in diamonds and ethnic homogeneity.84 In defense of Ghana’s dilapidating
economic conditions, African scholars argue that the country’s economic woes emanate
from external factors including colonialism, globalization, and the impact of
multinational institutions.85 These arguments, undoubtedly, have merits given the
interdependency that characterizes the global economy. However, the arguments fall short
in providing a complete explanation. Ghana and Botswana are both in the same global
system, yet Botswana is doing economically better.
Similarly, the mineral arguments being advanced to explain Botswana’s success
is also less convincing for two reasons. First, in relation to Ghana, the argument is less
substantive because Ghana also has minerals such as gold, diamond, and bauxite.
Moreover, exploration began in that country long before Botswana began its exploration
in the 1960s.86 Second, the Botswana mineral argument is not convincing enough because
there are other countries in the sub-Saharan region, such as Democratic Republic of
Congo, that possess an abundance of mineral resources but have not experienced similar
economic successes as Botswana.87 Thus, the explanation for Botswana’s success can be
said to lie somewhere else other than in the exogenous and mineral endowment
arguments that have been advanced.

84 Robert L. Curry Jr., “Botswana’s Macroeconomic Management of Its Mineral-Based Growth: It
Used Mining Revenues for Development and Service but Now Must Broaden the Beneficiaries,” American
Journal o f Economics and Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 4 (October 1987): 473-88.
85 Ayittey, “How Multinational Institutions Compounded Africa’s Economic Crisis."
86 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition.
87 Gould, Bureaucratic Corruption.
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As the two cases in chapters four and five qualitatively show, an important cause
for the difference in the economies of Botswana and Ghana lies in the kind o f social
cultures that have been established and legitimized by their postcolonial leaders in
managing the countries. As explained in chapter two, national economic development is a
complex phenomenon to the extent that, even though the mainstream variables of
analysis, such as colonialism, internal natural resources, and globalization, play a role, it
is the determination of leadership to create the appropriate political culture in
transforming the economic welfare of the society that is essential.88 From that contextual
point of view, the question emerges as to the comparative differences in cultural
conditions that leaders in Botswana and Ghana have established and legitimized in their
respective countries. The human factor on leadership can greatly explain the difference in
their economic outcomes.

Postcolonial Development Cultures in Botswana and Ghana
Before delving into a comparison of the postcolonial cultures in the two countries,
colonial differences need to be reiterated and taken into consideration in relation to
cultural establishment and legitimization by the postcolonial leaders. First, due to the
nature of the protectorate rule in Botswana, there was a continuation of leadership in the
postcolonial era that provided stability without political antagonism in that country.
Second, the leadership of Seretse Khama in Botswana had legitimacy willingly
transferred to his political officials from the traditional chiefs. On the other hand, the
colonial direct rule under which Ghana had existed did not make those qualities available

88 Doe, “Economic Development o f Francophone Africa.”
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in that country after colonial rule ended. Kwame Nkrumah was not continuing a
leadership that was in existence and he also did not have legitimacy from the traditional
chiefs.89
In contrast to Seretse Khama who was an heir to the royal traditional leadership,
Nkrumah came from the commoner educated leadership group that was vying for power
with the traditional leaders. Therefore, when power was transferred to Nkrumah and his
Conventions Peoples Party (CPP) from the British colonial leaders, there was no
continuation of leadership. In the eyes o f the traditional leaders, Nkrumah was a usurper
of their legitimate authority. Therefore, the competition for power continued and the
political stability that existed in Botswana did not exist in Ghana.90 On the other hand,
given the legitimacy and the political stability that came with the Botswana transition,
Khama combined the traditional kgotla democratic system with the British representative
system and stressed the importance of democracy in decision-making. He then designed
the actions of his government to promote such attitudes. In Ghana, the lack of collective
legitimacy and the antagonistic political struggle between Nkrumah and the traditional
leaders, immediately before independence, led Nkrumah to turn to dictatorial rule as
opposed to democratic dialogue for stability.91
On the economic administrative front, Seretse Khama set high moral standards to
prevent corruption from becoming part o f the social culture. In many o f his public
speeches, he denounced corruption and administratively established and maintained

89 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
90 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f Stability.
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policies of non-tolerance against corruption.92 In a practical move to avoid the appearance
of corruption, Khama and his officials required national institutions, such as the Ministry
of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP), to create oversight systems to monitor
and audit the government and thereby ensure the proper use o f public funds. That step
allowed his government and the leadership to hold public officials accountable for corrupt
practices.93 Seretse formulated policies designed to shield institutions from individual
interests and to cater instead to the collective national interests. In the economic
production sector, he established a capitalist production culture by turning the colonial
productive system that was based on a traditional patron-client system into one based on
market relations.94
Like Khama, Nkrumah began his economic development by using a market
approach in Ghana immediately after independence. However, he did not change the
colonial feudal system that existed in Ghana. Instead, he adopted policies that encouraged
privatization without government intervention in the productive sector.95 In the
beginning o f the 1960s, however, Nkrumah dropped the capitalist culture due to his
conviction, at the time, that development based on economic liberal culture was
inoperable in Ghana. In its place, he adopted a socialist economic culture.96 Unlike

91 Om ari, Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy o f an African Dictatorship.
92 C arter and Morgan, From the Frontline.
93 Isaksen, “Macroeconomic Management and Bureaucracy.”
94 Samatar, An African Miracle.
95 Smertin, Kwame Nkrumah.
96 Nkrumah, Neocolonialism.
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Khama, Nkrumah failed to set high moral standards for his officials. Even though he had
spoken and warned against bribery and corruption, he failed to take direct measures
against corruption.97 For failing to adopt punitive measures to stamp out corruption,
Nkrumah inadvertently, through the concept o f contributory negligence, legitimized
corrupt culture. This outcome became apparent in the way in which his leadership
managed national economic institutions. For example, when his government took over
the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB), no auditing and monitoring mechanisms were
established to ensure the proper legitimate use o f public funds. Without an oversight
system, the CMB was used for institutional corruption by CPP officials, which
established precedents in the culture of corruption.98
To enhance economic productivity, Nkrumah began to transform the Ghanaian
productive sector, from one solely based on an agrarian economy, to one diversify in
industrialization and fanning productions. Industrialization was Nkrumah’s way of
introducing scientific technology into Ghana’s economy but his transformation was
incomplete before he was ousted from office.99 The military leadership that seized power
from Nkrumah, a group that I have described as the interlude leadership, abandoned the
industrial scientific culture that Nkrumah had initiated.100 Since then, no other Ghanaian
leader has attempted to foster scientific culture to enhance economic production. Unlike
Nkrumah, Seretse Khama did not initiate scientific culture to transform the Botswana

97 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah, The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
98 Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End of an Illusion.
99 Hagan, “N krum ah's Leadership Style. ”
100 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f Stability.
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economy from agrarianism to industrialization, but emphasized export promotion o f the
country’s agriculture based-products, especially cattle. For that reason, Botswana also
lacks a scientific culture of creation. As the two case studies show, the successors o f both
leaders have, with few exceptions, basically followed the cultures initiated by their
predecessors.101 The above description depicts the picture of the political cultures that the
postcolonial leaders in the two countries have created. Botswana has advanced high moral
and low scientific cultures towards economic production. Ghana, on the other hand, has
created low moral and low scientific cultures.

THE LCD MODEL’S EXPLANATION FOR ECONOMIC DIFFERENCE
The Leadership Culture Development model developed in chapter three suggests a
reason why economies of African countries are underdeveloped. It states that African
leaders have been unable to establish appropriate cultures that spur economic
development. The model lays out a theoretical argument that the attainment of sustainable
economic development is conditional upon two inseparable and simultaneous premises.
First, national leaders who are able to rally their societies in establishing a high moral
culture with altruism in their societies satisfy one of the vital requirements for economic
development. In addition to the high moral culture, the second requirement, according to
the LCD model, asserts the need for a scientific culture of creation. In other words,
leaders who are able to engender a scientific culture of creation that enables their societies

101 In Ghana, successors to Nkrumah have abandoned the industrialization projects he initiated.
The Jerry Rawlings government added human rights abuses in the form o f killings innocent people and his
political opponents to the political equation. For more information on human rights abuses by the
Rawlings’ government see Herbst, The Politics o f Reforms in Ghana.
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to create their material economic needs, also satisfy the other vital requirement for
sustainable economic development. The establishment of both cultures ought to be
synchronous. The simultaneity of both cultures is vital and critical to the attainment of
sustainable economic development, since the combination is the only way to achieve a
development stage that yields full economic benefits to the collective interests of society.
Given the above premises of the LCD model, its explanation or justification for
the difference in the two economies flows logically. Botswana’s economic success vis-avis Ghana is due to the country’s leaders establishing and legitimizing one o f the two
cultural conditions that is essential for sustainable economic development. In its case,
Botswana has been able to establish the moral culture. The leaderships’ ability to
establish one of the appropriate cultures conducive for economic development explains
Botswana’s economic progress. In other words, the high moral attitude has enabled them
to abstain from corruption and avoid siphoning national financial resources away from
the public treasury for personal use.102 That abstinence, in tum , has allowed financial
resources to be utilized in improving human development and social welfare; which, the
leaders have done by providing clean water, education, and healthcare services
indiscriminately to all members of their society.103 However, according to the premises of
the LCD model, it should not be assumed that Botswana has economically developed
because it lacks the scientific culture of creation that the LCD model requires as a
component in order for a sustainable economic development to occur.

102Carter and Morgan, From the Frontline.
103 Colclough and McCarthy, The Political Economy o f Botswana.
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In contrast to Botswana’s positive economic performance, the LCD model also
explains Ghana’s poor performance as due to its leaderships’ inability to establish or
legitimize either of the two prerequisite cultures. The lack of high moral culture has
resulted in endemic corruption by the leadership that misdirects the use of financial
resources, thereby leaving the country with little financial resources for social
development.104 The lack of scientific culture in Ghana, just as in Botswana, has resulted
in its inability to produce most of the industrial consumption goods it needs. For that
reason, Ghana has become dependent on foreign sources for industrial goods, which has
resulted in the accumulation of debt that is undermining its prospects for economic
development.105 Based on the LCD model, both Botswana and Ghana are economically
underdeveloped. However, if economic development is taken in terms of human
development then, as this comparative analysis between Ghana and Botswana has shown,
the latter is developing in comparison to the former.

THE COLONIAL FACTOR AND THE SENGHORIAN DIMENSION
As discussed above, part of the reason why the leaders of Botswana have been
able to establish high moral culture to benefit their economy is due to the country’s
unique colonial experience. However, before looking at the colonial connection, we first
consider what high moral culture is, and why it became part of the Tswana political
culture in the postcoionial era. High morality is a human psychological attitude that takes

104 Yeebo, Ghana: The Struggle fo r P opular Power.
105 How interest payments are draining G hana’s financial resources, see W orld Bank, World
Development Indicators, 1997.
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time to nurture. It deals with doing what is collectively good for society, and its
importance in socio-economic relationships and to political economy is well known.106 In
Botswana, this leadership attribute can be traced back to precolonial days when relations
between leadership and their followers were seen as a social contract.107 Under the social
contract, precolonial leadership positions were based on the loyalty and the support they
received from their followers. In a reciprocal fashion, it was, and still is, an obligation for
the leadership to do what is morally right in order to continue to maintain the legitimacy
to safeguard their positions. Through these mutual social relations, the need for high
moral virtue became an obligation for the leaders not to uphold as their own personal
attribute, but to foster it throughout society. As an old Tswana leadership tradition,108 the
virtue was passed on to the postcoionial leaders, who themselves were heirs of traditional
leaderships and had received psychological nurturing of high moral virtues.109
It was under such a moral framework and psychological mindset that Seretse
Khama fostered the culture of high moral discipline among his officials and the
community at large. From that perspective, Seretse was doing his duty, as traditional
customs required of him. His background as royal heir of the Bangwato clan fostered in

106 Richard M. Coughlin, “Whose Morality? Which Community? What Interest? Socio-Economic
and Communitarian Perspectives," The Journal o f Socio-Economics, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Summer 1996): 13552.
107 Picard, The Evolution o f Modern Botswana.
108 In Botswana, precolonial and colonial leaders such as Khama the Great and Tshekedi Khama
saw to it as their moral obligation to keep their society together and protect its sovereignty.
109 Seretse’s mother, Tebogo, knowing that her son was one day going to be a kgosi (Chief)
instilled in him the Royal virtues of honesty and attention that the position will require. See Parsons,
Henderson, and Tlou, Seretse Khama 1921-1980, 22.
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him these traditional leadership qualities.110 In other words, high morality as a fiber o f
human individuals behavior and conscience had been transferred to Seretse through
familial nurturing.111 This cultural framework compelled him to fulfill his moral
obligation as a leader and further compelled him to establish it as a socio-cultural fixture
that could only benefit the development of his country. The question that arises then is
how was this traditional human quality able to survive the colonial era and be fostered by
postcoionial leaders? The difference in colonial rule becomes a factor at this point.
Under colonial protectorate rule, the British did not interfere in the domestic
affairs of the Tswana chiefs. They left them to maintain and regulate their own customs
and values.112 Under those conditions, the traditional institutions and their values that
they held were allowed to continue without being subverted by new values that are
usually associated with other institutions. This condition made preservation of the high
moral obligation a duty of leaders to be kept and also be fostered towards social
development in the community.113 From that lens, the colonial factor becomes the
difference between direct colonial rule elsewhere in Africa, including Ghana, and the
colonial protectorate system that existed in Botswana. With the latter making it partially
possible for the high moral obligation to be preserved and transposed into the
postcoionial era by leaders who were themselves royal heirs with that same mindset.
Dialectically, therefore, on a personal level, Seretse Khama was motivated to foster high

110 Ibid.
111 William Murchison, ‘Those Relativist Next Door," The Human Life Review, Vol. 24, No. 3
(Summer 1998): 7-14.
112 Schapera, Tribal Innovators.
113 Peters, Dividing The Commons.
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moral culture due to his belief and values, which were underlined by his psychological
mindset.
Besides his beliefs, Khama recognized that to build a nation in which all citizens,
irrespective o f race and tribe could live in peace, he needed a guiding national principle
with a traditional belief. In that regard, he adapted a Setswana concept of kagisano, which
means unity, peace, harmony, and a sense o f community. It embodied the Tswana
national identity that retained its social cohesion and stability throughout the protectorate
era. The concept requires high moral behavior to be fulfilled because it is based on doing
what is good for an entire society.114 The desire and motivation to advance kagisano as a
national guiding principle also made establishing high moral culture an obligation and
duty for Seretse Khama. Here, too, there was a colonial link in the sense that the
preservation of the kagisano traditional concept was made possible because of the
protectorate system. In other words, the colonial protectorate system made the protection
of traditional beliefs, such as the kagisano, possible and the belief, in tum, influenced
postcoionial leaders of Botswana to establish a high moral culture.
The above explains why Botswana's postcoionial leaders have been able to
establish, foster, and maintain high moral culture as one of the prerequisite elements of
the LCD model for development. In essence, the preservation of the leadership and the
kagisano national concept, were in themselves preserved under the protectorate colonial
system. Hence, the colonial factor in the ability of postcoionial leaders in Botswana to
legitimize high moral culture.

114 Carter and Morgan, From the Frontline.
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The Colonial Factor and the Lack of Moral Culture in Ghana
Prior to colonization, the nations that constituted precolonial Ghana had political
and economic systems similar to those in Botswana. The nations were under the rule of
chiefs, with their institutions for keeping peace, law, and order guided by their customs
and moral values. To preserve high moral attitudes and behavior among leaders as a way
to protect society, there were social institutions in place to prevent leaders from abusing
their office and engaging in corrupt practices.115 Why then, it is that postcoionial leaders
in Ghana are unable to foster a similar high moral culture to satisfy one of the conditions
espoused by the LCD model for improving economic development? Just as with
Botswana, part o f the explanation lies in what transpired socially during the colonial era.
It was, in part, due to the type of colonial administration that Ghana experienced. In other
words, the colonization factor also contributed to Ghanaian moral decay.
Unlike the protectorate rule in Botswana, the British ruled colonial Ghana with a
mixture of direct rule by a central government as well as indirect rule. Through that social
metamorphosis, direct colonial rule eradicated the traditional moral responsibility as a
social contract between the ruled and the rulers and brought about domestic moral decay
in the postcoionial era.116 The nature of colonialism in Ghana brought with it its own
legal system that ilegitim ized local authority and induced local citizens not to comply
with social norms that had been ordained by the traditional authority and its

115 Ayittey, A frica in Chaos.
116 A detailed description o f the Colony’s government is given by Sir Frederick Lugard in D ual
Mandate in British Tropical Africa.
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institutions.117 This disrupted the status quo of socially accepted moral values and fueled
the behavior of lawlessness from a perceived attitude by followers to question the
legitimacy of their traditional leaders. In essence, to the local people, the chiefs did not
merit their respect because of the judicial challenge that the colonial system posed for the
local chiefs and their institutions. Why, then did this metamorphosis take place in the
colonial legal realm? It does so because it is within the legal arena that social elements
within a community engage each another in contesting access to resources and labor, the
relationship of power and authority, and the interpretation of morality and culture.118
In the Ghanaian context, as the colonial legal system evolved, new institutions
that emerged gave the local social elements opportunity to regulate their relationships
with the colonizer. In the process, it also gave the local elements an opportune way to
regulate their relationship among themselves. It was through that regulation and re
organization of relations among the social elements and the colonizer that interpretations
of morality took a new form and priority for a high moral relationship. The result was the
disintegration and the breaking of the moral responsibility that used to exist in precolonial
Ghana.
No clear reason exists as to why postcoionial Ghanaian leaders are unable to
establish high moral culture to improve Ghana’s economic development. Clearly
however, leadership egocentrism and direct colonial rule are two reasons for the lack of
high moral culture in Ghana. This seems to be the case because, in terms of leadership
egocentrism, high morals would have prevented leaders from achieving their personal

117 Ibid.
118 K. Mann and R. Robert, Law in Colonial Africa (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1991).
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interests through corruption since those high ideals emphasize what is best for the general
public.119 In other words, high moral culture requires proper utilization of national
resources and equitable distribution o f national income. Leadership grounded in such
moral certitude would disdain the misuse of public trust. Thus, the absence of high moral
culture allows postcoionial Ghanaian leaders, such as the late General Acheampong, to
use national money to purchase personal houses abroad.120 Similarly, establishing high
moral culture could have acted as a psychological deterrent to stop some of Rawlings’
officials such as the ex-Deputy Finance Minister, A. Sorlemy, from achieving his
ambition of amassing foreign currency for his personal interests.121 The culture would
have similarly prevented the former president, Jerry Rawlings, from repressing his
political critics and opponents as a means of securing his political position through
authoritarianism and dictatorship as opposed to democratic dialogue.122 In all the above
instances, any attempt by the leaders to establish high moral culture would have been
detrimental for them in achieving their personal interest. Therefore, the ambition of
satisfying self interests acts as a motivating factor for postcoionial Ghanaian leaders to
avoid establishing high moral culture, simply because low moral culture serves their
economic and political interests.

119 Coughlin. “W hose Morality? Which Community?”
120 Petchenkine, Ghana: In Search o f Stability.
121 Thomas Friedman, “Here Comes the Sun: Ghana Digs in to Dig Out,” New York Times (May 4,

2001).
122 Gyima-Boadi, “Notes on Ghana’s Current Transition to Constitutional Rule."
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The colonial experience of Ghana is also critical to understanding contemporary
conditions. In the colonial days, the nature o f direct colonial rule in Ghana orchestrated
two strategies in the process of consolidating its power and that has had an economic
impact in postcoionial days. First, the colonial rule de-legitimized traditional leaders who
ruled in colonial Ghana through the legal system and initiated the outright removal of
chiefs from office.123 The traditional leaders who were removed were sometimes replaced
with those sympathetic to colonial interests.124 Second, traditional leaders who were left
in power were subjugated, while other local citizens were excluded from the national
decision-making process.125 Later, when there was an amendment to allow limited local
participation in politics, the right to participate in the political structure was contingent
upon certain types of behavior that demonstrated moral obligation and loyalty to the
colonial interest as opposed to the domestic interest. Those who were absorbed into the
system were personally rewarded.126
The inclusion of locals in the colonial political structure prompted tw o moral
psychological metamorphoses in Ghana’s social development. First, all those in positions
saw their authority as emanating from the colonizer and therefore pledged their allegiance
to the British government, shifting their moral obligations from their country. Few chiefs
who were allowed to participate saw their inclusion as gratifying because they felt their

123 In 1873 the British sent Kobina Gyan, a traditional leader o f Elimina, into exile in Sierra Leone
for opposing British rule of the G old Coast. He was not allowed to come back until 1896. See Gocking,
“British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony. ”
124 Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A M osaic in Transformation.
123 Kimble, A Political History o f Ghana.
126 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition.
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positions were supported by the weight of the British authority. To the educated
commoners, who became part of the colonial system, it was a satisfying recognition of
status because it gave them the chance to examine problems and give decisions on public
issues.127 That was how the high moral culture that existed was eliminated during the
colonial era. It was those who were absorbed into the colonial system that later became
the national postcoionial leaders.128 Hence, they had no motivation for establishing a high
moral culture that would undermine their personal interests. In essence, the legitimization
of low moral culture allowed leaders in Ghana to satisfy their personal interests through
corruption, human abuses, and political authoritarianism. This is the direct colonial factor
that has inhibited the motivation for postcoionial leaders in Ghana to establish high moral
culture.
In Botswana’s case, however, the protectorate system provided a political shield
that resulted with less damage to the way the people organized their social affairs. The
protectorate provided stability that helped to preserve high moral obligation among social
elements. The altruistic nature of leaderships’ high moral culture has resulted in
abandonment of individual egocentrism in executing a fair distribution o f national income
to improve the living conditions of the Tswana people. Despite the favorable economic
conditions that have come about due to the high moral culture, Botswana is industrially
underdeveloped like Ghana. As previously noted, the industrialization inefficiency is due
to the lack of scientific culture of creation in both countries. The lack of scientific culture,

127 Bourret, Ghana: The R oad to Independence.
128 In 1954 those leaders who became part o f the colonial government, including Nkrumah, also
guided Ghana to its independence and eventually became the postcoionial leaders. See Rooney, Kwame
Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
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as earlier noted, is in tum due to the adherence of Senghorianism by the regional leaders
including both Nkrumah and Khama.

The Senghorian Dimension
The Senghorian dimension is a philosophical argument advanced by Leopold
Sedar Senghor.129 Senghor’s argument claims that an African way of knowing how the
world works is different from that of European’s way. He asserts that the African mode of
knowing is a holistic one. It is absent of dualism between men and nature. European
thinking, by contrast, is analytic and promotes dichotomies. Senghor’s philosophy
postulates an intuitive form of rationality that is unique to Africans. He asserts that
Africans have a different personality that is not inferior to the European personality.130
The argument was used by Senghor in an attempt to defend African culture and correct its
personal denigration by some Europeans.131 The problem, however, is that this argument
denigrates analytic scientific rationality and accepts intuition as a source of knowledge.132
The denigration of scientific analytic rationality is not empirically evident nor is it
physically obvious. However the philosophy’s analytical indication to that effect is
apparent. It is illustrated by Senghor’s claim and description of European’s analytic

129 Leopold Sedar Senghor was once the president o f Senegal. For more information on Senghor,
see Rasmussen, M odem African Political Leaders.
130 Senghor, Prose and Poetry.
131 Masolo, African Philosophy. For a brief discourse on the denigration o f the African culture by
Europeans and its response from Senghor, see C hapter three o f this dissertation. For more detail analysis
see the work o f James, Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution.
132 Oladipo, “Reason, Identity, and the African Quest.”
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rational mode of knowing as a dichotomous and conflict promoting culture.133 This
assessment of the European mode of knowing by the philosophy implicitly infers the
denigration of scientific culture and its technological rationality. Even though this
interpretation may not be acceptable, and opened to debate, due to the opinion of others
that Senghorianism is intended for the defense of African’s self-definition and cultural
behavior.ljJ Despite such argument, however, the philosophy’s implied denigration of
the European analytic scientific mode of knowing is quite obvious and can hardly be
denied.
Senghor’s assessment of African’s mode of knowing as intuitive, inferring its no
need for step by step analytic approach to understand how the world works, is in itself
indicative of superiority of intuitive knowledge and a denigration of analytic scientific
thinking. In other words through comparative analysis, the philosophy hints at the idea
that intuitive knowledge does not have the need to go through the trial and error
mechanics to acquire the accumulative knowledge base that empowers human thinking.
Deductively the philosophy implies that due to its nature, intuitive knowledge avoids the
dualistic conflicting characteristic that is associated with dichotomous analytic mode of
knowing and makes it superior.
The denigration of European analytic rationality by Senghorianism goes far
beyond its dichotomous nature and its non-intuitive qualities. In another writing, Senghor
uses Frobenius to illustrate the inferiority of analytic mode of knowing in comparison

133 Senghor, Prose and Poetry.
134 Oladipo, “Reason, Identity, and the African Quest. "
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with intuitive mode of knowing.135 In his writing on Frobenius and the Revolution of
1889, Senghor argues that the dialectical European rationalism, including Cartesian and
anti-Hellenic rationalism were really not satisfactory. He further goes on to stress that
indeed the traditions associated with German romanticism in the Schlegels, in Novalis,
and Fichte were only re-enforcement and often degradation of quintessential European
rationalism.136 Unarguably, such a view of Senghor in describing European rationalism
and its analytical mode of knowing in no simple terms a denigration, while he viewed and
described African cultural antiquity and its potential for development.
It was Senghor’s belief that Frobenius achievements laid in his breaking away
from the kind o f structural analytic rationalism of which Claude Levi-Strauss was the
chief advocate.137 To Senghor, Frobenius was thus unlike both Levi-Strauss and
Durkeheim, and was not interested in the “perpetual accumulation of facts” rather he was
concerned with perpetual global perspectives. According to Senghor, Frobenius approach
sought the rejection of discursive reason and a return to feeling or intuition “as mean of
gaining insight into values, not facts of quantities” which Senghorianism deems as
superior to analytic scientific rationalism.138
In comparing African intuitive and European analytic modes of knowing,
Senghorianism sees African intuitive culture as a true balance in civilization and affirms

135 Michael J. C. Echeruo. “Negritude and History: Senghor’s Argument with Frobenius,"
Research in African Literature, Vol. 24, No. 4 (W inter 1993): 1-12.
136 Leopold Sedar Senghor, ‘T h e Revolution o f 1889 and Leo Frobenius,” in Isaac James Mowoe
and Richard Bjornson, eds., Africa and the West: The Legacies o f Empire, 77-88 (NY: Greenwood Press,
1986).
137 Ibid. 82.
138 Ibid. 83.
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it as the equilibrium between feeling and will, soul and mind; a feature which the
philosophy notes as missing in analytic mode of knowing. Senghor concurs with
Frobenius that European analytic mode is engaged in a pattern of steady and destructive
influence of rationalism.Ij9 Some adherents of the philosophy share similar views about
analytic scientific mode of knowing and address it in identical denigrative way. Among
that group, there is no reminder of the analytic denigration approach of the particular
acuity of Senghor’s response than a comment of Nnamdi Azikiwe. In his evaluation of
analytic mode of knowing, Azikiwe wrote: “I was convinced that although the western
system was more systematic than that of African, nevertheless African philosophy was
practical in the sense that people did not waste time on logic and frivolous arguments.
Their philosophy was more pragmatic in that it was related to practical problems of
everyday life which they solved by adapting themselves to the logic of reason and
experience.” 140 Most contemporary African leaders have accepted this Senghorian
dimension in its totality as a way to preserve African identity. In one sense, the
acceptance allows them to psychologically move African culture to its own locality, away
from criticism, thus serving as a solution to the crisis of African self-definition. The
dilemma is that, in doing so, postcoionial African leaders have psychologically
acknowledged that the indigenous Africans’ mode of knowing and understanding of how
the world works lacks scientifico-technical rationality.141

139 Echeruo, “Negritude a n d History: Senghor's Argument with Frobenius."
140 Nnamdi Azikiwe, My Odyssey: Autobiography (London: Hurst, 1970): 120.
141 Oladipo, “Reason. Identity, and the African Quest. ”
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As a result, contemporary sub-Saharan African leaders are less motivated to
establish scientific culture in an attempt to understand the natural law of creation through
analytical thinking. In other words, the rejection of a scientific culture o f creation, based
on the belief that it is an area of foreign culture per Senghor’s argument and the
acceptance of intuition as source of knowledge embedded in mythological paradigm, as a
reason for African cultural uniqueness, inhibits the leaders from fostering and
legitimizing scientific culture. It is within this psychological mindset that both
contemporary leaders of Botswana and Ghana, including all their colleagues in the subSaharan region, operate, thus making them unmotivated to establish scientific cultures in
their respective countries. The first postcoionial leaders, Seretse Khama of Botswana and
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, were adherents of the Senghorian philosophy and believed in
the uniqueness of African culture in its totality without noticing the universality o f culture
in some aspects. The subscription of Senghorian philosophy by Khama and Nkrumah,
along with their successors, is evident by the two leaders public declarations in support of
African cultural uniqueness.
Nkrumah, in his days as the leader, realized that the only way Ghana’s economy
could be developed to increase productivity and serve the diverse needs of the population
was through industrialization.142 To accomplish that objective, he embarked on setting up
industrial projects in Ghana and sending students to study in European and North
American countries.143 However, his adherence to the Senghorian philosophy and his
conviction to protect all aspects of African cultural uniqueness made him apprehensive in

142 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
143 Agyeman, “Social and Political O utlook."
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replacing the mythological intuitive part of the Ghanaian culture with scientific analytic
culture. Nowhere did Nkrumah take as much pains to demonstrate his Senghorian
convictions as in his speech “African personality,” a concept underpinned by the
Senghorian distinction. On the occasion, when Nkrumah was inaugurating the institute of
African studies, he declared that “the personality of the African was stunted in this
process can only be retrieved from the ruins if we make a conscious effort to restore
African’s ancient glory.” 144 In this regard, Nkrumah was identifying the cause of Africa’s
retrogression as its cultural alienation from the past, something he considered as African’s
unique personality. He went on to say that it is only in condition of total freedom from
foreign interference that the aspirations of Africans can be fulfilled and “the African
genius finds its expression.” 145 By alluding to the concept o f African genius, Nkrumah
was not only endorsing the uniqueness of the African mode of knowing, but he was also
advocating its preservation. Nkrumah made a further distinction between African culture
and others by saying “by African genius, I mean something positive, our social
conception o f society, the efficiency and the validity of our tradition.” 146
After being discouraged by the lack of capital inflows from the west to spur
Ghana’s economic development, Nkrumah shifted from a market approach to economic
socialism. In order to justify this cultural isolationist approach towards economic
development, Nkrumah told Ghanaians that it was essential for the nation to follow a
development path that will enable Ghana to undergo economic transformation that

144 Kwame Nkrumah, The African Genius (Accra, Ghana: Government Press, 1963): 5.
145 Ibid.
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“would not affect the roots of society.” 147 In other words, Nkrumah’s African socialism
was theoretically conceived as a paradoxical concept, one in which, the Ghanaian society
could have been able to associate itself with a material technical base without becoming
part of what is deemed by Senghorian philosophy as European culture. In that context and
on a practical structural basis, Nkrumah’s African socialism can be viewed as a parallel
existence of material technical ability and a holistic mode of knowing that could have
been simultaneous but mutually exclusive, with the objective of enabling Ghanaians to
preserve their self-identification.
In a sense, Nkrumah was caught in what can be termed as the Senghorian cultural
economic dilemma. This situation faces many sub-Saharan African leaders and prevents
them from being able to establish a scientific culture to develop. In Nkrumah’s case, and
perhaps in that of other African leaders, he did not intend to change the Ghanaian culture
by defying his Senghorian belief. In that context, what he meant by African socialism can
be fairly and accurately interpreted as creating an economic productive system different
from the one that used to be promoted by European social democrats in the 20th
century.148
One logical explanation as to why Nkrumah was toiling with the African socialist
idea was his belief in the Senghorian philosophy. He had come to believe that an
analytical culture that promotes dichotomies is a characterization of an European
epistemology. This was amplified in his belief of wanting to separate the material

146 Ibid., 6
147 Smertin, Kwame Nkrumah, 63.
148 Ibid.
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technical base from the roots of culture. In regards to whether the idea is feasible or not,
the problem that African socialism inherently poses is that it is not theoretically feasible
to unite a material technical based culture and solely intuitive culture. The reason is that
the two create an antagonistic pair. The difficulty of their coexistence emanates from the
fact that there is an inverse relation between the two aspects. The predominance of a
culture of holistic intuitive knowledge depends on the lack of understanding in an
analytical manner as to how the world works. On the other hand, a high magnitude of
material technical base depends on how well one understands the analytical scientific
informative structure that underlines natural law.
In essence, Nkrumah wanted to have the best of both worlds but that was not
possible in such a situation. That was part o f Nkrumah ‘s dilemma that partially inhibited
him from being able to foster, establish, and legitimize a scientific culture in Ghana
before he was ousted from office. A sim ilar predicament has befallen all of Nkrumah’s
successors, in the sense that, all postcoionial Ghanaian leaders have been caught in the
Senghorian cultural economic dilemma. They have neglected fostering, establishing, and
legitimizing a scientific culture of creation based on the philosophy o f Senghor, which
advocates that African’s culture falls outside the scientific paradigm.
As with Ghana, Botswana also lacks scientific culture as the country depends
on foreign sources for basically all its industrial consumption goods. Its economy is
dominated by mining and agricultural raw material production. Since independence, the
leaders have paid less attention to fostering a scientific culture capable of inducing
industrialization and, instead have been pursuing small seale Appropriate Technology
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which is unsuitable for industrialization that spurs economic development.149 Again, the
question becomes why was Seretse Khama, a highly moral conscientious leader, unable to
establish analytical scientific culture that could have stimulated the minds of his fellow
citizens to pursue an understanding of the natural law of creation that could further
develop Botswana?
From his youth, even though from a privileged house o f the Bangwato royal
family, Seretse Khama was confronted by European discrimination. In his native
Bechuanaland, black children were denied schooling beyond the primary level. Only
those who came from royal families had the chance to attend segregated black schools
like Tiger Kloof in South Africa.150 Given that background, Seretse Khama had always
been aware of how Europeans treated black Africans with humiliation. He tried to be
oblivious to the discrimination but had to deal with it on a personal level in his marriage
to Ruth W iliams, a white woman from England.151 Protests by white leaders in South
Africa and South Rhodesia to induce British leaders to ban Seretse from Bechuanaland
due to his marriage made it more obvious to him as to how white Europeans scomed
black Africans.152 Neighboring South Africa’s apartheid treatment of blacks and its
government’s ban against Seretse from entering that country following his marriage, all
contributed to Khama’s resentment of the European denigration of black African culture
and identity. In that regard, and as an African nationalist leader, Seretse viewed the

149 Segal, “Appropriate Technology.”
150 Henderson, “Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation."
151 Redfem , Ruth and Seretse.
152 Henderson, “Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation."
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European degradation and its social subjugation as an insult and disgrace to the authentic
African tradition and culture and as such accepted the Senghorian response in totality.
Consequently, he also became a believer in the Senghorian response and accepted the
notion that the African way of knowing was different from the analytical European way.
Adhering to this principle, Khama portrayed the African culture as different and
therefore categorized scientifico-technical rationality as characteristically European,
rather than African.153 With this psychological mindset, he neglected to formulate
policies to pursue scientific culture. Khama demonstrated his conviction to the
philosophy by making a distinction between African and non-African cultures and made
public declarations to that effect. For example, in advocating kagisano and in responding
to an accusation that his government had no traditional guiding principles, Khama
clarified that Botswana’s economic development was not going to follow the path of alien
cultures conceived in a “faraway land.” He asked his people that Botswana’s economic
development be built “on the foundations provided by Botswana’s culture and
Botswana’s values and traditions.” 154 Khama went on to conclude that foreign cultural
beliefs and ways “may be perfectly suitable for the countries and continents in which they
have developed, but they can have little meaning for the majority of Batswana.” 155
From the above position one can deduce that Khama was viewing Botswana’s
total culture as unique from others in terms of human development, a position that falls in
line with the Senghorian belief. Captivated by the uniqueness of the African culture,

153 Carter and Morgan, From the Frontline.
134 Ibid., 148.
155 Ibid.
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Seretse pursued relentless economic policies based on export promotion o f raw materials,
which Botswana possessed naturally or the ones that were produced under nature’s
constraints, without pursuing scientific culture of creation. As Nkrumah in Ghana, Seretse
believed in the Senghorian philosophy and came to accept that, by nature, the scientificotechnical culture is European. For this reason, he was unmotivated to foster scientific
culture. This path has been followed by Seretse’s successors. Because o f this, scientific
culture is not being established in Botswana, rather the country is pursuing what is
considered as Appropriate Technology which is more labor intensive and less
technologically oriented. 156

SUMMARY
This chapter has shown that, in comparing the impact o f leadership on economic
development in Botswana and Ghana, differences and similarities exist. The differences
in the leaderships relate to differences in colonization. The colonial administration type
helps explain cultural ramifications that defined the economic outcomes in both
countries. In terms of colonial difference, Botswana’s protectorate system allowed the
traditional leaders to manage their internal political administrative affairs without foreign
i

interference.

cy

Unlike Botswana, Ghana’s colonization came with direct British

governance of the local people.158 Protectorate and direct colonization, due to their
administrative differences, had significantly different impacts on leadership evolution in

156 Segal, “Appropriate Technology."
157 Shillington, The Colonization o f Southern Tswana.
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the two countries during the colonial era that, in turn, has had a postcolonial impact on
both countries economies. The state of political affairs helped to maintain leadership
continuity and moral obligations between the leaders and their followers in Botswana. In
contrast to the leadership continuity in Botswana due to the protectorate model of
colonization, the direct colonial rule in Ghana resulted in leadership discontinuity. At the
time of direct colonial rule, Ghana’s traditional leaders and their institutions were
subjugated to a British colonial judicial system.159
The colonial systems provided two different leadership contingencies for both
countries at the dawn of the colonial era. During the transition from the colonial to
postcolonial era, Botswana’s leadership remained continuous with the same class of
traditional leaders.160 In Ghana, the direct colonial rule created another group o f leaders
made up of an educated class that had self-interest in the colonial administration. It was to
that group that the colonizers transferred postcolonial leadership, with the traditional
leaders who previously had local legitimacy being excluded from the national
constitutional rule.161 W ithout legitimacy at home, the educated leadership group looked
to Great Britain for its legitimacy and accordingly aligned its moral obligation with the
colonizers. Based on that relationship, postcolonial Ghanaian leaders felt that they had no
moral obligation to local peoples. This structural problem combined with low morals
allowed them to satisfy their economic and political interest through corruption and

158 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.
159 Gocking, “British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony."
160 Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou, Seretse Khanta 1921-1980.
161 Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

315

repression. In the early years of his leadership Nkrumah spoke against bribery and
corruption but did not take any direct measure to combat the practice, thus allowing it to
permeate economic institutions.162
Botswana leaders, on the other hand, have always thought of themselves
differently. Given their past relationship with the people through their family
backgrounds, as being heirs from the royal families of the individual tribes, they have
always been aware of their fiduciary relationships with the people and the importance of
keeping their moral obligation. Botswana postcolonial leaders have kept their traditional
moral obligation through the Tswana concept o f kagisano, which emphasizes high morals
between the government and people. Khama, the first postcolonial leader, established a
high moral culture by emphasizing and developing policies of non-tolerance against
immoral acts of corruption in his government. Khama and his successors have followed
the high moral ground and have designed national institutions to achieve collective
interests as opposed to fulfilling personal interests.
In essence, postcolonial leaders in the two countries have established two different
social cultures. Botswana postcolonial leaders have been able to establish a high moral
culture void of corruption and a democratic capitalist system teeming with political
stability. Both traits have cumulatively resulted in higher per capita income, more
education for all school age children, and good healthcare service for the majority of
citizens in Botswana. The Ghanaian postcolonial leaders, on the other hand, have not
been successful in establishing high morals. Their low moral culture has led to
corruption and political authoritarianism. Those conditions have resulted in the theft of

162 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
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national financial resources and political instability. These have deprived the society o f
economic benefits such as education to all children and universal healthcare.
Unfortunately for both countries, however, their leaders have been unable to establish
scientific cultures, which could induce industrialization and enable their countries to
supply their own industrial material needs.163
Based on UNDP’s Human Development Index, current economic indicators show
that Botswana is doing well vis-a-vis Ghana. The theoretical explanation for this
difference provided by the LCD model, is that Botswana’s leaders were able to establish a
high moral culture as one of the essential prerequisite cultures needed for economic
development. The high moral culture has enabled the leaders to significantly curtail
corruption and altruistically direct national financial resources into social welfare. Again,
Ghana’s economy is doing poorly because its leaders have been unwilling to establish
high moral culture. The absence of this feature has allowed the leaders to siphon national
resources for personal uses. The diversion o f national resources for personal interests
means that fewer resources are available for social welfare improvement and human
development.
Despite the economic improvement, Botswana is still industrially underdeveloped
and its economy relies on raw material production because it lacks the scientific culture
of creation to enable it to produce industrial goods. Just like Botswana, in that context,
Ghana also lacks scientific culture and depends on raw material production. In other
words, Ghanaian leaders have not been able to establish either high moral culture or

163 Ahmad, “Science and Technology.”
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scientific culture needed for economic development; hence, its economic
impoverishment. While reasons for failing to establish high moral culture is partially
attributed to the colonial past, it can also be attributed to the Senghorian beliefs o f their
leaders and their desire to preserve what they erroneously deem as an African culture.
The Senghorian philosophy postulates that the African way of knowing is intuitive
rather than analytic, one that denigrates analytic scientific thinking.164 Even though the
original argument was used to defend African self-identification, most contemporary
African leaders have accepted its premises in totality in terms of African culture. Part of
the reason why Nkrumah and Khama accepted this concept of reasoning is that it helped
them to psychologically move African culture away from criticism as a solution to the
crisis of African self-definition.165 Both leaders believed in the Senghorian explanation to
the point that the acceptance of what the philosophy deems as European culture meant the
denial of who they are as Africans. Hence, the leaders’ lack of enthusiasm to pursue a
scientific culture that is essential for economic development, but which is characterized
by Senghorianism as un-African. It was that dilemma that led Nkrumah to adopt African
socialism as a developmental approach. Through that path, he thought Ghana could gain a
material technical base without negatively affecting its cultural roots.166 To avoid a
similar dilemma, Khama believed the way to develop Botswana’s economy was to use
African culture as opposed to cultures from foreign lands.167 To do that, he pursued

164 Senghor, Prose and Poetry.
165 Oladipo, “Reason, Identity, and the African Quest.”
166 Smertin, Kwame Nkrumah.
167 Carter and Morgan, From the Frontline.
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export promotion based on raw material production, which relies less on scientific culture
that Senghorian philosophy condemns as un-African. This belief has been followed by all
the successors of the two leaders and has resulted in the absence of industrialization. In
essence, the lack of scientific culture of creation in both countries has impaired their
desire for sustainable economic development.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

Immediately after the World War II, the global political economy changed. Many
nations in Africa that had been previously colonized by European countries began
asserting their sovereignty. The independence phenomenon swept across the continent,
and within a generation, most of the nations had become free from European
colonization. However, the end of the colonial rule came with a challenge of economic
development to the new leaders who took over the reigns of power in the newly
independent countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Since then, many o f those countries have
remained economically underdeveloped. In many cases, most o f these countries have had
economic development set back, and abject poverty has become the norm for the past
four decades. The regional leaderships have created cultural conditions that have
undermined hopes for socio-economic development that could improve living conditions
and fulfill the aspirations of their people.
In this research, I have examined the leadership problems that underlie the poor
economic conditions of countries in sub-Sahara Africa. In this final chapter, I conclude
the research by first reiterating the initial objective and review the theoretical linkage
upon which the study was based. Second, I review the major findings, and highlight the
work’s contributions to the literature. Third, the chapter looks at the limits of the research
and suggests other avenues for future research relating to leadership, culture, and
economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, the chapter considers some of the
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study's implications for sub-Saharan Africa countries and offers modest policy
recommendations.

OBJECTIVE AND THEORETICAL LINKAGE
The economic development literature maintains that leadership and culture are
important determinants of economic development. Despite this assertion, however, a
careful review of the literature shows that contemporary economic development advice
offered to sub-Saharan Afri can countries and the thinking that underlies it is misguided.
The advice ignores a substantial body of evidence about the importance of leadership and
culture in economic development.1Taking the above condition as a point o f departure,
two assumptions were made for this research study. First, it was assumed that leaders
have been impediments to economic development in sub-Sahara African countries. The
second assumption argues that the economic underdevelopment conditions in the region
are due to the absence of socio-scientific culture. Based on those assumptions, a
hypothesis and two research questions were formulated. The hypothesis states that subSaharan African leaderships have failed to establish socio-scientific culture that can
promote technological innovation for economic development. The first question asked:
Why have the leaderships in the region failed to establish the prerequisite scientific
culture needed for economic development? The second question assumes a failure in
establishing the appropriate cultural environments needed for development and asked:
What culture, created by leaders, impedes economic development in the region?

1 Casson, The Economics o f Business.
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In answering the above questions, the hypothesis has been tested by case studies
of Botswana and Ghana. Utilizing the leadership, culture, and development (LCD) model
in conjunction with the case studies, this research has shown a correlation between
leadership and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. The LCD model highlights
the association between the three variables in analyzing the progress of a nation. It
articulates that leadership is a process phenomenon where individuals with high moral
capability rally group members to achieve a mutual quest that benefits the group. Leaders
accomplish such objectives through legitimization and interpretation of social norms with
the power invested in them by the group members as a whole. Dialectically, the
legitimization and interpretation powers of the leaders make them cultural architects.2
Cultures are accepted systems of social practices o f behavior and prescriptions
embedded with technology in the form of knowledge. They are linked to economic
development as a social capital/ Culture is also economically related, in the sense that, it
is compatible with individuals’ optimization. Deductively, therefore, culture becomes
economically driven and becomes linked to economic development.4 There are two broad
aspects of culture, namely, the resen’e and the universal zones. The reserve zone is useful
for personal actualization and has no essential bearing on human truth or falsehood. On
the other hand, the universal zone anchors cultural elements of religion and science of
creation that has true human values and is essential to the quality of human life. Religion
offers moral attributes from which moral culture is derived, while scientific beliefs offer

: Casson, “Cultural Determinants."
3 Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development."
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informative ways of understanding the natural law of creation (i.e., technology). The two
cultural elements form the basic fabric upon which human values rely.3 Therefore, the
motivating desire and personal ability of leaders to establish those cultural attributes
determines how their societies progress economically.0
Countries with leaders that are able to engineer both scientific and moral cultural
attributes acquire a certain level of social and scientific knowledge that when
synchronously applied, become social and material technologies. These, in turn, help to
i mp r o v e societal living standards. It is the acquisition o f this capability to provide the

foundation for sustainable improvement in living conditions for a nation that constitutes
development. Development, therefore, occurs when a nation, through accumulative
causation by virtue of cultural process, acquires the understanding of the natural law of
creation and uses it to attain socio-scientific capability that enables the society to produce
diverse products and services to satisfy its population's need.7 Hence, its absence brings
about socio-economic underdevelopment, which most countries in sub-Saharan Africa are
experiencing.8
As discussed in chapters three through six, the hypothesized relationship between
leadership and economic development in Botswana and Ghana is strongly supported by
the evidence in the case studies. As the evidence suggests, the economic improvement

i Sen. “A Matter o f Choice.”
’ Wiredu, ‘‘Problems in Africa’s Self-Definition."
6 Casson. ‘‘Cultural Determinants.”
7 Kuznets, Economic Growth; M yrdal, “What is Development ’"
8 Muriithi, African Crisis, Is There Hopei
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that has occurred in Botswana is symptomatic of the presence of high moral cultural
standards, which it’s postcolonial leaders have fostered and nurtured through policies and
public speeches.9 In Ghana, by contrast, the economic stagnation reflects the low moral
cultural standards that its contemporary leaders have legitimized.10 The difference in
leadership that is being exercised by the leaders of both countries is partially elucidated
by their different colonial legacies, and partially by the Senghorian philosophy.
Taking into account the cultures that the leaders have established and the
difference economic outcomes that have materialized in both countries, this study
concludes that the hypothesized relationship between leadership and economic
development in sub-Saharan Africa is strongly supported by the evidence from the case
studies. The case studies show that the leaders have been unable to establish high moral
and scientific cultures synchronously. It is the absence o f both cultures to minimize
corruption, increase institutional efficiency, and provide innovative creative thinking that
explains the economic underdevelopment in the region.
The evidence from the case studies suggests that the answer to the first research
question, why the leaders have failed to establish the two prerequisite cultures for
economic development lies in part with the colonial discourse and the Senghorian
dimension. The colonial factor emphasized that the different colonial administrations
provided different postcolonial leaderships in sub-Saharan Africa. In Botswana, where
there was a protectorate administration, the precolonial leadership was left intact to allow
leadership continuity into the postcolonial era. That state of affairs allowed postcolonial

9 Samatar, An African Miracle.
10 Petchenkine. Ghana: In Search o f Stability.
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leaders to acknowledge their self-interest duty and to remain committed to the economic
interests of the general population. With that psychological mindset, contemporary
Botswana leaders have a motivation to foster and legitimize a high moral culture towards
economic improvement.
In colonial areas like Ghana, where there existed direct colonial rule, local
precolonial leaders with traditional legitimacy were subjugated and eliminated during the
colonial era.11 Towards the postcoionial era, new leadership groups without traditional
legitimacy were given national political power in the region by the colonizer. Without
fiduciary relations with the general society, the leaders are psychologically disconnected
from the masses. This fragmented relationship has led to a leadership focused on personal
rather than collective interests. This situation has created a leadership group of immoral
minorities, who dominate the sub-Sahara Africa’s political scene and remain unmotivated
to establish a high moral culture for collective national developmental interests. The case
study evidence suggests that the reason for the leaders’ inability to establish scientific
culture resides in their adherence to Senghorianism. This philosophy advocates that the
African mode of knowing is intuitive as opposed to being analytic.1- The acceptance of
this doctrine by the SSA leaders inhibits them from establishing a scientific culture
capable of inducing industrial economic development.

11 Gocking. “British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold C oast Colony."
12 Senghor, Prose and Poetry.
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Finally, regarding the question as to what culture has been created instead o f high
moral and scientific cultures: the case studies show that Botswana has been able to
establish a culture that minimizes corruption, while Ghana has failed to do so. In Ghana,
leaders have established low moral culture that has resulted in leadership corruption,
political authoritarianism, and human rights abuses. It is the Ghanaian socio-economic
cultural type that the sub-Sahara African leaders have established in place of the
prerequisite socio-scientific culture that is essentially needed for region’s economic
development. Based on the evidence from the two case studies and using deductive
reasoning, this study finds that the economic underdevelopment in sub-Saharan African
nations has been due to leaderships’ inability to foster and legitimize the prerequisite
socio-scientific cultures for economic development.

MAJOR FINDINGS OF THE CASE STUDIES
It was found that precolonial Ghana was occupied by different nations. The
nations were led by leaders who waged wars among themselves for political and
economic supremacy and, therefore, were unable to form a homogenous society with a
consolidated national leadership. In the fifteenth century, the Ashanti Empire emerged
with a central government guided by the Ashanti constitution. Even though the
centralized political system was effective from the beginning, it later became ineffective
due to expansion of the empire. For that reason, the Ashanti leaders adopted a repressive
method of ruling, as opposed to consociational democracy, that led to the disintegration
of the homogenous society they were trying to build.13 Economically, precolonial Ghana

13 Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition.
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was composed of agrarian societies that also engaged in commerce. The means of
production was land. and. in lieu of that fact, leaders supervised the access to land to
ensure that people who wanted to farm were not denied that right. In commerce, the
nations regarded their trade with the Europeans as important because it allowed them to
procure guns to embark on political and economic expansion.14
The nations were colonized between 1850 and 1902 by the British and were
joined to create the Gold Coast. Unlike a protectorate, the British administered the Gold
Coast under direct rule and eliminated most of the traditional leaders by either removing
them from their positions or sometimes sending them into exile.15 Traditional leaders
who were allowed to remain found their institutions subjugated to the colonial judicial
system.16 In the process, the British created another class of local leadership made of
educated elites. During the transition from colonial rule to the postcolonial era, the newly
created local leadership group became a competitor to the traditional leaders and vied for
national power. Due to vacillating policies of the colonial administration the two local
leadership groups could not unite to form a united leadership for the good for their
country.
By the end of the colonial rule, the national political power had been seized from
the traditional leaders and was given to the new educated groups. With the adoption of
the British representative system of democracy, the traditional leaders were excluded

14 Ward, A History o f the Gold Coast.
15 Gocking, “British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony.”
16 Gocking, “Colonial Rule and the Legal Factor."
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from the national constitutional rule.1' The transfer of power to the new educated
leadership group during the transition stimulated a moral psychological metamorphosis in
Ghana’s social development. The leadership group that inherited power from Britain
lacked local legitimacy because its legitimacy to rule emanated from the colonizer. With
that psychological perception, the leaders shifted their moral obligations and loyalty to the
colonizer to satisfy their personal interest as opposed to seeking to serve Ghana’s national
collective interests.
As a result, the direct colonial rule did two things that have had an impact on
Ghana’s socio-economic development. First, by eliminating and replacing traditional
leaders who had fiduciary relations with the masses, the direct colonial rule eradicated
moral responsibility as a social contract between the rulers and the ruled, causing a moral
decay in the Ghanaian society.18 This disrupted the traditional political economy system
of the country. Those who became postcolonial leaders had no motivation in establishing
high moral standards that could have undermined their personal interests. In 1951 when
Nkrumah became the head of the colonial government, his quest for power prevented him
from making political concessions to build a unified leadership for Ghana.19 Instead, he
adopted an authoritarian approach to stabilize the nation and, in so doing, laid the
foundation for dictatorial political culture for Ghana's postcolonial era.20

1' Bourret. Ghana: The Road to Independence.
18 Lugard, Dual M andate in British Tropical Africa.
19 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World.
20 Omari, Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatom y o f an African Dictatorship.

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

328

Economically, Nkrumah embarked on social projects to enhance development.
However, after independence, he failed to foster a high moral culture to curb corrupt
practices. Nkrumah allowed his party officials to use national economic institutions, like
the Cocoa Marketing Board to extract money from producers to satisfy their personal
interests at the expense of national development interests.21 Through authoritarian rule,
Nkrumah’s successors have followed and intensified the economic and political practices
that undermine development in Ghana. Today. Ghana’s economy is overburdened with
debt, and its per capita income stands at approximately $400.22 In education, Ghana has
an adult illiteracy rate o f 36%, and a basic education enrollment of 76% for school age
children.2j The universal healthcare service that Ghanaians enjoyed at the time of
independence has long been abandoned by contemporary postcolonial leaders. Today
many citizens do not have access to healthcare. On the average, there are four physicians
for every 100.000 patients with few rural dwellers having access to physicians.24 This
economic decline has been further worsened by the last twenty years under the Rawlings’
government.
Not only has the Ghanaian economy stagnated; it is also unable to produce
industrial goods due to lack of scientific culture of creation.25 The lack of scientific
culture is due to its postcolonial leaders’ adherence, beginning with Nkrumah. to

'' Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f an Illusion.
African Development Bank, Basic Indicators on African Countries (Abidjan. Ivory Coast:
African Development Bank, 1995).
Ibid.
24 Dugbatey, “National Health Policies.”
Ahmad. “Science and Technology."
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Senghoriunism. This philosophy advocates, by way of defending African selfactualization. that analytical scientific thinking is a European cultural trait as opposed to
an African one.26 In evaluating Ghana’s economic development since its independence,
the evidence points to the fact that the country’s current deplorable economic state of
affairs is largely due to its leadership’s abuse of power and corruption.'7 In essence, since
the end of the colonial era, Ghanaian leaders have all inhibited the country’s
development."
In examining leadership and development in Botswana, it was found that
precolonial leaders established a well-entrenched political and economic apparatus that
served the mutual interests of the rulers and the ruled. Acknowledging that their
legitimacy came from the people, the leaders maintained their moral obligation to the
society as a whole. Politically, the leaders organized their societies based on participatory
democracy, adjudicated disputes, and made decisions about social service. Economically,
the ruling classes were the guardians of the people and made sure that people had land for
grazing, crops, and residence. Through the cattle loaning (mafisa) system, the political
leadership established a fiduciary social relationship with the people to support and
maintain social stability and progression. In times of security needs, leaders, like Khama
the Great, rallied other traditional chiefs into military alliance to repel attackers. By the
time of Khama the Grate’s death, he had built a homogenous Tswana society.29

' f>Senghor. Prose and Poetry.
' 7 Rimmer. Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy.
' 8 Petehenkine, Ghana: In Search o f Stability.
■'* Picard. The Evolution o f M odem Botswana.
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In the mid 1800’s, the Tswana nations sought an alliance with the British. The
relationship later turned into a protectorate agreement. The arrangement obliged the
United Kingdom to recognize traditional leaders as an autonomous authority without
impinging on their legitimacy. That characteristic allowed the leaders to maintain their
moral obligations to the people and also made Botswana’s colonization different from
that of other African colonies that experienced direct ru le /0 When the British attempted
to change the protectorate arrangement to replace it with direct rule. Tswana leaders, led
byTshckcdi Khama, resisted the change to preserve Botswana’s traditional institutions
and the leaders' legitimacy without polarization among the local social elements. That
colonial protectorate legacy allowed Botswana to have leadership continuity during the
transition from the colonial era to the postcolonial era.
The first postcolonial leadership under Seretse Khama used traditional
institutional moral obligation to foster high moral standards to prevent corruption. ’1 In
addition to high moral standards, Khama stressed the importance of democracy in
decision-making and designed the actions of his government to promote democratic
attitudes. With high moral culture minimizing leadership corruption and good
governance, Khama channeled national resources into human development. Since
Khama’s death, his successors have followed the path of high moral cultural standards,
which he laid, and also have formulated policies that have improved the economic living

j0 Crowder. West Africa Under Colonial Rule.
31 Isaksen, “Macroeconomic Management and Bureaucracy.”
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standards of the Botswana people.

Today. Botswana has a high literacy rate of 70% and

a basic school enrollment has increased 112% for school age children; and many of the
citizens live within ten miles from health care centers.JJ Botswana's per capita income is
over $3,000 and is the only country in sub-Saharan Africa that is debt free. 4
Despite the above economic achievements, Botswana, like Ghana, is industrially
underdeveloped because its leaders have been less motivated to foster a scientific culture
of creation that can induce industrialization. The reason for the lack of enthusiasm in
establishing scientific culture is due to its postcolonial leaders’ adherence to the
Senghorian philosophy. It defends African self-actualization and argues that analytical
scientific thinking is a European culture, not an African one.35 However, in comparing
Botswana and Ghana’s current economic status, based on UNDP’s Human Development
Index as the ability of a country to translate economic gains into improving living
conditions, Botswana’s economic living conditions have dramatically improved. The
leadership’s ability to foster high moral culture has enabled the poor desert country that
was virtually seen as another Bantu state at the time of its independence, to surpass
Ghana. Even though the high moral culture has not resulted in economic development
due to the absence of scientific culture, it puts Botswana on the first stage of the
development hierarchy that Rostow proposed/6 The country’s acquisition of scientific

Samatar, An African Miracle.
33 Owuor-Omondi. Atlholang. and Diselco, Botswana: A National Health Status Evaluation.
34 African Development Bank. Basic Indicators. 1995.
35 Senghor, Prose and Poetry-.
36 Rostow, The Stages o f Economic Growth.
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culture will complete its second stage of development process and propel it into the ‘take
off’ stage as described by Rostow.’'
Just like the rest of the sub-Saharan African countries, there is no clear indication
as to when both Botswana and Ghana will be able to foster and legitimize scientific
cultures. As this research has shown, that situation will depend on when leaders emerge
in those countries to break away from the Senghorian myth and legitimize scientific
cultures. In Botswana, the acquisition of scientific culture can occur if a leader arises to
rally the people in establishing a scientific culture in conjunction with its present high
moral culture.
In Ghana, and in most parts of sub-Sahara Africa, where corruption, poor
governance, and political instabilities are rampant, more needs to be done to change the
prevailing dominant culture that promotes economic inefficiencies. Those countries need
leaders who can rally the people, foster, and legitimize both high moral and scientific
cultures. Ghana’s leadership problem mirrors that of most sub-Saharan African
countries/8 As this study has shown, even though Botswana leaders have been able to
establish high moral culture that minimizes corruption, the leadership’s ability to rally
people in Botswana towards a scientific culture is presently absent. This plight is similar
among the leaders in Ghana and many countries in all parts of sub-Saharan Africa.
Hence, leadership constitutes the missing variable in sub-Saharan A frica’s economic
development.

37 Ibid.
38 Muriithi, African Crisis. Is There Hope?
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CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE
While reviewing the literature, the importance of leadership in development was
asserted. In fact, the literature attests that the success or failure of a nation’s economic
development depends on the determination and the intentions of leadership/9 Following
this line of reasoning, Casson also articulates the importance of leadership in building a
national culture that reduces transaction costs and ultimately enhances economic
performance.40 Despite the importance of leadership and culture in development, no
research had been conducted by an)' of the major schools of thought on development to
link the role of leadership to underdevelopment in the less developed countries.
By using leadership’s impact to illustrate the difference in economic outcomes in
Botswana and Ghana, this research has introduced the leadership variable into the
development equation. It has taken leadership beyond the governance level to show how
leadership is responsible for transforming human behavior towards economic
development. Previously, the importance of cultural behavior has been neglected in
economic development analyses by the two major development paradigms with the
assumption that economic rationality is not compatible with cultural subjectivity 41 This
work has demonstrated that this perception needs to be re-examined. This dissertation has
shown the types of cultural attributes that are essential in order to promote and achieve
economic development in sub-Saharan Africa countries.

39 Doe, “Economic Development o f Francophone Africa."
40 Casson, “Cultural Determinants."
41 Ibid.
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Besides leadership and cultural variables, the study also has introduced the
colonial argument in a new way. It has used the colonial argument as an explanatory tool
to account for the moral difference between postcolonial leaderships in Botswana and
Ghana. Through the moral obligation lens, the colonial difference argument helps us to
explain why Botswana leaders, through their fiduciary responsibility, have interests in the
welfare of their people and are therefore psychologically prone to refrain from excessive
corruption that negatively impact a nation’s economic development. This contribution to
the literature is important because colonialism in Africa has a lwa y s been looked at with

tunnel vision and without distinction to how the differential impact of colonial
methodologies on Africa’s socio-economic development.42 Such a narrow approach
clouds the understanding as to why a country like Botswana is economically improving
and countries like Nigeria and Democratic Republic of Congo, both with comparably
larger mineral and human resources, are socio-economically impoverished.
Finally, it attempts to use culture to explain the extent to which countries
progress unevenly towards economic development. Scholars, such Huntington
recommends such an explanation. By using culture to explain economic differences
between Botswana and Ghana, this work offers a more comprehensive explanation for the
actual experiences of both countries. By introducing the above three variables, leadership,
culture, and colonialism and how they impact economic development in sub-Saharan
Africa, this work makes an original contribution to the development literature.

4' Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.
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IMPLICATIONS AND RECOM ENDATIONS

The implications of this work can be many for different segments of the African
and non-African communities alike. For the African nationalists, one implication of this
study is that in order to achieve development to improve the living standards of Africans,
due cognizance must be taken of the depth and enormity of African leadership problems.
Another implication is that in order for them to assist in resolving economic problems,
the African nationalists need to engage in organizing their communities to pressure
governments to embrace, foster, and cultivate high moral s tandar ds . In addition, they also
need to pressure leaders to implement policies and programs that will enhance the
economic well being of the people and reconcile, rather than divide and alienate, diverse
ethnic groups.
For the current leaders, the first implication is that they need to steer themselves
towards high moral standards and embark on strategies that will enhance institutional
efficiency and minimize official corruption in government. It is urgent that the leaders
institute monitoring and auditing mechanisms to hold themselves and their officials
accountable of misusing public financial resources and abusing their offices. In
governance, leader will need to institute policies that enhance transparency and enable
their economic institutions to communicate clearly to avoid inefficiencies and
redundancies. The social implications for current leaders are great. It is imperative for
them to modify their current psychological mindset by developing a renaissance
consciousness committed to their citizens, rather than one committed to ethnic
preferences or close associates. Most importantly, there is an implicit mandatory
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implication that the leaders engage in instituting democratic systems with respect for
human rights.
In the productive sector, the implications for the sub-Saharan Africa leaders are
also significant. Regional leaders must adopt a long-term vision towards sustainable
development as opposed to one emphasizing growth policies alone.4'5This direction will
require that they embark on transforming their economies from focusing solely on raw
material production to ones that include industrial production. In order to do that, it is
urgent for them to abandon their Senghorian conviction and embrace scientific culture.
That can be done only with an understanding that there are two aspects of culture,
namely, the reserve zone and the universal zone. The former offers them and their
societies self-identity or actualization, while the latter will offer self-improvement and
greater human quality.44 The knowledge o f this distinction will enable them to pursue the
acquisition of scientific culture from the universal zone without the fear of alienating
their self-identity.
Certainly, the enormity of African debt and lack of financial resources have
always been the hindrances of economic development in sub-Sahara Africa.43 One
alternative approach to minimize this financial stumbling block is for sub-Saharan
African leaders to divert military expenditures to the acquisition of scientific culture. To
attain scientific culture, financial resources need to be allocated to education. Specifically,
the money should be channeled into research and development at the domestic level. The

43 Todaro, Economic Development.
44 Wiredu, “Problems in Africa's Self-Definition.”
45 Cheru, The Silent Revolution in Africa.
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implication for development agencies is that there is a need to re-examine leaderships'
role, not only in regards to their governance abilities, but also in terms of their behavior
as social engineers and in terms of the political cultures they establish and legitimize.

Future Research
Future scholarship is need in various areas. First, our discussion has personified
the leadership function in terms of a simple individual in a group. Even though that was
done for analytical simplicity, in reality, not all groups have this kind of leadership.
Second, in some instances, our analysis has been general and the central feature that is
assumed to influence economic performance has been viewed in abstract terms. The third
limit of this research is due to the fact that in the analysis we have assigned cultural
legitimization solely to leadership. Though this makes theoretical sense, it maybe too
simplistic, especially, in these days o f high information technology where people are
influenced by information from everywhere and not just that is promulgated by their
leaders.
Based on the universal applicability of leadership, culture, and economic
development that has been argued in this research, any future research pertaining to the
above areas will help advance the principle concept of this study. Until any of the above
research initiative is undertaken, it is fair to note that this research illustrates the
importance of leadership and culture in economic development. Hence, achieving
sustainable economic development in sub-Sahara Africa will be difficult, if not
impossible, until leaders emerge to establish the appropriate prerequisite socio-scientific
and high moral cultures.
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